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TRANSNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS,

TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT TRENDS
By LAWRENCE C. MCQUADE*
Mr. McQuade's article is an elaboration of a speech he delivered at the Western Regional Conference on Transnational
Transactions, held at the University of Denver Law Center in
April 1967. In it he discusses the impact of technological change
on society. He examines four aspects of technology which bear
directly on transnational business, and suggests that the need for
a legal and institutional framework which will promote more effective transnational use of technology poses a challenge to the
lawyer to make full and beneficial use of his creative talents.

"The discovery of phlogiston is but a first step toward an endless march of scientific progress and social turmoil."
- Axophinius, circa fifth century B.C.
INTRODUCTION

T

HE dynamics of the law reflect - sometimes too slowly - the
dynamics of society. Nowhere does this idea manifest itself
more clearly than in the era of science and technology. The iconoclasm of science at its best puts society on its mettle. American businessmen, at least, accept the challenge with skill and pleasure. They
pour forth ingenuity, organization, and energy to move science's byproducts into the stream of our economy. In this process of creativity,
the law has a responsibility to facilitate these economic and social
processes by providing a degree of order within which creativity can
prevail over confusion.
Out of technology - that vigorous offspring of science - flows
an impulse to change and innovation in commerce and industry. For
the businessman of breadth and imagination, it opens new horizons.
For the self-satisfied and the stand-patters, it poses a peril to markets
and customers which can no longer be taken for granted. For the
lawyer, it calls for adaptation and change at a rate fast enough to
*Assistant Secretary for Domestic and International Business, U.S. Department of
Commerce.
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foster the new, yet moderate enough to preserve a responsible measure
of stability and respect for the virtues of values which have endured
the tests of experience.
The dynamic tradition of America welcomes the challenge of
technology. Four of its aspects bear directly upon transnational business and, hence, upon the lawyer with clients dealing across national
lines: (1) the impact on trade; (2) the psychological-political-practical imbroglio it creates between the United States and Europe; (3)
the promise it can hold for the economic problems of the less developed world; and (4) the legal and institutional framework needed
to foster more effective use of technology transnationally.
I. INTERNATIONAL TRADE

First, science and technology keep changing the pattern and relative progress in international trade. The impact of technology on the
pattern and progress of international trade has never been stronger
than in this new era of astronautics, electronics, and nucleonics.
Obviously this is true in the case of faster and better communications and transport. Containerization, refrigeration, pipelines and
other new transport techniques keep altering practicalities, costs, and
trade patterns - opening up new opportunities on a worldwide basis
for the businessman in inland areas like Denver - and threatening
those who fail to keep up with the times.
Science and technology, of course, continually alter the kind and
quality of goods and services which enter into international markets.
Close to half of the dollar volume of our expanding United States
exports, for example, now consists of such "high technology" products as machinery, transport equipment, and chemicals1 - all made
by highly skilled, highly paid American workers. The dynamics of
this process have profound effects upon our trade balance and our
trade pattern.
For those in and out of Government concerned with the health
of the nation's balance of payments, this dynamic has important implications.2 As a practical matter, the world-wide involvements of the
United States mean that we need, over a period of time, a trade surplus on the order of $5 billion or more in order to pay for recurrent
I In

1966, United States export performance was particularly strong in products
incorporating advanced engineering features, such as computers, heating and cooling
equipment and pumps. Shipments of these items rose from 20% to 30% over the
previous year. The increases might have been even larger had not military requirements and civilian demand in the United States market reduced export capabilities.
Exports Set Rapid Pace But Trade Surplus Shrinks, INT'L COM., Feb. 20, 1967, at 50.
2 The balance of payments dimension is outlined in McQuade, Corporate Voluntary
Balance of Payments Program and the Lawyer, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROADSTRUCTURES AND SAFEGUARDS 205 (V. Cameron ed. 1966).
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outlays for the national security, overseas travel by our citizens, and
the like. But, our balance of trade has met this objective in only two
of the last five years. In addition, the United States share of the
total value of free world trade has been declining, from 22.5 percent
in 1954 to 19 percent in 1966.'
Technological innovations and applications support our broad
effort to expand our exports and reduce the deficit in our balance of
international payments. In 1965, the United States earned an estimated $650 million from other countries in royalty payments for
technical know-how, patents, and other intangible property licensed
abroad - about 4V2 times the $144 million we paid others.4
Furthermore, technology, by raising productivity and lowering
costs per unit of production, helps American industry compete more
effectively in world markets. Production efficiency contributes to
our high exports of such products as aircraft, computers and pharmaceuticals.
Technology is one of the elements of competitive strength in
world markets. But the developer of the technology may or may not
win the prizes. Research and development comprise only a part of the
innovative process. The payoff in trade accrues to those who carry
through to the market.
Japan illustrates the point. Japanese industry spends relatively
little on basic research.5 It adapts and builds upon the results of foreign research and development, both through the purchase of technical know-how and through production by foreign-owned subsidiaries. For example, the United States, the original source of transistor technology, sold $10 million worth of radios in world markets
in 1966 but bought $94 million in transistor radios from Japan alone.8
Some people say that when a nation runs a deficit in its technical
balance of payments - meaning royalties, licensing fees, and other
payments for technical know-how - it suffers both economic and
trade disadvantages as against nations with technical payments surpluses. This type of simple analysis is faulty because it overlooks the
compensating benefits of resulting import savings and export gains.
These are often difficult to quantify but if measured and put into the
3Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1, at 59.
4 See Travaglini, Licensing U.S. Know-How Abroad Is Increasing, INT'L COM., July
25, 1966, at 2; reprintedin U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN BUSINESS PRACTICES
at 26 (Apr. 1967).
5 $10.6 million in 1964, which represents 1.7% of national income. See The Japan
Development Bank, Facts and Figures on the Japanese Economy, 1966, at 167.
6 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. IMPORTS OF MERCHANDISE FOR CONSUMPTION,

REP. FT 125, at 159 (Dec.

1966).

1966); U.S. EXPORTS, REP. FT 410, at 398-99 (Dec.
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payments vs. receipts equation the balance of advantage may be found
to be with the receiver of the technology rather than the seller. 7
Japan, with a continuing deficit in its technical balance of payments, is enjoying a rate of economic growth that substantially exceeds that of the United States.8 The fact that it has succeeded in
becoming one of the world's leading trading nations appears to disprove the assumption that a technical payments deficit must be a
disadvantageous factor in international commerce. Japan's experience
indicates that it is not necessary for a country to spend large sums on
basic research in order to succeed in export. It can attain excellent
results simply by buying foreign technology -possibly at less expense. Moreover, it demonstrates that follow-on efforts by management are essential to exploit fully the commercial advantages of new
scientific and technological developments. For this genius we look
to the American businessman to pursue world markets with the same
zest and intelligence he displays at home.
II. POLITICS, TECHNOLOGY, TRADE AND INVESTMENT

The second issue relevant to transnational business operations
raised by technology is political and psychological as well as economic. Resting on the alleged superiority of the United States in
matters of science and technology, this political phenomenon is expressed in graphic terms, "Brain Drain" and "Technological Gap."9
These terms lend emotion rather than clarity to the genuine feeling
that the United States somehow has an unfair advantage over others
simply because of technological excellence.
Recently a British professor called upon the United States to
prohibit American companies from recruiting skilled manpower
abroad. The numbers of European researchers, scientists and engineers leaving for greener American pastures are counted with alarm
and it is noted that fewer American scientists have gone to Europe
7 The Secretary-General of the United Nations has initiated a study of the role and

impact of international licensing arrangements in the establishment and development
of selected industries in various countries. Financing of Economic Development: Promotion of Private Foreign Investment in Developing Countries - Summary and Conclusions, U.N. Doc. E/4293 (1967).
8 The percentage increase per year in real Gross National Product for 1960-1965 was
4.7 percent for the United States and 9.7 percent for Japan. For comparative data on
other countries, see Table 29 in COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS ANN. REP., accompanying ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, at 171 (1967).
9

A bibliography could be compiled on these two terms alone. ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

EFFORT IN WaSTERN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION (1965),
provides an objective evaluation of the pros and cons of technological disparities.

(Summarized in Research and Development: A Major Atlantic Issue, EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, Mar. 1966, at 8.) For a good round-up of the relevant issues see
Guccione, That U.S.-European Technology Gap: It Stems from Deep European
Roots, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, May 8, 1967, at 90; Technology Gap Upsets Europe,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1967, at 1, cols. 2 and 4.
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to do research. The net loss is regarded as further evidence that the
"gap" is getting wider, and "if allowed to continue, jeopardizes
Europe's economic future."'" For example, Amintore Fanfani, Italy's
Foreign Minister, has called for a ten-year cooperative plan for technological development to help redress the alleged technological imbalance between American and European industry."
To add to the confusion, there are facts stemming from the size
and effectiveness of many new American investments in Europe
which are disconcerting to many Europeans. For example, the total
sales of General Motors has exceeded the Gross National Product of
Belgium.' 2 In Germany, Americans own over 40 percent of the petroleum industry. The preeminence of the United States in computers
is but feebly challenged so far by any other country. s United States
owned or controlled companies produce over one-third of Europe's
auto sales,' 4 yet our total investment in Western Europe is modest,' 5
and we account for only a minor percentage of total business in any
single European country. To compound things further, American
companies enter into overseas markets with the same vigor they use
at home. In some industries, the arrival of energetic, iconoclastic
American management techniques into Europe has rudely jolted the
comfortable cartels with their "breakfast-table agreements" and oldfashioned, gentlemanly courtesies among competitors.
All of these various ingredients somehow relate to each other.
While still a murky phenomenon and related to more than technology, a European attitude of concern toward United States firms
and toward the United States exists. Both American businessmen and
the American Government need to worry about it. Europeans ascribe
the so-called "gap" to the disruption of World War II, the postwar
"brain drain," and the advantages accruing to United States technological progress through our large mass market, our extensive re10

U.S.-Europe Gap in Science and Technology Widening, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
Nov. 1966, at 10, 11.
11N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1966, at 12, col. 5.
12According to STANDARD AND POOR'S STANDARD CORPORATION DESCRIPTIONS 8657
(1966), General Motors' 1965 sales exceeded $20 billion. The GNP of Belgium was
$16.7 billion. INT'L FINANCIAL STATISTICS, Mar. 1967, at 54.
13 The computer industry has been watched closely as a sign that "European countries
risk being squeezed out of the science-based industries." The Wilson Community,
222 THE ECONOMIST 197 (Jan. 21, 1967). The Economist comments: "Itis not
surprising that American corporations have virtually taken over the computer industries of Germany, France and Italy, and nearly knocked out the British industry too
in 1964." Id. However, the explosion in the technological application of computerization is probably unique. For a summary of the development and technical extension of the electronic computer see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1474, TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS IN MAJOR AMERICAN INDUSTRIES 3 (1966).
14 Based on statistics from Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc., Statistical Dep't,
World Motor Vehicle Data 1965, Nov. 1966, at 22-64.
15 The total direct long-term private investment was $13.9 billion in 1965. See Pizer &
Cutler, Foreign Investments, 1965-66, SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus., Sept. 1966, at 30.
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substantial United States Government

support of military and space research and development. They say
they cannot maintain their economic growth rate in the future if the
"technological gap" continues or widens. The Europeans obviously
are concerned, and the issues they raise are of concern to us and
warrant our careful study and attention.
As a starting point, the President has charged Dr. Hornig, his
Science Advisor, to head a group within the Government to study
the real meaning of the so-called "technological gap." Under Secretary of Commerce J. Herbert Hollomon serves on this group. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
has also started its own study. Out of these efforts should emerge
some facts to supplant the histrionics currently in vogue and point
the way to answers as to whether there is an across-the-board "technological gap," as the Europeans seem to think, or whether there are
various kinds and degrees of technological disparities. The answer
certainly does not lie in mere scientific or technological terms.'"
A test based on spending on research and development amounting to about 3 percent of our .sNr- inuiCat that United
States industry is much more oriented in this direction than its European competitors. While the United Kingdom spends a healthy 2.6
percent of its GNP on research,' France is spending barely half this
amount and other European countries spend a good deal less.'" The
percentage differences seem less significant, however, if you consider
that about half of our research and development expenditures serve
military and space purposes, while Europeans spend relatively little
in this field.' 9 On the measure of expenditures for research and
development which are of direct benefit in upgrading the technical
level of the industrial sector of the economy, we are probably fairly
16 Guccione sums it up in the following terms:

In essence, it is small markets, small companies, relatively little availability
of risk capital, old-fashioned management practices, resistance to change on
the part of both producers and consumers, basic weaknesses in educational
systems when it comes to science and technology, and debilitating anti-trust

and fiscal policies that are the reasons for an unhappy European state of
affairs. The technology gap is merely a symptom of it.

17

Guccione, supra note 9, at 92.
In 1964-1965 Britain spent £756.6 million ($2,118.5 million) or 2.6 percent of the

GNP on research and development. COUNCIL FOR SCIENTIFIC POLICY, REPORT ON
SCIENCE POLICY, CMND.No. 3007, HMSO (1966).
18 For detailed consideration of comparative expenditures for research and development,
see Quinn, Technological Competition: Europe vs. U.S., HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug.
1966, at 113.

19 The McGraw-Hill survey of 1966 research and development expenditures revealed
that federal financing accounted for 54 percent or $8.4 billion of the industry total.
More than half the research and development is concentrated in two industries:
aerospace, and electrical machinery and communications. Washington Post, May 12,
1967, at D8, cols. 4-5. See also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT,

THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORT IN WESTERN EUROPE,

NORTH AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION, ch. IV.
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even with the Europeans. There is, of course, some spin-off from
United States military and space research and development as well,
but its impact on the economy in this regard is inadvertent and perhaps less than is generally assumed. Moreover, it is a costly way to
introduce new technology into industry.20
There is no direct correlation between the size of such expenditures and rate of economic growth or trade expansion. Research and
development spending obviously cannot explain why many European
economies have grown faster than our United States economy in recent years, or why our United States exporters are encountering stiff
competition from European businessmen in many world markets.
Neither does it explain why the United Kingdom economy, with relatively higher research and development expenditures than other European countries, has advanced less rapidly than its continental colleagues. Europe does not in fact suffer any great dearth of technological innovation and know-how. Some European firms enjoy
large foreign currency earnings from the United States and elsewhere
for the use of their technological know-how and services.2 ' If there
is a lag, it lies in the application rather than in the possession of
technology.
Such disparities as may exist between European and American
industry cannot be properly considered except in the context of other
differences between Europe and the United States: for example, in
(1) amount of capital investment per worker; (2) degree of mechanization; (3) availability of resources; (4) size of business enterprises;
(5) productivity; (6) development of mass markets; (7) size of the
educational base; and (8) work habits and attitudes.
Industrial management policies and initiative in using know-how
as factors in technological progress may well be the crucial factors,
as the Japanese example suggests. A speaker from abroad broached
this view at the Symposium on Technology and World Trade, held
at the National Bureau of Standards last November. He said:
To my mind there is a gap, but I'm not certain that the reason
the gap is there is to be found in the technological field. I believe
that the fundamental reason for the gap is more a question of
mentality and attitude....
Science and technology are and have been present in Europe
many years. What we would like is the attitude necessary for the
20 Sixteen percent of companies surveyed by McGraw-Hill answered yes and 84 percent

21

no when asked if they had been able to take advantage of new technology resulting
from federally financed research and development. Washington Post, May 12, 1967,
at D8, col. 5.
Impressive testimony to this effect will be found in advertisements which Imperial
Chemical Industries, of the United Kingdom, has been running in the British press.
ICI says: "We do a brisk trade in brainwavesthe ideas thought up by our backroom boys. Last year these earned us £37,000 a day. That's what other people paid
us for our manufacturing know-how and the rights to make our products - and they
paid most of it in foreign currencies." 72 NEW STATESMAN 311 (Sept. 2, 1966).
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creation of more big industries22with leaders who know how to make
use of science and technology.

It is reasonable to assume that our current studies will uncover
some "technological gaps" - some of which may be in favor of
Europe - but I doubt that we will find many, if any, which can be
defined as strictly "technological." My guess is that the basic difficulties may be outside the area of technology.
As to remedies, some people have advanced the idea that our
Government might engage in a give-away program of technology.
This, of course, is out of the question. It neglects to take account of
the private ownership of most United States industrial technology
and fails to come to grips with what probably is one of the basic
problems: the limitations on effectively and economically transplanting United States technology outside the United States market and
resource context. Except for the results of government-financed
research and development, private enterprise owns and controls
United States technology. It is often protected by patents but just
as often it is unpatented know-how, developed and perfected by its
owners. The Government could not give it away.
On the other hand, we have long cooperated with the European
nations in many fields of activity, including the sharing of technology: (1) in the OECD; (2) in the exchange of scientific and
technical information through NATO; (3) in close cooperation about
atomic energy through the European Atomic Energy Commission
(EURATOM); (4) in the European Nuclear Energy Agency; (5)
in the European Space Research Organization; and (6) in the European Launcher Development Organization. We share peaceful scientific data and technological know-how with other nations, including
the European countries, through the United Nations and its specialized organizations, and through many other international groups.
Furthermore, much government-financed research and development in military, space, atomic energy, and other fields has been
made accessible to anyone in the United States or abroad. Unless
the information is specifically related to our national security or has
been developed by industrial contractors on their own, it can be purchased at nominal cost from the Commerce Department's Clearing
House for Federal Scientific and Technical Information. The Clearing House was set up expressly to make government research and
development results available as widely as possible.
However, even a technology-sharing program cannot really solve
Europe's problems if it turns out to be basically non-technological.
2

Robert Major, Director of the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research, quoted in NAT'L BUREAU OF STANDARDS, MISC. PUB. No. 284, TECHNOLOGY AND WORLD TRADE: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM

107-08

(1967).
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If entrepreneurial, capitalization, or other difficulties are involved,
only the European nations themselves may be able to take corrective
action. There are clear signs that the real nature of the problem is
understood by many Europeans, but their efforts tend to be overlooked in the vain hunt for facile solutions.2 3 It is a question of
practicality - not of willingness or unwillingness to cooperate. Our
most useful contribution in this instance may be to help identify the
real disparities and their fundamental causes, so that it will be possible to determine what kind of action is most appropriate.
III.

GROWTH OF LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The third major transnational business aspect of science and
technology is its impact upon the economic growth prospects of the
less developed countries.24 It is quickly apparent that the greatest
"gap" in technology and its dimensions is that between the industrialized countries of the world on the one hand and the less developed
countries on the other. One of our national policy objectives is to
contribute to the economic growth of these developing nations. As
President Johnson has repeatedly emphasized, we want to help these
countries help themselves. One way to do this is to help them achieve
the technological progress they want and need to advance their economic development, living standards, and international trade. Sturdy,
self-reliant, progressing states contribute to greater stability and security in the world. Their progress serves our own and other nations'
best interests. It expands the opportunities for mutually profitable
trade and investment.
What can be done to raise the level of technology in the less
developed countries? As an early objective, create an economic environment conducive to innovation. This means change - and change
can be painful. As of today, the kind and amount of technology that
can effectively be put to work vary from country to country, industry
to industry, even product to product. The needs, objectives, and
development stage of each nation must be taken into account.
For example, a licensing agreement has been signed in Mexico
for float glass production which will give Mexico a factory that is
23

A realistic diagnosis of the ailment and a prescription for its cure will be found in
France, "Technology Gap" Demands "Hard Choices" of Europe, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar. 1967, at 18. Defense Secretary McNamara has cited education as a
handicap to European economic growth, pointing out that 40% of the United States
college-age population is attending college, as against 10% in the U.K., 15% in
France, and 7% in Germany and Italy. Address by Secretary McNamara, Millsaps
College Convocation, Jackson, Mississippi, Feb. 24, 1967, reported in 33 VITAL
SPEECHES 357 (1967).

2 See generally The Encouragement and Protection of Investment in Developing Countries, 11 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY [INT'L & COMP. L.Q.]
SuPP. PUB. No. 3 (1962).
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far more modern than some glass plants we have in the United
States. The float process for making glass is a capital-intensive,
high-technology technique that might be completely unsuited to the
needs, skills, and resources of some other countries. Many developing countries could benefit much more from technological investment
in agriculture. Indeed, the miracle of progress in American agriculture outstrips our success in industry. This is the forthcoming frontier in the less developed countries, which are rapidly becoming more,
rather than less, dependent on non-domestic food supplies. Latin
America, Africa, and Asia exported a net annual average of 5 million
tons of grain in 1934-1938. Today they import some 78 million
tons a year.
For some less developed countries, the purchase of technological
know-how - through patent royalty and licensing arrangements,
joint ventures, and capital investment by the business firms of other
countries - might be the easiest, quickest, and least expensive way
to obtain the desired results. Others may simply want to buy the
products of foreign technology. Absolute technological equality is
not essential. From the standpoint of trade expansion, it is not even
beneficial. If every country were as advanced in computer technology
as the United States, for example, there would be little trade in
computers. Technological inequality in the sense of differing fields
of specialization actually stimulates trade.
What is essential is the opportunity to obtain and develop technology. The less developed countries say the technology they desperately need exists in the world, but it is too often available to them
at a cost and on terms they cannot meet. The technology they want
is owned largely by private companies, so the opportunities for government action by the United States and other industrialized freeenterprise countries are necessarily limited.
A. Private Investment in Less Developed Countries
There is a wide array of ways by which the United States encourages American private investment in the less developed countries.
In addition to the AID program, the Commerce Department sends
out trade missions to develop business and investment opportunities
for American industry, circulates trade and investment leads to American businessmen, and provides many other business services that
contribute to the transfer of American technology to less developed
countries. There may be possibilities for additional action. Last year
the National Export Expansion Council, which advises the Secretary
of Commerce on international business policies and programs, formed
an Action Committee to come up with suggestions. Recently the
proposals of this Action Committee on U.S. Trade and Investment
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in Developing Countries were approved by the NEEC and made
public."
The Committee suggested, among other things, that (1) United
States firms should step up the level and quality of their trade and
investment efforts in the less developed countries. Since 70 percent
of the world's total population lives in less developed areas, the
Committee considers it short-sighted to give them marginal attention.
(2) The less developed countries themselves should make new and
objective reviews of the unique contributions of capital, technology,
and skills which business firms from the United States and other
industrialized countries can make to their development objectives.
In the light of these reviews, their governments should then seek to
develop programs which will act to minimize barriers and maximize
26
incentives to potential foreign private investment.
B. InternationalAssistance to Less Developed Countries
Of all the things the less developed countries can do to improve
their investment climate, one of the most important is to provide
basic legal protection for industrial property rights.27 To this end,
the United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual
Property (BIRPI) has developed a Model Law for Developing
Countries on Inventions." Any less developed country can adopt
or adapt this model law. There are options on controversial questions, so each country can frame the law to fit its own needs. BIRPI
has also prepared a model trademark law, which will soon be published. Especially adapted to the needs of countries with basically
non-industrialized economies, the model covers trademarks, trade
names and unfair competition.2"
Another new international effort to help the less developed
countries is being made through the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), established by the U.N. General
Contained in Report of the Action Comm. of the Nat'l Export Expansion Council,
Trade and Investment in Developing Countries, Apr. 3, 1967.
26 New studies of the nature of technological change, and of the transfer process are
appearing rapidly. The U.N. Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas produced a valuable series of
papers on the subject from technical specialists, planners and policy-makers. The
United States papers for the Conference have been published (U.S. Government Printing Office 1963). On the methodology of technological change, see M. Boretsky,
Comparative Progress in Technology, Productivity, and Economic Efficiency: U.S.S.R.

25

vs. U.S.A., in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY, studies prepared for the
JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).

27 The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, U.N.
Doc. E/3861/Rev. 1 (1964).
28 UNITED INTERNATIONAL BUREAUX FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIRPI PUB. No. 801(E), MODEL LAW FOR DEVELOPING COUNTKIFS ON
INVENTIONS (1965).

2 See Offner, Draft Model Law for Developing Countries on Marks, Trade Names,
Indications of Source, and Unfair Competition - An Appraisal, 56 THE TRADEMARK
Rs P. 831 (Nov. 1966).
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Assembly last December to replace the U.N. Center for Industrial
Development. UNIDO is an action group. Under its Special Industrial Services Program, it sends trained consultants out to less developed countries requesting assistance on specific problems, such as
plant management and quality control. The U.N. has provided such
technical assistance in the agricultural and health fields for many
years. Now it is extending its effort into the industrial area.
UNIDO is also organizing an international symposium on industrial development which will be the first international meeting
of governments to concentrate on the problems and prospects of
industrial development. The three-week symposium, open to all U.N.
member nations, will be held in Athens, starting November 29, 1967.
In March 1968, in New Delhi, another U.N. meeting, the second
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
will focus on the problems of the less developed countries in expanding their exports and obtaining technological know-how.80
IV. A

LAWYER'S MENU: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, STANDARDS

A fourth issue is how to enact laws and build institutions which
will maximize the benefits which science and technology - to a great
extent through business - can make available to people. Here is
where many of the lawyer's skills come into play.A'

A. Patents
Variations in patent law and practice from country to country
often result in duplication of efforts, uncertainties, and unnecessary
expenses which impede, if not discourage patent protection, thereby
delaying the transfer of technology from one nation to another."
The Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Union),8 of which the United States has been a member
since 1887, sets forth the basic rights of patent applicants in the
member states, regardless of an applicant's country of origin. But
in today's world trade it is not practical to continue to operate on
the principle of territoriality which necessitates separate applications
in each country in order to obtain adequate protection of those rights.
30 A general statement on the problems and some possible solutions in this area is
presented in the U.N. report preparatory to the first UNCTAD Conference, Towards
a New Trade Policy for Development, U.N. Doc. E/CoNF. 46/3 (1964).
31 For a study of the innovative process and the legal and other circumstances which
foster invention and innovation, see DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: ITs ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT (1967) (referred to as the "Charpie
Report" after the name of Robert A. Charpie, Chairman of the Panel, an advisory
committee of private citizens reporting to the Secretary of Commerce).
32 The importance of patent policy in overall corporate planning is described in Shipman, International PatentPlanning, HAv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 56.
33 Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372
'(1887-1889), T.S. No. 379; revised at Lisbon, Oct. 31, 1958, [1962) 1 U.S.T. 1,
T.I.A.S. No. 4931.
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The United States is participating with other nations and with
BIRPI,8 1 the Secretariat for the Paris Union, in expanding interna-

tional patent cooperation to make it easier to obtain adequate patent
protection in both domestic and foreign markets. For example, active
steps are being taken to develop a patent cooperation treaty to provide for a single international filing which could be utilized in lieu
of the multiple, duplicate, foreign national filings now required.
In addition, the United States Patent Office is engaged in a series of
search exchange programs with a number of other countries. Patent
Office experts are also studying the international classification system, to see how it and the United States system might be harmonized.
Other programs, developed to assist the United States Patent Office,
and American attorneys and businessmen, could also benefit their
counterparts in other countries. Present activity in the field of documentation, which includes plans for improved accessibility of published technological data, is one example of such programs.
In order to provide a suitable basis in our domestic patent law
for this program of expanded international patent cooperation, and
to modernize the United States patent system, President Johnson has
proposed a general revision of the patent laws. The Patent Reform
Act of 1967, 3 5 transmitted by the President to the Congress on February 21, 1967, would bring about the first major revision of these
laws in more than 130 years.
The proposals are based upon the Report of the President's
Commission on the Patent System. 6 The Commission was appointed
by the President in 1965 to study ways "to ensure that the patent
system will be more effective in serving the public interest

....

31

Ten leading citizens representing the business, scientific and academic communities and the bar served on the Commission together
with representatives of the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
Defense, the Administrator of the Small Business Administration,
and the Director of the National Science Foundation. The Report
of the Commission testifies eloquently to the fruitfulness of interaction between informed businessmen, the bar, and members of other
disciplines. Based on the practical experience of their companies, the
business members were able to delineate lines of approach in the
Bureaux Internationaux Reunis pour la Protection de la Propriete Intellectuelle,
Geneva, Switzerland, the administering body of several industrial property and
copyright conventions.
35S. 1042, H.R. 5924, H.R. 6043, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
34

36 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, REPORT, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS

OF . . . USEFUL ARTS IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY (1966).

See O'Brien,
An Appraisal of the Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System, 49
J. OF THE PATENT OFFICE SOC'Y 139 (1967), which includes the text of the
legislation proposed and a sectional analysis.
3 Exec. Order No. 11,215, 3 C.F.R. 123-25 (Supp. 1965).
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interest of simplification and improvement of industrial property
rights protection which heretofore did not always coincide with the
preferences and traditions which mold the patent lawyer's opinion on
these issues.
Acting Under Secretary of Commerce Hollomon, urging enactment of the patent proposals, pointed out that basic revision of the
system was essential "for it to serve effectively to stimulate the development and public disclosure of new technology and to provide
incentives rather than barriers, to international trade.'"'"
B. Trademarks
In the trademark field, we are exploring the possibility of developing a sound and workable international program that will provide better protection than is now available. We must have adequate
protection for United States trademarks. They are valuable export
assets.39
The most important aspect of the problem is the number of
jurisdictions in which a proposed mark must be searched, cleared,
and filed. Separate actions in more than 150 different jurisdictions
are required for American companies to extend protection of a brand
name to the rest of the world.4" An international filing procedure,
commonly called the Madrid Arrangement, was established in 1896
under the Madrid Agreement for International Registration of Trademarks, but the United States is not a member of this treaty. The
filing system is still operating successfully for 21 countries, principally European, but a United States trademark owner can obtain
registration under the system only if he has a bona fide industrial or
commercial establishment - branch or subsidiary - in a member
41
country.
C. Standards
The American businessman who has been kept out of a foreign
market because his product - quality and performance notwithstand38 Statement of J. Herbert Hollomon, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce, Hearings
on H.R. 5924 before Subcomm. No. 3, House Comm. on the judiciary, 90th Cong.,
ist Sess. (1967).
3

See

E. OFFNER,

INTERNATIONAL

TRADEMARK

PROTECTION

(1965);

Lightman,

Trademarks as "Silent Salesman," INT'L CoM., Oct. 28, 1963, at 2.
40 See St. Landau, The Handling of Trademarks Abroad by United States Companies,
56 THE TRADEMARK REP. 207 (Apr. 1966).
41 Consideration is being given to United States adherence. The positions for and
against adherence are propounded in 56 THE TRADEMARK REP. No. 5 (May 1966).
(See especially Allen, A Report on the Madrid Agreement, at 290, for a discussion
of the advantages of adherence to American industry, the effect on domestic trademark practice, and cost implications; and Ladas, The Madrid Agreement for the
International Registration of Trademarks and the United States, at 346, for a position
against adherence.)
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ing - does not meet foreign standards is well aware that standards
can be a crucial factor in international trade. Various groups, including the Panel on Engineering and Commodity Standards of the Commerce Technical Advisory Board (the LaQue Committee) ,42 have
suggested that the role of the United States in international standardization should be strengthened. Unlike the other industrialized countries, the United States is not represented officially by government
delegates in international standardization organizations. This means
that we cannot effectively encourage the international adoption of
standards which would be more harmonious with American technological and industrial practices. Legislation has been proposed to
improve this situation. An international standardization bill pending
in Congress would provide grants to qualified standardization organizations for participation in the international standards process and
43
for information activities.
D. Institutions
Free trade arrangements and common markets provide another
important possible step toward faster use of technology to raise economic levels. The European Economic Community and European
Free Trade Area in Europe have opened up wider markets, as we
hope the proposed Latin American Common Market will do in Latin
America. Such markets provide a non-technical but very important
boost to technically based agriculture or industry. Within these markets, much can be done by legal reform to make conditions suitable
for innovation to succeed."' Attorneys in private practice and lawyers of the EEC Commission staff are coping with antitrust problems
as the European Common Market moves ahead toward unification
of national laws. 5 Common Market lawyers are also working to42 The major recommendation of the industry group was to establish a new federally

chartered institute to coordinate voluntary standardization activities in the United
States. The report of the panel ("The LaQue Report") is available from the Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Springfield, Virginia 22151 '(Rep. Nos. PB 166811 and PB 16681).
4 S. 997, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
"Among other innovations, the Central American states, for example, have entered
into a treaty permitting "integration industries" and making valuable privileges
available to companies operating in the area. Convenio sobre el Regimen de Industrias
Centroamericanas de Integracion, signed by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, June 10, 1958; Protocol, Jan. 29, 1963; INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE ESTUDIOS JURIDICOS INTERNACIONALES, INSTRUMENToS RELATIVOS A

LA INTEGRACION ECONOMICA EN AMERICA LATINA 57 (1964).

0See Gaudet, The Common Market and the Law,

INFORMATION SERVICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNrrY Topics No. 4 (reprinted from ANNALES
DE DROIT ET DE SCIENCES POLTIQUEs, Tome XVI, No. 2, Brussels, 1961); Grisoli,

The Impact of the European Economic Community on the Movement of the Unification of Law, 26 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 418 (1961).
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ward a Community-wide corporation law,"' a common patent law
and a common trademark law.47 This year work is being started to
harmonize taxes under a common system of tax on the value added
48
at each stage of manufacture.
On December 17, 1966, the U.N. General Assembly acted unanimously to establish a United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law to unify and harmonize divergent national laws in this
important field. The Commission will hold its first session in 1968.
Since it will be working in fields affecting both national law and
trade practices, its activities merit close attention by the corporate
49
bar and lawyers generally.
CONCLUSION

Changes through the world are vastly enlarging the dimensions
of international law - and the role of the international lawyer. The
scientific and business ingenuity of the United States has helped us
achieve our preeminent position in world trade. We need these export earnings to help pay for our broad international responsibilities.
Differences in industrial effectiveness between the United States and
Western Europe merit thoughtful analysis so we can better underLAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 45TH CONFERENCE at 43
(1952); Conard, Corporate Fusion in the Common Market, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 573
(1965-1966) ; Thompson, The Project for a Commercial Company of European Type,
10 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 851 (1961); Legal Disparities Obstruct Intra-Community
Mergers, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, June 1966, at 6; Fligler, Multinational Public
Enterprises, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, June 1967.
Continental European literature on this subject is extensive. E.g., EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, SuPP. BULL. No. 9/10-1966, MEMORANDUM BY THE

46 INTERNATIONAL

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF EUROPEAN COMPANIES; WANG, DIE EUROPAISCHE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT IN DER

E.W.G. (1964); Dorat des Monts, Vers un droit europeen des societes commerciales, 39 JURIS CLASSEUR PERIODIQUE, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 1-1896 (Mar. 3,
1965) ; Fikentscher & Grossfeld, The Proposed Directive on Company Law, 2 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 259 '(1964); Lecourt & Chevallier, Comment progresse le
rapprochement des legislations europeenes?, RECUEIL DALLOZ-CHRONIQUE 24
(June 30, 1965) ; Patry, La Societe Anonyme de Type Europeen, ETUDES DE DROIT
COMMERCIAL EN L'HONNEUR DE PAUL CARRY 29 (1964) ; Rault, Pour la creation
d'une societe commerciale de type europeen, 13 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
COMMERCIAL 741 (1960); Sanders, Vers une Societe Anonyme Europeene?, REVISTA
DELLE SOCIETA 1163 (1959); Thihierge, La Statut Des Societes Etrangeres, LE
STATUT DE L'ETRANGER ET LE MARCHE

COMMUN,

57TH CONGRESS OF FRENCH

NOTARIES, Tours (1959); Vasseur, A Company of European Type, 1964 JOURNAL
OF BUSINESS LAW 358 and 1965 id. 73; Vasseur, Quelques Arguments pour une
Societe de Type Europeen, 83 REVUE DES SOCIETES 18 (1965); Willemetz, Une
Societe de Type Europeen, 21 REVUE Du MARCHE COMMUN 38 (1960).
47 A summary analysis of the proposed European Patent Law is set out in 45 J. OF THE
PATENT OFFICE SOCY No. 3 (Mar. 1963). See also Restrictive Practices, Patents,
Trade Marks and Unfair Competition in the Common Market, 11 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q., SUPP. PUB. No. 4, at 153 (1962).
48 Community Draws Nearer to Economic Unity: EEC "Value Added" Tax System,
First Medium-Term Economic Program Approved, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar.
1967, at 30.
49 Stavropoulos, The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 4
U.N.Monthly Chronicle 89 (No. 4, 1967).

1967

TRANSNATIONAL

TRANSACTIONS

stand some of the resulting political and economic implications.
Much greater effort needs to be spent toward bringing the benefits
of science to bear upon the economic needs of the less developed
countries. The legal profession has much to contribute toward building the laws and the institutions within which science and industry
can raise productivity and better serve our own people and the transnational world in which we live. Never before has the international
lawyer had a more challenging opportunity to make full and beneficial use of his creative talents. 50

,0 Cf. Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Western Europe, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. (1963); Nadelmann, Assumption of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents, 41 TUL. L. REv. 75 (1966);
and Stein, Assimilation of National Laws as a Function of European Integration, 58
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1964). The subject-matter of the foregoing articles illustrates
some of the problems and challenges. Widening U.S. participation in unificationof-law activities, resulting from U.S. membership (since 1963) in the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the International (Rome) Institute for the
Unification of Private Law, is a major development which will have growing significance to businessmen and lawyers concerned with international private law and
practices. For materials on the range of problems see the symposium, Unification of
Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 231 (1965).

SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
STATE PROTECTIVE LAWS
By JAMES C. OLDHAM*
An amendment was added as an afterthought to Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, banning discrimination in employment based upon sex. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which was to enforce the ban, was given no guidance on
the handling of conflicts between this provision of Title VII and
the state protective laws. Mr.Oldham analyzes the conflict and the
Commission's original position in dealing with it. Subsequently,
Mr. Oldham devises a test, in the context of the preemption provision of Title VII, to determine in which instances state protective
legislation should be upheld to coincide with congressional intent.
Any state statute which, on its face, retains an underlying protective
policy pertinent to the modern labor force, would be within the
state's police power to enact, and would not be preempted by Title
VII.
INTRODUCTION

(

ONSIDER yourself as the owner of a medium-sized cement manu-

-facturing
company. One fine morning you are confronted at
your plant by a female job applicant who theretofore has gained
widespread acclaim for her talents as a lady wrestler. She is seeking
a job which is available at your plant - that of manually transferring
100-pound cement sacks from your warehouse to shippers' vans at the
loading dock. Her application captures your attention sufficiently
for you to contact your personnel man, who promptly informs you
that a state law exists forbidding the employment of women in jobs
which involve lifting more than 25 pounds. You convey this fact,
with regrets, to your applicant. However, to your surprise and dismay, she retorts by not only eyeing you as a likely prospect for a half
nelson but also brandishing before you a copy of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which in no uncertain terms prohibits discrimination in employment based upon sex.' What are you to do?

The employer's dilemma has been facetiously put, but that
dilemma is both obvious and real. The answer which the employer
may give at the present time is that Title VII does not oblige him to
provide employment to a woman at the cost of a clear violation of
*B.S., Duke University, 1962; LL.B., Stanford University, 1965; M.S.B.A., University
of Denver, 1967; Associate in the firm of Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard,
Denver, Colo.
'Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1)
(1964) [hereafter cited as Civil Rights Act of 19642.
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state law. 2 However, that answer may soon prove to have been
temporal, and even now it will vary according to the nature of the
administration of the state protective law in question.'
Since state protective laws regulating the employment of women
are not uncommon, it is probable that the employer's quandary will
be a recurring problem.4 This paper will endeavor to analyze the
problems resulting from the conflict between state protective laws
and the mandate of Title VII from several viewpoints. First, the
published opinions of the administrative body created to administer
Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, will be
examined to discover what guidance that body has offered in this
area. Representative types of state protective laws will then be discussed in terms of the degree to which they conflict with Title VII.
Finally, the standards in this area anticipated from the courts, including expected responses to the inevitable argument on preemption,
will receive attention.
I. A

CAPSULE HISTORY OF THE

SEX DISCRuMINATION PROVISION

A. The General Background
The statutory framework dealing with discrimination on the
basis of sex under Title VII is simple. Employers with the jurisdictional number of employees 5 cannot "fail or refuse to hire" or
deprive a person of "employment opportunities" or "otherwise adversely affect" that person because of sex. To do so constitutes an
"unlawful employment practice." 6 The one exception to this rule is
that discrimination on the basis of sex is permitted wherever sex is
2 See text accompanying notes 12-22 infra. Unfortunately, existing interpretative opin-

ions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission provide no guidance whatsoever as to how to cope with professional talents of lady wrestlers; no doubt
individual resourcefulness will come to the fore in this regard.
3See text accompanying notes 25, 29-36 in/ra.
4According to a recent survey by the Bureau of National Affairs of 78 varied companies, restrictions imposed by state laws account for 18 percent of the cases where
employment was denied females by the employers questioned. BNA, SEx & TITLE
VII, at 7 (Survey No. 80, Apr. 1967).
5 The definition of "employer" contained in Title VII will eventually encompass any
.person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty-five or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year." This level of 25 employees will be attained
through the following descending scale of coverage:
July 2, 1965-July 1, 1966: 100 employees
July 2, 1966-July 1, 1967:
75 employees
July 2, 1967-July 1, 1968:
50 employees
July 2, 1968 and thereafter:
25 employees
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b).
6
Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 703 (a)(1 ),(2).
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"a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 7
This sex discrimination provision was inserted into the civil
8
rights bill as a floor amendment in the House of Representatives.
Thus, apart from a brief period of floor debate in both Houses,
legislative history is not available to those wishing to interpret the
provisions.
The debate which did occur on the sex discrimination provision
is not particularly enlightening. Senator Dirksen was careful to point
out that he thoroughly enjoyed discrimination in favor of the fairer
sex, and that historically, such discrimination has been of a protective
nature. 9 In response, Senator Clark merely indicated that equal job
opportunity need not be given both sexes wherever sex is a bona fide
occupational qualification for a particular job.'0 Congressman Celler
took care to bring to the attention of the House a letter received from
the United States Department of Labor stating the opinion of the
Women's Division that the sex discrimination amendment "would
not be to the best advantage of women at this time."" This conclusion was based upon a previous study by the President's Commission
on the Status of Women, which was considering the advisability of
including sex as a forbidden type of discrimination in federal government contracts. That Commission determined that discrimination
based on sex involved different problems from discrimination based
on race, creed, color or national origin, and should be given specialized study and treatment."
Nevertheless, the sex discrimination provision became law. The
provision is being taken seriously by the Equal Employment Oppor7 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(e)'(1).

8 The amendment's introduction by Congressman Smith (D., Va.) is noted at 110
CONG. REC. 2577 (1964). Representative Smith indicated his sincerity in introducing
the amendment by citing a letter from a constituent which outlined the imbalance
between males and females in the country and the resultant impairment of a woman's
right to a husband, aggravated by the country's killing off many available males
through war involvement. It has been pointed out subsequently that the purpose
behind the amendment was a ploy by opponents of the Civil Rights Act to secure the
entire bill's defeat. See Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv.
431, 441-42 (1966) ; Note, 50 IowA L. REv. 778, 791 (1965).
9 110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964).
10 1d.
11 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964).
12*d. The reports of the President's Commission and committees working under it

have been collected and supplemented with additional materials in M. MEAD & F.
KAPLAN, AMERICAN WOMEN (1965). In addition to Rep. Celler's comments, Rep.
Green, a member of the President's Commission, spoke against the amendment as
being untimely and insufficiently considered. 110 CONG. REC. 2581-82 (1964).
However, several of Rep. Green's female colleagues in the House spoke in favor of
the amendment. Id. at 2580-84. But see, for an interesting analysis of the similarities
between race and sex discimination, Murray & Eastwood, lane Crow and the Law:
Sex Discriminationand Title VII, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965).
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tunity Commission; it must also be taken seriously by employers
subject to Title VII.
B. Discussion of the Effect on ProtectiveLegislation
The existence of state protective legislation and the potential
conflict of that legislation with the sex discrimination ban of Title
VII was recognized in both Houses of Congress during debate on the
sex amendment. Yet the effect the amendment was intended to have
on state protective laws is unclear.
Senator Dirksen's comments characterizing laws dealing with
employment of women as historically being of a protective nature,
coupled with Senator Clark's response, 13 certainly cannot be taken as
evidencing a considered judgment that all state protective laws fall
under the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception. In the
House of Representatives no reference whatever was made to protective legislation, in the context of the occupational qualification
exception.
Representative Celler did express apprehension that the sex
amendment might be an "entering wedge" toward striking down
protective legislation. 1 4 Representative Griffiths expressed her view
that some of the protective legislation was arbitrary and would be
tested and eliminated after passage of the amendment.' " Representative Multer indicated a fear that state protective laws "may be
repealed by implication" by the amendment." But on the other hand,
Representative Kelly stated her belief that the amendment "will not
repeal the protective laws of the several States."' 7 She also complimented Representative St. George for having indicated that "the
protective laws of the several States would not be destroyed by our
favorable action on this amendment." 18
In sum, no Congressman appears to have asserted that the sex
amendment would result in unqualified obliteration of state protective
laws. No reference was made to the preemption provision of Title
VII. 9 Most of the comments made did express concern that the
amendment would have some effect on protective legislation. Thus,
unfortunately, it is impossible to extract from the record a conclusion
of congressional intent as to whether or not protective legislation
would retain vitality after adoption of the sex provision.
1 Text at note 9 supra.
14110 CONG. REc. 2577-78 (1964).
15 110 CONG. REC. 2580 (1964).
16 110 CONG. REC. 2732 (1964).
17110 CONG. REC. 2583 (1964).

18 110 CONG. REC. 2582 (1964). This comment by Mrs. Kelly is somewhat curious in
light of Mrs. St. George's statement that she considered most protective laws to be
disadvantageous to women. Id. at 2580-81.
19See text at note 109 infra.
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COMMISSION VIEWS ON STATE PROTECTIVE LAWS

Assuming the desirability of an antidiscrimination statute on the
subject of sex, it is plain that the federal standards and machinery
created to eliminate such discrimination are lamentably inadequate.
That inadequacy stems chiefly from two major factors: the relatively
hasty conclusion by Congress that sex discrimination exists as an evil
equatable with other types of discrimination and equally deserving
of wholesale elimination; and the somewhat inconsistent failure of
Congress to provide the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
20
with the means to enforce the discrimination ban.
Both of these shortcomings are placed in sharp relief whenever
the sex discrimination provision of Title VII collides with state protective laws regulating the employment of women. Such state laws
proceed upon the premise that instances of sex "discrimination" are
desirable as a matter of public policy - a premise which would seem
to have been tacitly rejected by Congress when it included sex in
Title VII. 21 Perhaps in no other context has the frustration caused the

Commission by its lack of enforcement powers been more apparent
than in the area of state protective laws.
The Commission's initial comments concerning such laws were
forthcoming in the official guidelines on sex discrimination issued
November 11, 1965.22 It was observed by the Commission that state
protective laws were generally of two types: laws providing benefits
for female employees such as rest periods, and laws prohibiting the
employment of women in certain hazardous or strenuous occupations.23 This classification was accompanied by the following
statement:
The Commission believes that some state laws and regulations
with respect to the employment of women, although originally for
valid protective reasons, have ceased to be relevant to our technology
or to the expanding role of the woman worker in our economy.

The Commission does not believe that Congress intended to
disturb such laws and regulations which are intended to, and have
the effect of, protecting women against exploitation and hazard.
Accordingly, the Commission will consider limitations or prohibitions imposed by such state laws or regulations as a basis for application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception. How20

Powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission extend at the present
time only to conciliation, education, persuasion, technical assistance and like activities. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 705(g). Legislative proposals are currently before
both Houses of Congress which would grant enforcement powers to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. See 64 LAB. REL. REP. 210 (Mar. 6, 1967).
21 See text at notes 13-18 supra; see also Anderson, Civil Rights and Fair Employment,
22 BUS. LAW. 513, 522 (1967).
2 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1965) (guidelines on discrimination because of sex).
2Id.
§ 1604.1 (a)'(3).
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ever, in cases where the clear effect of a law in current circumstances
is not to protect women but to subject them to discrimination,
24 the
law will not be considered a justification for discrimination.
Additionally, as a means of mitigating the conflict between state
protective laws and Title VII, the Commission stated its expectation
that an employer would in good faith exploit any available administrative exception to a state law before asserting a bona fide occupational qualification.25
Under the view expressed in the guidelines, the Commission
clearly considered any employer who discriminated against women
pursuant to a state statute which did not have the effect of protecting
women from exploitation and hazard to have committed an unlawful
employment practice. This conclusion was confirmed by former
Commissioner Richard Graham who said in a speech before the
National Federation of Business Women that all state laws pertaining
to the regulation of wages and hours and conditions of work should
apply equally to men and women, with the single exception of childbirth laws.2" Yet these views were not extremely useful to employers.
The Commission did not reveal what laws or types of laws it considered to fall within its test of protection from "exploitation" or
"hazard."
The occasional interpretative opinions of the General Counsel of
the Commission pertaining to state protective legislation add very
little to the Commission's original statements. The General Counsel
has ruled that an employer was not obliged to violate reasonable
licensing requirements of a state regarding professionals or entertainers "where there is no intention to discriminate on prohibited
grounds." 2" The negative inference contained in this ruling is interesting - that an employer cannot rely upon the defense of a reasonable statute if his motivation is discriminatory on the basis of sex.
It seems doubtful that such a negative inference was fully intended
by the General Counsel. Other opinions by the Counsel on state
protective laws are not controversial; none of the rulings deals with
a state statute considered to be antiquated or not to possess the protective effect intended when the statute was originally enacted.2 8
24

1d. §§ 1604.1(b), (c).
Id. § 160 4 .1(c) (3).
26 Graham, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, NAT'L Bus. WOMAN, Mar. 1966, at 7.
27Op. Gen. Counsel (Aug. 27, 1965), BNA, 6 LAB. POL. & PRAc., FAiR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 401:1012 [hereinafter cited as FEP REPORTER).
28
The General Counsel has articulated such reasonable propositions as: that Title VII
rohibits classification by sex only with regard to employee status, which would not
e offended by the existence of separate restroom facilities; and that an employer may
not decline to hire a woman in order to escape coverage of state minimum wage
laws. Op. Gen. Counsel (Sept. 20, 1965), FEP REPORTER 401:1012; Op. Ltr. Gen.
Counsel (Mar. 22, 1966), FEP REPORTER 401:1012.
2
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In any event, within the past year the Commission has retreated
from its original formulations dealing with state protective legislation. In a statement adopted by the Commission on August 19,
1966, the Commission described a case before it as presenting squarely
the question of "whether Title VII supersedes and in effect nullifies
a state law which compels an employer to deny equal employment
opportunity to women." 29 The situation was one in which there was
no indication that the statute, limiting hours of work to 48 hours per
week, in fact protected the health or welfare of the particular applicant. However, the Commission found itself unable to resolve the
question presented to it. It was reiterated that an intention of
Congress to overrule the vast number of state protective statutes
outstanding could not be lightly presumed. The Commission then
acknowledged that it had no ability or authority to rewrite state laws,
to insulate employers against liability under state laws, or to commence suits to avoid the enforcement of state laws."0
As a result, the Commission officially adopted a "hands off"
policy with regard to cases such as the one just mentioned. The
Commission will make no determination on the merits of the case,
but will merely advise the charging parties of their right to bring suit
under Title VII, reserving to itself the privilege of appearing as
amicus curiae in any such ensuing litigation. 1 Since this promulgation, the position stated has been applied by the General Counsel of
the Commission in responding to letters of inquiry.32
The Commission's disengagement from the conflict between
state protective legislation and Title VII is not an end to the matter.
On April 10, 1967, Chairman Shulman announced that "the Com29 FEP REPORTER 401:1601.
30id. at 401:1601-02. The text of the Commission's comments in this regard is as

follows:
Over forty states have laws or regulations which, like California's limit
the maximum daily or weekly hours which women employees may work. What
effect Congress intended Title VII to have upon such laws is not clear. An
intent to alter drastically this pattern of state legislation should not lightly
be presumed. However, the Commission believes that in fact these laws in
many situations have an adverse effect on employment opportunities for
women. To what extent this adverse effect is counterbalanced by the protective function which these laws serve this Commission is not presently
in a position to judge. A choice between these two competing values could
probably be avoided if these protective laws were amended to provide for
greater flexibility, but the Commission cannot rewrite state laws according
to its own views of the public interest.
The Commission's functions in~processing charges under Title VII are
limited to investigation, determining whether there is reasonable cause to
believe a violation has occurred, and conciliation. While we have a duty to
interpret Title VII, we have no authority by such an interpretation to insulate employers against possible liability under state law, nor do we have
authority to institute in the name of the Commission suits to challenge or
restrain the enforcement of state laws.
31
32

Id. at 401:1602
See, e.g., FEP REPORTER 401:3025.
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mission is presently considering whether to indicate by rule or decision
the extent, if any, to which State protective legislation is affected by
Title VII."383 Subsequently, public hearings were held on the subject,
and written statements were received until June 2, 1967. Thus a new
statement of position by the Commission in this area appears imminent.
It is difficult to predict what that statement will be . 4 Testimony at the recently completed hearings was diverse, with views
being expressed for and against the preservation of state protective
legislation by witnesses of both sexes representing union and nonunion organizations.8 5
But even a new tack on the subject taken by the Commission
may not be a conclusive resolution. The courts ultimately will pass
judgment -through suits brought by individuals, or by the Commission if and when enforcement powers are received.8 6 Therefore, in
anticipation of one of these eventualities, it may prove useful to
review the character of representative state protective laws and to
examine the severity of their conflict with Title VII as well as to
suggest possible means of resolving that conflict. 7
III.

TYPES OF STATE PROTECTIVE LAWS AND THE
DEGREE OF CONFLICT WITH TITLE

VII

As indicated earlier, the Commission has categorized state protective legislation as generally either designed to provide benefits to
female employees, or intended to prevent women from engaging in
33 32 Fed. Reg. 5999 (1967).

The testimony at the hearings dealt with, among other issues, the policy considerations behind the protective laws when they were enacted and subsequent changes
which invalidated them. Transcript of Proceedings, GSA, EEOC (ACE -Federal
Reporter, Inc., May 2, 1967). Preemption was only considered in passing by one or
two of the witnesses. See, e.g., remarks of Miss Neese, id. at 46-48, and those of
Rep. Griffiths, id. at 234-35.
3565 LAB. REL. REP. 20-22 (May 8, 1967). According to this report of the hearings,
Stephen Schlossberg, General Counsel of the United Auto Workers, testified that all
protective laws are detrimental to women and should be declared to have been superseded by Title VII. Witnesses for the National Organization of Women spoke in
favor of eliminating state laws arbitrarily restraining hours of work, barring night
work, and limiting weight-lifting. Mrs. Mary Callahan of the IUEW stated that a
clean sweep of protective laws would not be desirable since the laws represent the
only protection some women have. In accord was Mrs. Anderson Page, testifying for
the National Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers. Mrs. Katharine
Ellickson of the National Consumers League asserted that to eliminate the protective
laws, even selectively, would be "unreasonable and reckless" on the basis of present
inadequate information. A commissioner of the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin
urged a two-year moratorium during which thoughtful solutions could be worked out.
Interestingly, Chairman Schulman asked Mr. Schlossberg his reaction to a position
that state maximum hour legislation would be superseded only if the work were
covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. As noted by the BNA Report, this could
be a clue to the Commission's thinking. Unfortunately, Mr. Schlossberg's testimony
was not included in the official transcript of the hearings so that further enlightenment is unavailable.
36
See note 20 supra.
34

11 The effect of recent fair employment practice legislation at the state level which
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hazardous occupations. 8 The chief types of statutes named by the
Commission in the "benefit" category are those dealing with physical
facilities, wages, and overtime or other compensation for women.39
Beyond these types of statutes, however, the "benefit" -"hazard"
dichotomy loses its clarity. For example, the Commission names rest
periods as a benefit given to female employees by state laws, while
limitations on hours of work are listed as being designed to protect
women from hazard.4" Yet the same statute which requires a rest
period for women who must stand continuously may also require an
employer to limit the hours his employee may work.4 ' The point is,
both of these requirements constitute "protective" legislation, protecting women from the hazard of exceeding alleged inbred physical
limitations or from hazards imposed by external conditions of labor.4 2
In the discussion to follow, only one class of statutes will be
encountered which is clearly in the "benefit" category - specifically,
the legislation dealing with unemployment compensation payments
afforded to female employees discharged because of pregnancy.4"
The remainder of the statutes to be mentioned were enacted for the
purpose of protecting female employees from hazardous or strenuous
working conditions.4 4
includes sex as a prohibited basis for discrimination will also be addressed briefly.
See text at notes 110-19 in!ra.
38 Text at note 23 supra.
3929 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (3) (i) (1965) (guidelines on discrimination because of
sex.)
0Id. §§ 1604.1(a) (3) (i),(ii).
41
See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-218 (1957).
42 It is another question whether the basis for thie statute remains today truly protective,
or whether the only justification for the statute is anachronistic notions of chivalry.
43 No attempt will be made in this study to detail any problems which may be inherent
in the existing requirements of equal pay for equal work without regard to sex. This
topic is treated under federal wage and hour legislation and administration, to which
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act expressly defers. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703 (h).
In addition, the examples to be given will be limited to statutes regulating the
employment relationship. Colorado does have statutes which demand separate restroom facilities for male and female employees, and separate dressing room facilities
under certain circumstances. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN'. § 80-2-10 (1963). For purposes of this paper, the General Counsel's ruling that these classifications by sex do
not pertain to employment status and thus are not offensive to Title VII will be
accepted. See note 28 supra. However, one observation in this regard is interesting.
It has been firmly established in the race relations field that separate but equal
facilities are but a discreet form of unconstitutional discrimination. Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This conclusion would clearly cover separate restroom facilities for whites and Negroes. Yet it would smack of lunacy for a female to
apply logic and argue under Title VII that the requirement imposed by state law of
separate restroom facilities for males and females is also a discreet form of prohibited discrimination. The example is trite, but it does illustrate the fact that sex
discrimination inevitably involves different considerations from other types of discrimination. Of course, one easy answer to examples of this type is the observation
that such differences, although based upon sex, do not proceed upon an assumed
inferiority of the female sex. This point was made by Murray & Eastwood, Jane
Crow and the Law. Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 232,
240, 249-50 (1965).
44 Statutes to be discussed will be taken from states constituting the Rocky Mountain
region and surrounding area, emphasis being given to Colorado legislation.
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A. Seats for Female Employees
Under Colorado law, employers must provide "suitable" seats
for female employees for use by those employees "when they are not
necessarily engaged in the active duties for which they are employed." 45 Similar statutes are quite common in other states. 46 Utah
allows an employer some discretion in that instead of being limited
to "seats," he is privileged to choose from among "chairs, stools or
other contrivances." 47 New Mexico, on the other hand, requires the
traditional "seat" and demands that employers post a conspicuous
notice in letters at least one inch high that female employees may use
the seats when not engaged in active duties of employment.4" Arizona
is perhaps the most demanding state on this subject, requiring employers to maintain at least two seats for every three female employees.4"
It is evident that any conflict between these statutes and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is, or should be, insignificant.
Theoretically a conflict could be posed in one of two ways: by an
employer's refusing to hire a female employee because of the burden
of obtaining the required seating, or by a charge of "reverse discrimination" by male employees for whom such seating is not provided.
As to the first setting, it is clear that an employer would violate
Title VII by refusing to hire a female due to the extra cost involved.
The employer is not faced with the choice of violating either Title
VII or state law; he can and must comply with both.5 ° Concerning
reverse discrimination, the complaining male employee would seem
to be logically correct in urging that, in the language of Title VII,
he has been "adversely affected" on account of sex by being deprived
of seating facilities. Yet the possibility that a male employee would
seriously urge this position and that he would be seriously opposed
by his employer is virtually nil. Even if a showdown did occur on
this point, the Commission would in all probability quickly dispose
45

COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-2-13 (1963).

46 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN.

§ 44-1108 (1948) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 41-1119
(1961); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-201 (1960); Wyo. STAT. ANN.§ 27-219 (1957).
47UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-4-2 (1953).
48
N.M.STAT. ANN. § 59-5-10 (1953).
4

9 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-261 (1956).

This Arizona statute and other Arizona

protective legislation will be discussed as if binding on employers. It is important to
note in this connection, however, that the Arizona Civil Rights Commission has ruled
that whenever a conflict occurs between the Arizona Civil Rights Act ban on sex
discrimination and the state law regulating hours of work, the Civil Rights Act controls. Reynolds v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 17-12E (Ariz., Dec. 2,
1966), reported at BNA, FEP Summary of Latest Developments, No. 48 (Dec. 22,
1966). However, the Arizona Civil Rights Commission has enforcement powers only
as to first offenses by employers, and the views of the state's judiciary on this subject
have yet to be formulated.
50The General Counsel of the Commission has made an express ruling to this effect
regarding state minimum wage laws. See note 28 supra.
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of the matter through any administrative exception existing in the
state law, or by suggesting that the employer comply with the male
employee's request for equal seating "rights." In an analogous case,
dealing with an employer's policy, rather than a state statute, which
allowed fifteen minute breaks for women twice a day, but none for
men, the General Counsel of the Commission stated that the policy
violated Title VII. 51
B. Hours of Work
Perhaps the most extensive and most common type of state protective legislation regulating the employment of women involves
limitations on hours of employment. These statutes fall into three
classes: absolute limitations on hours of work, limitations qualified
as to types of work covered and as to emergencies, and limitations
only in the sense of requiring time and one-half compensation for
hours worked in excess of a certain number. The Colorado legislation
on this subject falls into the middle class. Employment of women in
"laundries, hotels, and restaurants, and in any and all manufacturing,
mechanical, and mercantile establishments," other than in clerical
capacities, is declared to be "injurious to health and dangerous to
life and limb." 52 Thus women are not allowed to work in such
employment for more than eight hours per day except in cases of
"emergencies or conditions demanding immediate action.""
Also in the middle class of state statutes limiting hours of work
is the New Mexico provision. Females may not work more than eight
hours per day in any "industrial or mercantile establishment, hotel,
restaurant, cafe or eating house; or in any laundry, or in any office
as a stenographer, clerk, bookkeeper or in any other clerical position;
or in any place of amusement; or in any telephone or telegraph
office. . . ." 11 This statute is considerably broader as to the types of
51
52

Op. Ltr. Gen. Counsel (Mar. 10, 1966), L.R.X. 1883.
COLO. REV. STAr. ANN. § 80-14-9 (1963).

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-14-9,-10 (1963). It is interesting to note that in another provision dealing with minimum wages for women, the Colorado legislature
declared that it is unlawful to employ women under "conditions of labor detrimental
to their health or morals." CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-7-3 (1963). If this provision were to be taken literally, the conclusion would follow that employment under
the eight-hour day law which is "declared to be injurious to health" does not involve
"conditions of labor detrimental to health," since the legislature would not have
condoned employment (limited to eight hours per day) which it had earlier declared
to be unlawful. Such a result is so finespun that it becomes absurd. Thus the only
conclusion possible is that the legislature did not intend that provisions of the
minimum wage law be read with those of the eight-hour day law to yield any
deductive results whatsoever.
54
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-5-1 (1953). Hours of work of females in telephone and
telegraph offices with more than five employees are further regulated by N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59-5-6 (1953). Also, women employees in the field of transportation
apparently may work nine hours per day by virtue of N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-5-13
(1953). See [1943-1944] N.M. ATTY's GEN. OP. 4388.
53
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employees covered than is the Colorado legislation. Nevertheless, the
New Mexico statute does allow work by females in excess of eight
hours per day in "emergency cases," not to exceed a total of 50 hours
per week and provided overtime is paid for time worked above 48
hours per week. 5
In Utah and Arizona, laws regulating hours of work of female
employees are similar in their structure to those of Colorado and
New Mexico. Utah places the eight-hour limitation on all employment of females in "any industry, trade or occupation except in
domestic service and executive positions," exempting certain employment in agriculture and the perishable fruit industry.56 The emergency exception in Utah is rather liberal, allowing the Industrial
Commission to permit extra work in cases of an "emergency or peak
period in the business of an employer. '5 1 This provision would
appear to allow employment of females for more than eight hours
over an extended length of time during the employer's busiest period.
Such license is not available under Arizona law. That state's provisions in this area prohibit employment of females other than in
domestic work for more than eight hours per day or 48 hours per
week (42 hours per week on the basis of a six-hour day) .5s These
requirements are not applicable to certain categories of employees
such as nurses, and agricultural, perishable fruit, managerial and
professional employees.5 9 The only exception available to manufacturing and industrial female employees is "to meet an emergency
or extraordinary need occurring occasionally and not as a regular
practice," and even then an absolute cutoff exists at ten hours per
day and 48 hours per week."0
More stringent than any of the statutes regulating hours of work
which have been discussed thus far are those of Nebraska and Montana. The pertinent statutes of both of these states constitute an
absolute limitation on hours of work for female employees with no
administrative exceptions available for emergencies or otherwise.
In Nebraska, the ceiling is nine hours per day and 54 hours per week
STAT. ANN. § 59-5-7 (1953). Provisions for emergency work exist in the
statutes dealing with telephone, telegraph and transportation employment, although
curiously the telephone and telegraph exception is limited to "extreme emergencies
that could not have been reasonably contemplated." N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-5-6,-13

5sN.M.

(1953).

56

§ 34-4-3 (1953).
571d.
58 AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-281 A, Bi (1956). Recall, however that this
statute is subordinate to the state civil rights law according to the Arizona Civil
Rights Commission. See note 49 supra.
59Auz.REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-281 B2-B6 (1956).
UTAH CODE ANN.

60 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-281

B7 (1956).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 44

for females employed in virtually all types of employment."' The
Montana limitation is eight hours per day in most commercial types
of employment, although no limitation other than the daily limit
62
appears to exist as to the hourly work week.
At the other end of the spectrum in regulating hours of work
are the laws of Idaho and Wyoming. Both of these states merely
require that if employment of females in the commercial establishments named exceeds eight hours per day or 48 hours per week,
time and one-half shall be paid for the excess time worked."3
Wyoming does retain a requirement that female employees who are
required to be on their feet continuously be afforded two rest periods
of 15 minutes each, one in the morning and one in the afternoon.6 4
The above statutes are representative of state legislation dealing
with hours of work of female employees, but even among the statutes
discussed, wide variations exist. The fact that these variations do
exist as to both the type of business covered and the nature of the
limitations imposed presents serious difficulties in terms of the administration of the sex discrimination ban of Title VII. In Nebraska and
Montana, an employer filling a job which legitimately demands long
hours simply cannot use female help without contravening state law.
Since no administrative exceptions are available, the Commission is
at once at the stage where it will merely advise a complaining female
of her right to sue in the federal courts, but will not itself challenge
the state law. In contrast, it is clear that an employer in Idaho or
Wyoming could not decline to hire a female applicant because of the
added cost which might attend required overtime payments.6 5 Between these two extremes are the states requiring eight-hour days
except in cases of emergencies. Under these laws, an employer would
have to ascertain whether or not an administrative exception for
61 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-203 (1960). The statute applies "(a) in any manufacturing,
mechanical, or mercantile establishment, laundry, hotel, restaurant, or office in any
metropolitan, primary, or first-class city in this state or (b) for any employer of
twenty-five or more people within this state."
62
MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 41-1118 (1961), covering "any manufacturing, mechanical, or mercantile establishment, telephone exchange room, or office, or telegraph
office, laundry, hotel, or restaurant."
6

3IDAHO CODE ANN.

§ 44-1107 (1948);

Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-218 A (1959)

(Supp. 1965), amending § 27-218 '(1957). The Idaho statute covers employment by
"any mechanical or mercantile establishment, laundry, hotel, or restaurant, or
telephone or telegraph establishment, or office or by any express or transportation
company." The Wyoming coverage extends to "any manufacturing, mechanical, or
mercantile establishment, laundry, hotel, public lodging house, apartment house,
place of amusement, or restaurant."
64
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-218 B (1959), amending § 27-218 (1957). This provision

would be open to a challenge of "reverse discrimination" by a male employee.
65 See notes 28, 50 supra. In addition, to the extent employment is covered by both the
state laws in question and by the Fair Labor Standards Act, the federal overtime
requirements are more exacting than are the requirements of any of the state statutes
discussed. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19
(1966).
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emergencies, or for peak periods in the case of Utah, would be available to him so that a female could fill the particular job satisfactorily.
However, since most of the exceptions address unanticipated emergencies, it is probable that the female applicant for a job requiring
long hours would be told by the Commission at the present time to
resort to the courts in these states as well.
As to types of work, a clerical job necessitating considerable overtime could be filled by a female in Colorado, but could not
be in New Mexico. Numerous other types of work which would be
covered under the limitations on hours of employment in one state
and not in another are apparent from the earlier discussion of the
various states' legislation.
Thus not infrequently a woman's chances for obtaining a commercial job which demands long hours will depend on the fortuity of
her place of residence. At least this is true to the extent the state legislation being discussed is enforced or respected by employers.6 6 What
Congress would have done about this problem under Title VII had it
given the matter serious consideration is unknown. The Commission
initially attempted to achieve a rough resolution of this question in
its formulation which allowed only those statutes which in fact protect women from exploitation or hazard to be excepted from the
Title VII sex discrimination ban. Since the Commission's present
official position is to avoid the issue, the problem is now reserved
for the courts, unless new rules result from the recent Commission
hearings.
C. Hazardous Occupations
1. Mines and Mining
In Colorado, an express legislative declaration exists in the safety
regulations article of the provisions relating to coal mines that "no
females shall be employed in or about the coal mines, or beehive coke
ovens, except in an office or clerical capacity." 67 Such a provision
is not found in the statutes which govern other types of mining.
However, under the "safety regulations" section of the general mining
statutes, it is stated that "the commissioner of mines shall have the
power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary for
the carrying out of the provisions of this article and such rules and
regulations shall be enforceable in the same manner as the provisions
The Arizona experience (note 49 supra) indicates that states may resolve these
matters of their own accord. But the mere existence of sex as a prohibited ground
for discrimination in a state fair employment practices law will not necessarily
achieve such a result, as is indicated in text accompanying note 113 infra.
67
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92-10-2 (1963).
66
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of said statutes. ' 68 Citing the authority just quoted, the Commissioner of Mines has issued the following regulations:
1. No girl or woman shall be permitted at any time to work
underground, nor shall they be permitted to work in mills,
excavations, mines or quarries, as defined in Section 3, or at
any other work which would be hazardous or harmful to them.
2. Women may be employed in mills in the operation of jigs,
tables, flotation cells, dryers or filters, or at any sorting or
picking belts and tables, provided that such employment does
not require them to stand constantly.
3. No women shall be permitted to do any work which will be
detrimental to their health.
Working in offices shall not be
69
considered detrimental.
Other states are equally explicit as to the employment of women
in mining operations. In Arizona, a statute exists stating bluntly that
"[flemales shall not be employed or allowed to work in or about a
mine, quarry or coal breaker ....
,,70 Similarly, in Utah, it is declared
to be unlawful to employ any female "to work in any mine or smelter
in this state.'" 71 On first glance, the Utah provision would seem to
allow the employment of females in surface jobs such as in milling
operations. However, the provision has been amended in cases of
wartime emergencies to waive the ban, permitting females to work
at mines "in other than underground work." 7 2 Thus, by inference,
the basic prohibition must be taken to include employment of women
in surface mining operations.
Until 1959, Wyoming law contained a provision prohibiting the
employment of women "in or about any coal, iron or other dangerous
mine, or underground work or dangerous place whatsoever in this
state." 78 This statute was repealed in 1959 along with certain other
provisions pertaining to child labor.74 However, the constitutional
provision, of which the statute on employment in mines was virtually
a replica, remains in full force. 75
That the employment of females was not contemplated by mining
legislation of other states is evident by implication. For example, the
statutes of Idaho which regulate hours of work in mines, smelters,
mills and the like, expressly speak of the period of employment of
"workingmen." 7 The same is true of Montana statutes regulating
68

COLO.REv.STAT. ANN. § 92-33-28 (1963).
69COLORADO BUREAU OF MINES, BULL. No. 19, RULES AND REGULATIONS § 54
1, 1962).
70 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 23-261 A (1956).

(Jan.

7

1 UTAH CODE ANN.§ 34-4-1 ('1953).

72

Utah Laws 1943, ch. 58, § 1; Utah Laws 1945, ch. 78, § 1; Utah Laws 1951, ch. 59,

§ I.
T3

27-237 (1957).
§ 1.
5Wyo. CONST. art. 9, § 3.
76
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 44-1104,-1105 (1948).
7

Wyo. STAT. ANN. §

4 Wyo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 100,
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hours of work in mines, mills and smelters.7 7 Also, in Montana a
requirement exists that coal mine owners furnish a single wash house
"for the use of persons employed in such mine, for the purpose of
washing themselves and changing their clothes." 7 8 Obviously this
provision assumes the existence of male employees only. A like
assumption clearly underlies the provision detailing the maintenance
of "a checking system of the employees" since the provision is captioned "Checking men in and out of mines and the rights of men to
79
come out of mines.
Significant questions are presented as to the potential conflict
of these mining statutes and regulations with Title VII. In jurisdictions such as Arizona, Utah and Wyoming, where the prohibition on
the employment of women in mining is absolute and unequivocal,
the problem is the standard one created by clear-cut opposition of
state laws to Title VII- a problem in limbo at the moment under
the views of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
In Colorado, however, the express prohibition on employment
of females in mining (other than coal mines) is derived from administrative regulations rather than from the legislature. The question
raised is whether or not such administrative regulations, which are
given the status of law in the eyes of the state, are to be given that
same status in the contemplation of Title VII. 0
A related question is posed by those state statutes which implicitly contemplate employment of only males in mining operations, but
which have no express declaration by the legislature or through
administrative regulations to that effect. In this case the position is
open to the Commission that no clear conflict between Title VII and
state law exists, so that a female cannot be denied mining employment in such states if otherwise qualified."'
2. Bartending and Miscellany
Both of the states mentioned earlier as possessing the most liberal statutes regarding hours of work of women employees, Idaho
and Wyoming, maintain statutes prohibiting women from perform§§ 41-1107,-1108 (1961).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 50-435 (1961).
79 MoNT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 50-519 (1961) (emphasis added).
77MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
78

80 See discussion at note 119 infra.
81 This view might be especially attractive to the Commission since no problem is
presented as to whether or not state statutes have been preempted. It might be
argued that legislative inferences as clear as those mentioned should be binding on
federal and state administrative bodies alike. In this connection, one Colorado
experience is noteworthy. The Colorado legislature expressly declared employment in
stamp mills and concentrating mills to be injurious to health, and on that basis
limited the employment of men working in such capacities to an eight-hour day.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-14-1,-2 (1963). The clear inference is that em loyment of women in the mills was not intended. Nevertheless, this inference did not
deter the Bureau of Mines from ruling that women may engage in certain employment in mills generally. BULL. No. 19, § 54.2, quoted in text accompanying note 69
supra.
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ing the job of bartender. Wyoming law expressly states that "no
female shall be employed as a bartender in a room holding a retail
liquor license." 82 Idaho statutes approach the matter in reverse,
stating that bartenders in licensed premises must have permits, and
one requirement for obtaining a permit is that the applicant be male. 8
The chief difficulty with these statutes under Title VII is the
problem of obsolescence. Probably the bartending provisions originally
did stem from protective intentions toward women. No doubt bars
were less decorous places at the time of the origin of these statutory
restrictions than is the case now, but it may be questioned whether
the protective motivation behind such provisions still has vitality.
It is not known that the existence of women bartenders in states
without such restrictions has been unmanageable or harmful regarding the women in question.8 4
Another type of statute regulating female employment which
will be troublesome under Title VII because of its obsolescence is
the occasional provision dealing with jobs performed while standing.
Arizona law continues to forbid the employment of women "in any
capacity where the employment compels them to remain standing
constantly." 8" In addition, as noted earlier, the Colorado Bureau of
Mines has forbidden the employment of women in mills in any job
requiring them "to stand constantly."8 It is difficult to imagine
that either of these flat prohibitions is seriously enforced. Yet they
remain in existence, and to the extent they are enforced or complied
with by employers, the effectiveness of Title VII is lessened.
D. Benefits for Unemployment due to Pregnancy
Occasionally the unemployment compensation statutes of a particular state will contain special provisions dealing with a loss of job
by a female employee because of pregnancy. These statutes are pertinent to a discussion of Title VII only to the extent that distinctions
based on pregnancy can be treated as distinctions based on sex. The
Commission has ruled that pregnancy is a special condition attending the female sex which must be given special consideration, notwithstanding the absence of any possible test of equality with male
employees. 8 7
8Wyo.STAT. ANN.§ 12-20 (1957).
3 IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 23-922 (1948).
84Nevertheless, the Idaho statute has been held constitutional by the Idaho Supreme
Court as recently as 1957. State v. Burke, 79 Idaho 205, 206, 312 P.2d 806, 807
(1957). That court relied entirely in its decision on the United States Supreme
Court decision in Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). These cases are discussed
in more detail at text accompanying notes 141-42 infra.
85
Amz.REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-261 A (1956).
86 BULL. No. 19, supra note 69.
87
Op. Gen. Counsel (Aug. 17, 1966), FEP REPORTER 401:3017.
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On first glance, it seems hard to deny that a discharge for
pregnancy is "discrimination" on the basis of sex. But even though
some jobs simply cannot be handled by a woman in the advanced
stages of pregnancy, that woman could be replaced by a nonpregnant
female or by a male. The possibility of replacing the pregnant employee with a nonpregnant female indicates that discrimination in
the sense addressed by Title VII has not occurred by the discharge.
Thus, it could be said that the employer "discriminated" against his
employee only because she was pregnant; that she was female was
merely coincidental. Suppose, for example, that a male employee
needed a leave of absence in order to effectuate an adoption. In such
a case, he, too, could be discharged by an employer not because he
was male but because of the disruptive effect of his action on his
employer's business.8 8 However, since the Commission has included
the subject of pregnancy within the scope of Title VII, it will be considered briefly.
Certain unemployment compensation statutes address only the
situation in which a female employee has left her employment voluntarily because of pregnancy, in which case unemployment compensation benefits are denied. 9 Even if the statute denies benefits
in the case of involuntary terminations, as does the Utah statute, the
sex discrimination ban does not apply. This type of statute does not
pertain to an employer-employee relationship, 90 and the sex discrimination ban does not have anything to say about action taken on
the basis of sex by persons other than employers, employment agencies
and labor unions. 9
Nevertheless, these statutes do treat special conditions created
because of sex, and thus the validity of this legislation may come into
question in the context of preemption if such legislation is considered
to be inconsistent with Title VII. The problem of preemption will
be addressed below, but it is first necessary to examine whether any
such inconsistencies exist.
Just as no problems are presented by the statutes allowing benefits for voluntary terminations, none appear in the Montana-type
provision which denies benefits to female employees discharged for
pregnancy only if those employees fail to present evidence of ability
to work.9 2 In the Montana example, the decision as to whether or
8 See in this connection Murray & Eastwood, supra note 43, at 239.
8See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1366(d)

(1948)

; NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-627(c)

(1960). The Utah statute denies compensation benefits without regard to whether
or not the termination of employment was voluntary or involuntary. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 35-4-5(h) (1953).

90 Cf. note 28 supra.
91 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703.
2MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 87-106(i)

(1961).
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not to provide benefits has been removed from considerations of sex
to the full extent possible under the circumstances.
The Colorado statute provides that female employees who voluntarily terminate employment because of pregnancy are not entitled
to benefits; however, a pregnant employee who is involuntarily separated from a job may be entitled to receive unemployment compensation." Specifically, compensation is recoverable unless the involuntary termination took place "according to the provisions of a
reasonable rule of the employer providing for the separation of
pregnant workers." 4 This latter condition is to a large degree inconsistent with the sex discrimination provision of Title VII, as interpreted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's holding
that, in general, an employer may not maintain a rule discharging
female employees because of pregnancy without alternatively offering
them a leave of absence. 5 For employers, this means that there can
seldom, if ever, be "reasonable rules" providing for the separation
of pregnant workers. The Colorado provision on this point is thus
inconsistent if the state takes a view different from that of the
Commission as to the reasonableness of such employer rules; otherwise, the provision is rendered essentially moot.96
IV.

CONSIDERATION OF THE INITIAL COMMISSION

TEST AS APPLIED TO THE VARIous TYPES OF
STATE PROTECTIVE LAWS

Should the Commission be given enforcement powers, it is reasonable to assume that judicial decisions in the state protective law
93COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
9COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
9

§§ 82-4-8(f)(ii), (iii) (1963).
§ 82-4-8(f) (ii) (1963).

Gen. Counsel (Aug. 17, 1966), FEP REPORTER 401:3017. The possibility that
a female may become pregnant during her employment would not seem sufficient
to label sex as a bona fide occupational qualification at the hiring stage for jobs

5Op.

which would be disrupted by leaves of absence. When a female employee becomes
pregnant, however, may it be concluded that sex suddenly becomes a bona fide
occupational qualification? An affirmative answer to that question appears, again on
first glance, to be impossible, since the bona fide occupational qualification exception
refers to hiring and not to discharg ing employees.
A more likely resolution of the matter is the possibility that the omission of
discharges from the bona fide occupational qualification exception was a Congressional oversight. Oversights will occur; for example, it has been noted that the
omission of national origin from the bona fide occupational qualification exception
was probably inadvertent. BNA, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 37 (1964).
Thus the existing language might be read expansively to cover the case of
discharges.
98 A similar situation was presented to the General Counsel pertaining to a provision
of a state's unemployment compensation laws which permitted, but did not require,
an employer to terminate female workers who married. Because of the permissive
nature of the statute, the employer was not faced with the choice of complying with
either state law or Title VII, and thus it was ruled that the employer must comply
with Title VII and must not maintain a rule of termination for female employees
who marry without having a similar rule for male employees. The aspect of the law
permitting discriminatory treatment of females was thus eliminated for practical
purposes. Op. Gen. Counsel (Aug. 5, 1966), FEP REPORTER 401:3013-14.
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area will be prompted. The Commission has already reopened the
subject by virtue of its recent public hearings.9" In this connection,
the Commission may refurbish its old views as to what state protective
laws it will respect, or, more likely, it may take a completely fresh
approach to the matter.
Even with enforcement powers, the Commission's latitude in
dealing with state protective laws will ultimately be determined by
the extent of the applicability of the preemption doctrine under the
Civil Rights Act.9" However, addressing for the moment the Commission's approach to state protective laws instead of the jurisdictional
scope of Title VII, a few observations may be made.
The Commission has taken two separate approaches in handling
alleged unlawful employment practices under the sex discrimination
prohibition of Title VII. On the one hand, the Commission has
severely limited the possibility of discrimination based on sex if
pursuant to employer policies. Any employment practices based on
"assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of
women in general" or on "stereotyped characteristics of the sexes"
are invalid.9 9 In the area of employment policies, employers are
being forced to decide to hire on the basis of an individual's qualifications. On the other hand, the Commission has proceeded slowly in
challenging state protective laws which may discriminate. 10 0
State protective laws are no different in principle from the
employer rules which have been condemned by the Commission.
They invariably proceed upon the basis of a "stereotyped characterization" of the sexes to the effect that women by their nature must
be afforded protection which it is unnecessary to extend to men. 10
It is true that the Commission's initial position was merely that
state laws constitute a "bona fide occupational qualification" exception to the sex discrimination ban if they in fact protect women from
9 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
98
See text accompanying notes 127-29 infra.
S29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1(a) (1) (i),(ii) (1965) (guidelines on discrimination because
of sex).
1
0°See notes 22-32 supra, and accompanying text. See, in particular, comments by Miss
Cunningham, Transcript, supra note 34, at 308-11.
101 Ile Colorado legislature has admitted as much by affirmative declaration. In COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-7-1 (1963), it is stated:

The welfare of the State of Colorado demands that women and minors be
protected from conditions of labor which have a pernicious effect on their
health and morals, and it is therefore hereby declared, in the exercise of the
police and sovereign power of the State of Colorado, that inadequate wages
and unsanitary conditions of labor exert such pernicious effect.
The Arizona Civil Rights Commission has expressly concluded that Arizona protective legislation "was based on the assumption that women were inferior to men
and in need of special protection." Reynolds v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
No. 17-12E (Ariz., Dec. 2, 1966), reported at BNA, FEP Summary of Latest
Developments, No. 48 (Dec. 22, 1966).
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exploitation or hazard.'" 2 Yet it is clear that in most cases the Commission would not allow such rules which are excepted from the Act
when in the form of state laws to be excepted if in the form of rules
held and applied by employers. To cite a case in point: the General
Counsel of the Commission has held that a union contract embodying
a blanket prohibition against women working as bartenders is violative of Title VII, unless a state statute contains such a prohibition.'
The Commission did not rule on the validity of such statutes, but
under the Commission's original test, state bartending restrictions
such as those mentioned earlier in this paper might have been upheld
as in fact protecting women from hazard, and perhaps from exploita1 04
tion.
In short, to say that state-declared stereotyped characterizations
of the sexes can be bona fide occupational qualifications is, more
often than not, to be unfaithful to the Commission's basic philosophy
under Title VII - that such rules if privately declared are invalid.
Whether or not the Commission's views ultimately will be accepted
by the courts, it does seem important that the Commission be consistent in giving content to the "bona fide occupational qualification"
exception. 0 5
It is suggested that the Commission should not hesitate to state
its views on rules pertaining to the -employment status of women,
whether those rules derive from employers or from state legislatures.
102 See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
03
1 Op. Gen. Counsel (July 21, 1966), FEP REPORTER 401:3009-10.
104Even so, no social unhappiness or molestation of women appears to have occurred
in states such as Colorado where the use of female bartenders is frequent. See, in
this regard, comments at note 84 supra and accompanying text. This fact illustrates
the chief difficulty with the sex discrimination ban of Title VII - the law attempts
to change some existing social mores while retaining others, with the dividing line
being extremely unclear. For example, the use of female washroom attendants has
been known for years on the European Continent, but it is certain that under Title
VII sex would be considered a bona fide occupational qualification justifying the
denial of employment to a female applying for the job of an attendant in a male
restroom in the United States. In this connection, the Commission has the task of
defining what the dividing line shall be under Title VII by giving content to the
phrase "bona fide occupational qualification." The Commission could start with
the proposition that there are virtually no types of legal employment where "built-in"
sex requirements exist, although certain occupations would be limited to one sex
due to the need for maintaining social order. For example, females could not be
used as guards in male penitentiaries. However, the Commission clearly will not
adopt this extreme a view, as illustrated by the washroom example given earlier.
Nevertheless, the resultant subjective nature of the "bona fide occupational qualifiqation" exception makes it important for the Commission to be cautious and consistent in giving content to that exception.
105 In addition to the need for consistency when dealing with a subjective standard,
discussed in note 104 supra, it is significant that state fair employment practice laws
generally adopt the "bona fide occupational qualification" phrase as an exception
to prohibited sex discrimination. Of the five states with sex discrimination bans in
their fair employment practice laws cited at note 112 infra, all but Wyoming
utilize the "bona fide occupational qualification" phrase. Undoubtedly the development of the meaning of the identical phrase in the federal law will be influential on
the content given to the exception in state usage.
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Only in this manner will the Commission be able to develop a workable approach as to when sex does and when it does not constitute a
bona fide occupational qualification.10 6 Then, any differences between employer rules and state rules would be placed in their proper
context - that of the intended jurisdictional scope of Title VII. The
Commission would have power to supersede state rules which are
considered offensive to Title VII to the extent that such state rules are
declared by the courts to have been preempted by the federal law.'
V.

JUDICIAL VIEWS AND PREEMPTION

It is natural for an administrative body charged with enforcement of a statute to seek to enforce and apply that statute as broadly
as possible. It is not surprising that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has followed this approach regarding the sex
discrimination ban of Title VII. At the same time, it is expected that
the courts should and will provide a check on overenthusiastic administrative positions. This check will be provided by the courts in the
case of sex discrimination. Since the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception will necessarily be given content to a large degree
on a subjective basis, 10 8 the restraint may be exercised by the courts
according to their views as to what is socially necessary in the way of
eliminating sex discrimination. And, given the meager legislative
history on the provision, this view may at the same time be rationalized as that which Congress "intended."
Nevertheless, the development just anticipated probably will not
take place as to the sex discrimination provision of Title VII to the
extent that it conflicts with state protective laws. The freedom of
106 To be consistent with Commission views on "stereotyped characterizations," it is
probable that all of the state protective laws regulating hours of work of women
and regulating the ability of women to work in hazardous occupations would not be
allowed to constitute "bona fide occupational qualification" exceptions. This result
is the position which has been urged recently in the Commission hearings by Mr.
Stephen Schlossberg, General Counsel of the United Auto Workers. 65 LAB. REL.
REP. 20-21 (May 8, 1967). However, Mr. Schlossberg viewed the law as being clear
that all state protective laws which conflict with the federal law are superseded by
Title VII. It is suggested that an examination of § 708 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is necessary before any conclusion as to the clarity of the law on this point
can be reached, and that upon such examination, the clarity discerned by Mr.
Schlossberg is not apparent. See discussion accompanying notes 127-29 infra.
10 The Commission has already stated that it has no power to insulate employers against
liability for violations of state laws. See note 30 supra. For this reason, the Commission has refrained from instructing employers to disregard the state protective
laws. Under the approach being suggested here, the Commission would still refrain
from instructing employers to violate state laws which are not considered preempted
by Title VII. However, it is not thought inconsistent for the Commission to state
that sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification with regard to a particular
statute just as it would not be with regard to a similar employer's rule, even though
the Commission may not be in a position to instruct an employer to disregard the
statute if that statute has not been preempted.
103See note 104 supra.
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the courts to act on such laws will be shaped by preemption considerations, a subject on which Congress has spoken. Section 708 of
Title VII reads as follows:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any
person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by
any present or future law of any State or political subdivision of
a State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit
the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this title. 10 9

This statute must be considered not only in the context of state protective laws, but also with regard to state unemployment compensation
and fair employment practice laws.
A. State FairEmployment PracticeLaws
Even though little illumination is shed by the congressional
floor debate on the sex discrimination provision of Title VII, one
matter is clear: Congress did not intend to supersede state antidiscrimination statutes. This view is apparent not only from the

legislative record, but also from the language previously quoted
from section 708.11° In addition, it has been established through
another provision of Title VII and through amplification by the
Commission that the Commission will defer for a statutory period of
time to state agencies enforcing state fair employment practice laws
before federal conciliatory or investigatory action will be taken."'
Of the states which have been examined in this paper, five
possess antidiscrimination statutes which include sex as a prohibited
109 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 708. Section '1104 of the same act contains a miscellan-

eous preemption provision:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating
an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such
title operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter,
nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the
purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.
Presumably the latter provision adds nothing new, when considered in conjunction
with § 708.
" 0 See remarks of Senator Humphrey, 110 CONG. REc. 12721 (1964). See also Purdy,
Title VII: Relationship and Effect on State Action, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 525
(1966).
M1Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706. That the deferral is a rather limited one is evidenced
by the following remarks of Senator Humphrey:
Section 706(b) provides that in a State with a nondiscrimination law the
individual must first follow state procedures for 60 days (or in some
cases, 120 days). However, to avoid the possible imposition of onerous
state requirements for initiating a proceeding, subsection (b) provides that
to comply with the requirement of prior resort to the state agency, an
individual need merely send a written statement of the facts to the state
agency by registered mail. 110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964).
For a general discussion of this section, see Rosen, Division of Atahority Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Preliminary Study in Federal-State
Interagency Relations, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 846 (1966).
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ground.' Of these, only three have been accepted by the Commission as possessing sufficiently effective enforcement procedures for
the Commission to follow Title VII's procedure for deferral to the
state enforcement agency.1 13
While no preemption problem is generally presented as to these
statutes since they do not "purport" to allow unlawful employment
practices, this is not absolutely clear in two instances. The Nebraska
statute contains a provision to the effect that its antidiscrimination
statute is not intended to repeal "any of the provisions of the civil
rights law, any other law of this state, or any municipal ordinance
relating to discrimination because of race, creed, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.""' 4 The intended scope of this provision is unclear; certainly it could be said that the Nebraska legislation discussed
earlier which regulates the employment of women "relates to" discrimination because of sex, and thus is left untouched by the state
fair employment practice law. If this be true, it could be argued that
the Nebraska saving provision "purports" to permit acts which would
be an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. This conclusion is somewhat circular in that acts complying with state law will
constitute unlawful employment practices only to the extent the state
protective laws are preempted. However, assuming that some of
Nebraska's state protective legislation would be preempted, then to
that extent the state's antidiscrimination law would also be ousted.
However, the saving provision of the Nebraska antidiscrimination statute need not be read as broadly as above. The phrase
"relating to" could, and probably should, be read to refer to other
state statutes in existence which tend to promote elimination of the
previously named categories of discrimination.
Greater difficulty on the preemption subject exists with the Utah
fair employment practice act. That law states that it is an unfair
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
person otherwise qualified because of sex, among other grounds.' 1 5
However, the statute also states that "otherwise qualified" means
"possessing the education, training, ability, moral character, integrity,
disposal to work, adherence to reasonable rules and regulations, and
1 12

ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1401 to -1485 (Supp. 1966); Idaho Laws 1961,
ch. 309, as amended, H.B. 34, L. 1967 (FEP REPORTER 451:725); Neb. Laws
1965, L.B. 656, as amended, L. 1967, L.B. 357 (FEP REPORTER 451:725); UTAH

CODE ANN. §§ 34-17-1 to -8 (1966); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-257 to -264 (Supp.
1965). Of these statutes, those of Arizona, Nebraska and Utah appear to have been

patterned directly after Title VII.
11 FEP REPORTER 401:1022-23. The three states accepted by the Commission for
deferral purposes are Nebraska, Wyoming and Utah. For a policy guide on deferral.
see FEP REPORTER 451:1-4, 8, 10.
114Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act § 24, FEP REPORTER 451:733.
215 UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-17-6 (1966).
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other qualifications required by an employer for any particular
job."" 6 This added definition is sufficiently broad and subjective to
permit a conclusion that the statute "purports" to permit acts which
would be unlawful employment practices under Title VII of the
federal statute. The "otherwise qualified" definition does appear to
enervate significantly the Utah statute.
Magnifying the difficulty with the Utah statute is the existence
of certain administrative regulations. In those regulations it is said
that consideration can be given to sex as a "bona fide occupational
qualification" in terms of job performance, community standards of
morality or propriety, or in fulfilling the provisions of other statutes,
citing the Utah statute which prohibits the employment of women in
mines and smelters."17 The factor of community standards of morality
or propriety would again seem to allow a wide range of subjective
judgments that may or may not be based on discriminatory attitudes.
Also, the reference to other statutes indicates rather clearly that at
least as to the statute dealing with mines and minerals, sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification by administrative declaration. Such a
conclusion can stand only if the state statute referred to in the regulation itself remains valid under Title VII.1 8 Since no other example
is cited by the regulation, whether or not sex is a bona fide occupational qualification as to the other state protective laws existing in
Utah can only be treated on a case by case basis." 9
B. Unemployment Compensation Legislation
In general, state unemployment compensation statutes which
provide benefits for female employees terminated from their employment because of pregnancy do not conflict with Title VII to any
significant degree.'
If those statutes which deny benefits to pregnant females were to be translated into employer rules denying
severance pay in such situations, it is probable that these rules would
llBId.
17

FEP REPORTER 451:1158a.
I' 8 See note 130 infra.
11A similar problem is presented by the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act.
The state attorney general has declared that the Fair Employment Practices Act does
not conflict with the provision of the Alcoholic Beverages Act which prohibits the
employment of females as bartenders (see note 82 supra). Wyo. Arr'Y GEN. OP.
No. 11541 (Sept. 14, 1965). A further difficulty is presented in the Wyoming and
Utah situations, in that it is not inevitable that administrative regulations constitute
state "law" for purposes of federal preemption under § 708. If so, as would seem
to be the most sensible result, the fact that such regulations might be preempted
should not have any effect on the validity of the basic fair employment practices
statutes. This conclusion should be equally applicable to administrative regulations
amplifying or underlying state protective legislation, such as the Colorado mining
regulations, discussed in the text accompanying note 80 supra.
120 See text accompanying notes 87-91 supra.
1
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violate Title VII in the view of the Commission.'
Thus in that
sense, the state statutes are inconsistent with the spirit of Title VII.
Other statutes in the unemployment compensation field embody
such an inconsistency to a larger degree. For example, a Montana
statute exists denying unemployment compensation to a female leaving
her most recent job to be married, with no such penalty for male
employees.' 2 Another Montana provision states that no benefits are
payable to an employee leaving her most recent job to change her
place of residence to remain with her husband or relatives.' 2 3 Provisions similar to the latter one exist in Utah and Idaho, and in no
case does an equivalent provision exist pertaining to male employees.' 24 If these rules were held by private employers, it is clear
that the Commission would disapprove of them. 2 5 Yet according to
the language of section 708 of Title VII, the provisions in state laws
are not preempted because the state, in providing or denying unemployment compensation benefits, cannot commit an unlawful employment practice.'2 6 Conceivably the inconsistency between these statutes
and Title VII is sufficient to permit the invocation of common law
preemption authority.
These statutory provisions are, however, relatively innocuous.
They would in all likelihood be made to apply equally to males and
females by the states concerned. The fact that section 708 of Title VII
does not cover these provisions is not of serious concern.
C. Protective Laws
The most pressing and difficult questions arising under section
708 stem from those state laws which truly originated for "protective"
reasons. It might well be argued that all of such laws should be
eliminated to the same extent that similar employer rules would be
disapproved by the Commission under Title VII - that is, in almost
121 The

Commission has ruled that pregnancy must be given special recognition in order
to provide substantial equality of employment opportunity for both sexes, and that
an employer may not maintain a rule automatically discharging pregnant women
without first offering them leaves of absence. Op. Gen. Counsel (Aug. 17, 1966),
note 87 supra.
12 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 87-106(g) (!961).
13Id. at § 87-106(j).
124 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1366(c)

(1948) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(i) (1966).
This conclusion is made clear from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
interpretative opinions dealing with insurance plans provided by employers for
their employees. The Commission has ruled that assumptions pertaining to the
structure of families, e.g., who is dependent upon whom, who is head of the household, are irrelevant as far as employer rules are concerned. The rules must be equally
applicable to males and females. See Interpretative Opinions, FEP REPORTER
401:1011-12.
12 Title VII addressed only discriminatory employment practices by employers possessing
the jurisdictional number of employees. See text accompanying note 5, 6 supra.
125
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all cases. 127 Yet the preemption provision of Title VII may not lead
to such a result.
If section 708 is to go beyond the preservation of state antidiscrimination statutes, the problem is to discern a dividing line
between those state statutes which will and those which will not be
preempted by Title VII. There appear to be three possible judicial
solutions within the language of section 708. First, a court could
conclude that, contrary to the Commission's initial views, any denial
of employment to a female on the basis of potential hazard to her
would be a situation in which sex is a bona fide occupational qualification whether or not a state law existed. This stance, however, would
eliminate most of the substance of the sex discrimination ban.
A second solution could be to stress the word "purports" as used
in section 708. Since any state statute not "purporting" to permit an
unlawful employment practice is not disturbed by Title VII, it could
be held that no statute which on its face retains an underlying protective policy pertinent to the modern labor force can "purport" to
allow an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. The Commission's initial statement that a statute must, not only by design but
also in effect, protect women from hazard is thus incorporated into
this second solution. Statutes which set patently "unreasonable"
limitations on the employment of women according to modern standards would "purport" on their faces to allow unlawful employment
practices.
This approach is admittedly somewhat amotphous. The inquiry
into which statutes will continue to be valid will necessarily be
directed to whether or not legitimate differences between the sexes
exist as to the type of activity being regulated by a given statute. The
difficulty presented is that the Commission has ruled that employers
may not generalize as to employment practices if some women would
thereby be prejudiced, even though the women who might complain
would be few compared with the total number of women affected by
the particular rule. But as far as the states are concerned, surely
their police power permits generalizations which continue to address
the majority of women regulated thereby even to the detriment of
a few. Those protective laws retaining meaningful underlying
policies would appear to represent examples of such generalizations.
Since it does not appear that Congress intended to invalidate these
generalizations, this second approach has been formulated as an
attempt to interpret section 708 accordingly.
The third possibility is for courts to conclude that all state laws
which in fact foster sex discrimination "purport" to allow unlawful
127 This

argument has been presented to the Commission in the recent hearings which
were held on state protective laws. See note 106 sspra
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employment practices because based on "stereotyped characteristics,"
even though in individual cases sex might be a bona fide occupational
qualification. This solution has the advantages of being consistent
with the Commission's approach to sex discrimination generally and
of being easily administered. However, the result was probably not
intended by Congress,12 and it would be unlikely that the courts
would promote such a broad conclusion - that all state protective
laws "purport" to allow unlawful employment practices - without
any support from legislative history.
As to the second solution, no guarantee exists that it would snare
all capricious or outmoded state statutes. Another drawback of this
second solution is that it depends completely on the word "purports."
It therefore would allow practices under a given state statute which
would constitute unlawful employment practices in other states without such a statute. A possible result could be widespread legislation
in those states lacking provisions regulating the employment of
women.
Nevertheless, it is thought that the second solution represents
the most likely resolution of the matter. Courts will probably attempt
to give content to Title VII, and a conclusion that "protection from
hazard" always permits application of the bona fide occupational
qualification exception seems a bit strong even for the courts. In
addition, the conclusion is definitely contrary to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's opinions. The second solution, on
the other hand, does provide a reconciliation of Commission statements with section 708 and forces no real commitment by the courts
with regard to the "protection from hazard" defense when no state
statute exists.
The second solution could be further supported by reading section 708 in a more general and traditional manner with regard to
preemption. As once stated by Justice Stone, "As a matter of statutory construction Congressional intention to displace local laws in
the exercise of the commerce power is not, in general, to be inferred
unless clearly indicated by those considerations which are persuasive
of the statutory purpose." 129 It may be said that a discussion of the
"statutory purpose" behind the sex discrimination provision of Title
VII is an empty inquiry due to the origin of the provision as a floor
amendment. Clearly, however, the general purpose of Title VII is to
eliminate discriminatory motives in hiring practices, and in that sense
the purpose of the sex discrimination provision does not demand the
wholesale elimination of state statutes and regulations in fact designed to protect women from "exploitation and hazard."
In See text accompanying notes 13-19 rupra.
12 Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940).
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VI. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

The interpretative view of section 708 favored in the previous
comments results in upholding certain existing state protective legislation.'" 0 It goes without saying that such a result must not contravene the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. This
inquiry is limited to the question of whether the policy or policies
underlying the legislation left standing by section 708 constitute a
valid exercise by the state of its police power. 18 '
Under the present state of judge-made law it is clear that most,
if not all, of the protective legislation earlier discussed is constitutional. The outstanding authority in the area of maximum hours for
women is the 1908 Supreme Court decision of Muller v. Oregon.'3 2
Responding to an exhaustive collection of economic and medical data
briefed by Louis Brandeis, the Court concluded that physical differences between men and women did exist and that long hours for
women were harmful to motherhood and thus to the public interest.' 3 3 Therefore it was held that state legislation prohibiting women
as a class from long hours of work was justified and was not in
conflict with the Federal Constitution." 4 Significantly the Court had
indicated that it reached this result in order "to secure a real equality
of right."'

13

5

The Muller decision has been relied upon subsequently to sustain
other state legislation limiting hours of work for females when such
legislation would not have been considered valid if pertaining to
males.136 As has been noted elsewhere,' 7 such reliance was not
necessarily justified if the legislation in question, although represent130No specific appraisal of each protective law under the author's view of preemption
has been undertaken. However, since that view discards statutes with outmoded
rationale, it is probable that, in general, legislation prohibiting women from working
in jobs requiring constant standing would be preempted. Laws limiting hours of
work for females could be disapproved, at least where such laws no longer have
protective influence due to the effect of federal and state wage and hour legislation.
(Recall the position arguably taken by the Commission on this subject at the recent
hearings, note 35 supra. See also text accompanying notes 138-40 infra.) Laws
regulating female employment in underground mining address the worst type of
working conditions involving considerable physical danger and, perhaps, danger of
physical assault; these probably will continue to be valid. Bartending statutes are a
marginal case. Such laws depend upon a social view of morality which does not
appear relevant to the latter half of the twentieth century. Statutes requiring rest
periods and seating for women also appear obsolete. Such statutes need not operate
to provoke unlawful employment practices. In all likelihood the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission will be successful in urging states to revise voluntarily the
latter type of statute so that the statutes apply equally to males and females.
131 Cf. Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
132208 U.S. 412 (1908).
13 Id. at 421-22.
' 34 Id. at 423.
135 Id.
138See, e.g., State v. Dominion Hotel, 17 Ariz. 267, 273, 151 P. 958, 960 (1915).
137 Murray & Eastwood, lane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII,
34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 232, 237 (1965).
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ing a classification based on sex, actually did not serve to equalize
rights of males and females in the labor force.
Most maximum hour legislation did have as its purpose the
improvement of general working standards and was not intended to
coddle the female sex.' 8 The Fair Labor Standards Act and state
wage and hour legislation have rendered this purpose obsolete to a
certain extent.' 39 Yet to the extent women are not covered by overtime restrictions, maximum hour legislation would appear to remain
useful. In fact, retention and expansion of the legislation under such
circumstances was the official recommendation of the President's
Commission on the Status of Women as recently as 1965.14°
In the area of state statutes on bartending, the Supreme Court
declared in 1948 that:
Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working
behind a bar. This is so despite the vast changes in the social and
legal position of women. The fact that women may now have
achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced,
does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between
the sexes,
certainly, in such matters as the regulation of the liquor
41
traffic.1

This language was quoted in 1957 without discussion by the Supreme
Court of Idaho to sustain an Idaho statute restricting licenses for
bartending to males. 142 These cases were decided on the basis of
moral judgments; the goal of labor equality was not considered.
Thus the validity of the bartending statutes under the fourteenth
amendment may be open to question sooner than will the maximum
hour legislation.
In this connection, recent speculation has been forthcoming to
the effect that the Supreme Court would readily revise the formulations of the Muller and Goesaert decisions, 143 if presented with an
appropriate case.144 But unless and until such renovation takes place
138M. MEAD & F. KAPLAN, AMERICAN WOMEN 55-57, 128-30, 132-33 (1965).
13ld.

at 55, 133.

14°ld. at 211-12. Esther Peterson, Executive Vice Chairman of the President's Commis-

141

sion, has pointed out that the FLSA still retains significant exceptions and exemptions
leaving a good portion of the labor force not covered. Peterson, Working Women, in
THE WOMAN IN AMERICA 160 (1965). No doubt this situation was alleviated by
the 1966 amendments to the FLSA, but it was not eliminated. It is interesting to
note, incidentally, that the views of the President's Commission on the effect of the
FLSA lend support to the hypothetical position posed by the EEOC to Mr. Schlossberg in the recent hearings, described at note 35 supra.
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1948).

142 State v. Burke, 79 Idaho 205, 206, 312 P.2d 806, 807 (1957).
143 See notes 132, 141 supra.

'

See generally Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Art of
1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62 (1964); Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the
Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 232, 238-42
(1965) ; Note, 50 IOWA L. REV. 778 (1965). The President's Commission on the
Status of Women urged such a reconsideration by the United States Supreme Court
in its recommendations. M. MEAD & F. KAPLAN, AMERICAN WOMEN 212 (1965).
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it is clear that state protective legislation on maximum hours, on
bartending, and probably in general does not offend the fourteenth
amendment.1 45 Renovation might be achieved through the second
approach suggested earlier to the preemption question. Under that
approach to section 708, state statutes with anachronistic underlying
46
policies would not be allowed to stand.
CONCLUSION

The existence of state protective laws regulating the employment
of women remains the rule rather than the exception in current state
labor legislation. The statutes range from those requiring affirmative
conveniences, such as seats for female employees, to those restricting
the privileges of women to work long hours or in hazardous occupations. The philosophy of these statutes, particularly the latter type,
is dissonant with the philosophy of the sex discrimination ban of
Title VII. In this connection, it has been suggested in this article that
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission should tread carefully when speaking in terms of a state protective law as constituting
a "bona fide occupational qualification" exception where an employer's rule identical with the state protective law would not stand under
the Civil Rights Act. Because of the inherent vagueness in the "bona
fide occupational qualification" exception, and because of the frequent adoption of the same language of exception by state fair
employment practice laws, it seems important for the Commission
to avoid the confusion attending the use of a double standard in
giving content to the phrase. Thus, it is thought that the Commission
should uniformly define the jobs for which sex does constitute a
bona fide occupational qualification, regardless of the existence of a
pertinent state protective law.
However, in administering Title VII, it is not suggested that the
Commission should exceed the bounds of that which Congress
intended. While little is clear from the meager legislative history on
the provision, it does not appear that Congress intended to accomplish the wholesale elimination of state protective legislation or of
ither types of state legislation pertaining to the employment of
women. And to the extent this question remains in doubt, constitu145 A proposal to add an equal-rights amendment to the Federal Constitution whereby

neither the United States nor any state could deny or abridge equal rights under
the law because of sex has been introduced in every Congress since 1923. M. MEAD
& F. KAPLAN, supra note 144, at 147; Murray & Eastwood, supra note 137, at 236.
In fact, in the House debate on Title VII, Rep. Celler expressed surprise at the
introduction of the sex amendment due to the existence of such a proposal before
the Congress at that time. 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964). Perhaps the failure of Congress to ado pt this amendment contains a further inference that Congress did not
intend to make a clean sweep of state protective legislation by its enactment of the
sex amendment to Title VII.
146 See text following note 127 supra.
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tional problems being absent, any solution should at least be couched
in terms of intended federal preemption according to an interpretation
of the provison of Title VII on that subject. In this article, a middle
position on the preemption statute as it applies to state protective
laws has been put forward as the most likely resolution of the matter.
This solution allows state protective legislation to stand as long as it
does not on its face "purport" to allow unlawful employment practices in the sense of being patently outdated as far as the modern
woman's capabilities or inclinations are concerned. This results in
permitting employers to deny employment to women because of a
state protective law when such employment could not be denied on
the basis of an employer's rule. Nevertheless, this is a question of
federalism and of the extent to which Congress intended to legislate.
The result is that certain discriminatory employment practices (where
sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification) which Congress
did not intend to eliminate, will remain.
With regard to social policy, the initial reaction is that the
modern woman should not be subjected to state protective restrictions
on her right to work should she choose to experience the conditions
from which she is being protected. However, it is clear that the
extent to which sex differences constitute "discrimination" is a question of degree, depending upon what social mores it seems desirable
to perpetuate. Whether or not sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification" in any given situation is a difficult question. Individuals
would be more likely to disagree in this area than they would as to
race, color, creed or national origin as the basis of a "bona fide
occupational qualification." As to the latter, general agreement can
be obtained that bona fide qualification instances will be rare.' 4 7
But as to sex discrimination, countervailing considerations of preserving femininity and motherhood appear. Problems of physical
capabilities and of the propriety of mixing the sexes exist which are
not present with regard to the other forms of discrimination.
These problems inevitably mean that as to sex, the existence of a
bona fide occupational qualification will be asserted by employers
with some frequency, and at the same time these assertions will be
extremely difficult to establish as fact. Without the availability of
"rules" of any nature allowing employers to deny employment to
women where the employment would be hazardous or strenuous,
complaints against employers could be frequent and burdensome.
Yet the percentage of women in the labor force who would be perturbed about being denied hard labor employment would in all like'47

See, e.g., the HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT ON H.R. 7152, H.R. REP. No. 914,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (analysis of § 704(e)), in BNA, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 161 '(1964).
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lihood be quite small. In addition, denial of employment with long
,hours due to state statutes on maximum hours for women still serves
in some instances to protect and promote labor standards for women.
Thus total elimination of all state protective laws does not seem
appropriate at the present time.
For these reasons, it is thought that the second judicial solution
to the preemption problem which was suggested previously is the
most desirable. This solution reserves to the state and indirectly to
employers the right to administer "rules" genuinely designed to protect women from hazardous or onerous working conditions. Clearly
outdated statutes would not be allowed to stand. This scheme admittedly promotes maternalism through the device of a little paternalism, but this fact would not seem to be offensive - paternalism is an
inbred characteristic of many laws aimed at protecting a certain group
of society. Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
has reflected this fact by having injected a bit of paternalism into the
sex discrimination problem through ruling that pregnancy must be
given special consideration by employers. And in any event, the
areas of work left regulated by the states under the approach being
suggested would be few in the total employment picture, leaving the
sex discrimination ban of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act essentially
unfettered and free to accomplish its intended goal of eliminating
discriminatory practices within the employment relationship.

COURT CONGESTION AND CRASH PROGRAMS:

A CASE STUDY
By

GRESHAM M. SYKES*

AND
MICHAEL ISBELL**
Court congestion, and the resultant serious time lapse between
filing of pleadings and trial of civil cases, has been for years a major
problem of both state and federal court systems. The Federal District Courts in particular face a growing backlog of pending civil
cases. In the spring of 1966 the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado conducted an intensive six-week program
designed to reduce the Court's backlog. The operation and effects
of the program were studied by the Administration of Justice Program of the College of Law at the University of Denver. Professor
Sykes and Mr. Isbell report the findings of this study and examine
the question of whether judicial manpower might have been more
efficiently employed during the program. The Court must continue
to experiment with small, tentative changes, and systematically
evaluate the effectiveness of the changes, if remedies for congestion
are to be found. These experiments might be directed at such goals
as more accurate estimation of length of trials, more precise prediction of which cases will be settled out of court, and more efficient management of judicial time for performing nontrial duties.

DELAY in court has long been viewed as a serious defect dogging our legal system, and over the years society has attempted
to cure it with a variety of remedies. Yet despite the imagination
and effort devoted to getting rid of this malaise of the law, it
appears that we are not much better off than we were 60 years ago
when Roscoe Pound delivered his address on "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice" at the annual
meeting of the American Bar Association in 1906.1 Court congestion
is still a critical social problem, a basic threat to legal rights, and a
major weakness of our tribunals.
The United States District Courts have suffered from this difficulty along with the variety of state courts. In recent years, however,
the situation in state courts appears to have improved while the
situation in Federal District Courts has grown worse; and the need
*Professor of Law and Social Science, College of Law, University of Denver.
*"Member of the Colorado Bar; A.B., University of Colorado, 1964; J.D., University
of Denver, 1966.
1
Repvinted in 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1956).
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for effective remedial action in the Federal system has become ever
more pressing. Between 1960 and 1965, civil cases filed in all
United States District Courts increased approximately 17%, from
57,791 cases to 67,678 cases. Although the percentage of cases terminated also increased during this period, cases were still coming into
the courts at a faster rate than they could be disposed of. As a consequence, the backlog of cases grew from 61,251 in 1960 to 74,395
in 1965. The United States District Courts, despite the fact that
they had increased the rate of disposition between 1960 and 1965,
were being confronted with increasing congestion.'
A part of the increase in filings can be attributed, of course,
to the increase in the population in the United States which went
from some 181 million in 1960 to 195 million in 1965, a growth of
about 8%. Since the United States Census Bureau has estimated that
the population may very probably grow to 380 million by the year
2010, approximately double the 1960 figure, it is clear that the
courts will undoubtedly be faced with a greatly expanded work load
which cannot be solved by minor tinkering with the system.'
On July 1, 1964, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, (hereinafter referred to as the Colorado U.S. District Court) had a backlog of 426 civil cases pending. During the
ensuing fiscal year, 586 new cases were filed and 518 cases were
terminated, increasing the backlog to 494 cases - a growth of
about 16%. At this rate, the backlog of the Colorado U.S. District
Court would double in six or seven years, although, fortunately, it
would still not approach the staggering burden of the Southern District of New York (10,180 civil cases pending, July 1, 1964), Eastern District of Pennsylvania (5,287 cases pending), or Eastern
District of Louisiana (3,952 cases pending) .4
In 1965 the Colorado U.S. District Court ranked very near the
midpoint for all United States District Courts in terms of the amount
2 See

REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,

OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP.
(1965). See generally Lagging Justice, 328 ANNALS (1960).
3 The projections vary between 438 million and 322 million, depending on different
assumptions concerning the birth rate. J. SIEGEL, M. ZITTER, & D. AKERS, PROJECDIRECTOR

TIONS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, BY AGE AND SEX: 1964 TO 1985,
WITH EXTENSIONS TO 2010, at 55 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population

Rep., Ser. P-25, Pub. No. 286, 1964). Projections
not available, but the Bureau of the Census has
from 2,971,000 to 2,726,000. Since Colorado had
this could well mean an increase of about 65% in
CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REP., SER. P-25,

for Colorado for the year 2010 are
made estimates for 1985, ranging
a population of 1,754,000 in 1960,
25 years. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE
PUB. No. 326, ILLUSTRATIVE PRO-

JECTIONS OF THE POPULATION OF THE STATES: 1970 TO 1985, at 14-15 (1966).
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra

75, app. table Cl.

note 2, at 174-
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of time between a case being "at issue" and coming to trial.5 This fact,
however, must be interpreted with caution. A premature complacency about dealing with delay with apparently somewhat greater
efficiency than many United States District Courts may be misleading, since Colorado's slightly better performance may be due, at
least in part, to the types of cases filed and the relatively lower frequency of jury trials, rather than to greater efficiency in administrative procedures.
The distribution of types of cases filed in the Colorado U.S.
District Court differs slightly from the distribution of cases filed in
all United States District Courts. There is a somewhat larger percentage of contract actions and a somewhat smaller percentage of
tort actions in Colorado; and since, in general, contract actions
require less trial time than tort actions, the difference in the types
of cases filed may help explain Colorado's slight edge in the number
of months between cases "at issue" and trial -a median of 10
months in Colorado compared to approximately 11 months for all
Federal District Courts. In addition, in the Colorado U. S. District
Court there are relatively fewer jury trials in civil and criminal cases,
and this, too, may help to speed the judicial process.'
I.

THE CRASH PROGRAM

-

OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS

In any event, a desire to better the situation prompted the
Court, under the direction of Chief Judge Alfred A. Arraj, to undertake an intensive six-week program to see what could be done about
the growing number of cases awaiting court action. From the middle
of April 1966, to the end of May 1966, two judges trying cases five
days a week were to be added to the Court's normal complement of
three judges.7
In order to determine the effect of the program (which one
newspaper termed rather dramatically a "massive assault on the
backlog"), the Court invited the Administration of Justice Program
of the College of Law at the University of Denver to study its
5

As Milton Green has pointed out, "Considerable difficulty is encountered in ascribing
a precise meaning to the term 'at issue.' " We are using it here, as Green suggests,
to refer to
the status of a case when final pleadings on both sides have been filed and
preliminary motions have been disposed of. In some jurisdictions, however,
the term is used in a different sense. For instance, in New Jersey a case is
considered "at issue" when the first answering pleading is filed, whereas in
New York a case is not considered "at issue" until the pleadings have been
completed, all preliminary motions made and determined, and a certificate
filed by the attorneys indicating that the case is ready for trial.
Green, The Situation in 1959, in Lagging justice, 328 ANNALS 7, 9 n.7 (1960).
6
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 204.
7The additional judicial manpower was to be drawn from Federal District Courts in
other states, depending on the work load of these judges in their courts.
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operation during this period. 8 The Court started with 111 cases
which it intended to dispose of during the six-week period, in order
to reduce its backlog to more manageable proportions; and the outcome of these cases was as follows:
Cases Disposed of Priorto the Crash Program
1 case went to trial before the crash program got underway and was disposed of by the Court;
1 case was disposed of before the crash program by a
default judgment;
1 case was disposed of before the crash program by a
summary judgment;
33 cases were settled out of court before the crash program and thus did not require a trial.
Cases Disposed of During the Crash Program
29 cases were settled during the crash program (of these
29 cases, 7 involved a total of approximately 24 hours
of trial time as a part of the process of settlement) ;
32 cases were completed by trial during the crash program
and were disposed of by the Court;
3 cases were disposed of by the Court during the crash
program by a summary judgment.
Cases Not Disposed of at the End of the Crash Program
7 cases were postponed for disposition, until after the end
of the crash program, at the request of the attorneys;
4 cases were not brought to trial during the crash program, since further action by the Court was required or
settlements which had been reached required later
official approval.
It would appear, then, that by the end of the Colorado U.S.
District Court's crash program, 100 cases of its planned work load
of 111 cases, i.e. 90o, had been eliminated. In the sense that the
great share of the backlog represented by the cases scheduled for
this period was disposed of, the crash program could well be
acclaimed a success.
However, the following points should be noted:
First, 36 cases were disposed of before the crash program had
even begun. And of these 36 cases, 33 were settled out of court by
agreement between the parties and attorneys.
SThe Administration of Justice Program is financed primarily by a grant from the
Russell Sage Foundation and has as one of its major objectives the creation of closer
bonds between law and the social sciences. Special appreciation is to be expressed to
Michael Katch and Robert Minter, students at the College of Law, for their work in
the study, and to Mr. G. Walter Bowman and Mr. James Manspeaker of the Colorado
District Court for their cooperation.
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Second, 64 cases were disposed of during the crash program;
but of these 64 cases, 29 were settled by agreement between the
parties and attorneys.
In short - about one-third of the cases (32) were disposed of
by a trial verdict during the crash program.
It is possible that the 32 cases disposed of by trial during the
crash program represented a full work load for the judicial manpower available in the six-week period. The original plan, which
scheduled more than three times this number for trial, might not be
as naive or overly optimistic as it may appear at first glance, since
the Court might have been operating with a well-reasoned expectation born of long experience that most cases scheduled for trial will
not come to trial in fact. Indeed, the act of scheduling a case for
trial may increase the chances of settlement, making a trial unnecessary: explicitly planning an event at a definite time and place makes
it unlikely that the event will occur.'
It is also possible, however, that the 32 cases disposed of by
trial during the crash program did not represent a full work load
for the judicial manpower available in the six-week period. If this
were true - if the judges had trial time they were not using - and
if additional cases for trial had been available to be substituted for
those which had been settled out of court, the total number of cases
disposed of both by trial and settlement could have been far greater.
If we assume, for example, that (1) the Court had tried and disposed of 32 cases as scheduled; (2) 62 cases had been disposed of
by settlement out of court; and (3) 62 additional cases had been
substituted for those settled and these additional cases had been
brought to trial; then, the Court could have disposed of 156 cases
approximately 41% more dispositions than originally conceived
by the crash program. The crucial question, then, is whether the
judicial manpower of the Court was fully employed in taking
care of the 32 cases disposed of by trial and whether additional cases
could have been substituted for those disposed of by settlement.
9 If a case has definitely been scheduled for trial, settlement may become more likely
because the uncertainties of trial outcome loom larger in the minds of attorneys and
a settlement becomes preferable. It is also possible that full, detailed work on a case,
on the part of attorneys, may be delayed until it seems certain that a case will go to
trial. As this process comes into play, a basis for a mutually acceptable settlement is
more likely to emerge and a trial becomes unnecessary. Robert Merton has analyzed
the phenomenon of the self-fulfilling prophecy in which the prediction of an event
makes its occurrence more likely. See R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE (1949). We seem to be dealing here with the phenomenon of the sell-

defeating prophecy.
Whether the "rush to settlement" under the threat of an impending trial results
in more just settlements remains an unexplored issue.
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II.

TRIAL CALENDARS

-

PREDICTING LENGTH OF TRIALS

The actual length of the judge's working day has, of course,
been subject to much popular debate - and to much misunderstanding. Time spent in trial is in fact only one portion of the judge's
work and much effort must be devoted to hearing motions, writing
decisions, keeping abreast of the legal literature, pre-trial conferences, et cetera. Furthermore, as one writer has pointed out, "judges
are not ordinary employees and the problem of delay in court, if the
judiciary is to retain its dignity and independence, is not simply one
of time-clock efficiency."' 0
Under the crash program, four days of each week were to be
devoted to the trial of cases for the three regular judges of the
Colorado U.S. District Court. The fifth day of the week was to be
set aside for other judicial duties such as those mentioned above.
Thus, the regular judges were to provide a total of 72 days available for the trial of cases during the six-week crash program. As far
as the visiting jurists were concerned, each was to spend five days a
week on the trial of cases, providing a total of 60 additional days
available for trial work. The entire number of trial days available
to the Court, then, during the crash program would in theory amount
to 132 days.

Now in setting cases for trial, it is necessary for the Court to
predict as accurately as possible the length of time each case is expected to take, so that a rational calendar of cases can be established."1 The predicted lengths of trial for the cases in the crash
program were as follows:
Total PredictedDays of
Type of Case
Number
Trial Time Required
Contract
27
49.25
Tort
40
95.25
Actions under Statutes
42
112.00
Real Estate
Total

2
111

1.50
258.00

Since the Court had predicted that the total number of trial
days required for the cases in the crash program would amount to
258, it is evident that the Court could not possibly have completed
its work if its predictions for the length of cases were correct and
if all cases did in fact go to trial.
Such a massive discrepancy could be explained on several
grounds. First, it might be argued that the Court did not expect that
10
t

H.

ZRISEL,

H. KALVEN, & B. BUCHHOLz, DELAY IN THE

COURT

14 (1959).

These predicted lengths of trial are determined during the course of pre-trial confer.
ences, based on the evaluations of the attorneys and agreed to by the Court.
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all the cases in its crash program would actually go to trial but rather
that they would be settled before reaching the court or settled quickly
after the trial began. Since this is in fact what happened and seems
to be the common experience of the Court, we think it is likely that
the expectation of settlement was an important element in explaining the Court's scheduling far more trial work than it could actually
accomplish.
Second, it is possible that the Court had knowingly accepted
overestimated trial times for the cases it had scheduled; and thus
its apparent excessive work load could actually have been disposed
of within the period of the crash program. The Court would need
far less than the 258 days it had predicted -it
could accomplish
its duties in the 132 days available.
If we take the 32 cases actually tried, to get some information
on this last point, we find that the Court had based its plans on the
estimate that these cases would require a total of 77.5 days for their
disposition. If we assume that a judge spends an average of 6 hours
per day in the trial of cases, the 32 cases would have taken 465 hours
to complete." Li fact, these 32 cases were disposed of in some 292
hours.
In other words, the Court overestimated the time needed for its
trial work by a factor of about one and one-half - at least for those
cases actually reaching the trial stage."2
It is true, of course, that the flow of trial work is not continuous and that a case which ends before its predicted half-day or fullday mark leaves an awkward gap of several hours or more about
which little can be done as far as starting another case is concerned.
It makes little sense, after all, to begin a case at three o'clock in the
afternoon or to expect the parties to a case to present themselves
before the Court at a moment's notice. Nonetheless, it appears likely
that the predictions of length of trial were grossly inaccurate.
At the same time, the Court with its extra complement of judges
could have completed its disposition of 32 cases by trial in about
three and one-half weeks, even with these inaccuracies of prediction
about length of trial, if the Court had not been faced with unexpected settlements for which no substitute cases could be found in
time and which left large holes in the trial calendar.14 Without the
12

The number of hours per day a judge spends on trial work in the courtroom is highly
variable, depending on the press of other duties, gaps in the trial calendar, local
expectations about a "normal" working day, personal work habits, etc. On the whole,
however, the calculation of one day being equivalent to approximately six hours spent
in trial work on the average does not seem unreasonable. Cf. H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN,
& B. BUCHHOLZ, supra note 10, ch. 16, at 181-89.
13 Of the 32 cases going to trial, only 4 cases took longer than expected.
14 The Court was able to schedule 14 additional cases which had not been a part of the
original planning for the crash program. Nine of these cases were disposed of before
the program ended and involved a total of approximately 52 hours of trial time.
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help of the additional judges, the 32 cases would have required
about six weeks and two days for their disposal. On the other hand,
if the Court had been more accurate in its predictions in the number
of days required for each case, and again assuming the Court had
not been left with gaps in its calendar by unexpected settlement, the
32 cases could have been disposed of in approximately two weeks
and one day. Without the help of the additional judges, the Court
would have needed four weeks and one day.
III.

THE NEED FOR CONTINUED EXPERIMENTATION

The essential elements of the Colorado U.S. District Court's
crash program, then, can be summarized as follows: (1) the Court
attempted to eliminate 111 cases (about one-fifth of its backlog)
with 132 judge-days in a six-week period; (2) about one-third of
these cases were disposed of by trial and about two-thirds of these
cases were settled out of court, either before or during the crash
program; (3) approximately 50 judge-days were required for the
disposal of cases by trial; (4) about 10 judge-days were used for
the cases which had been added to the program;15 and (5) about
72 judge-days were left vacant, either because of gaps in the trial
calendar due to cases which had been settled or because trials took
less time than expected.
Since the Court had reserved 18 judge-days for judicial duties
other than trials, it would seem that the Court was left with a surplus of some 72 judge-days which was not used with full effectiveness - approximately the time of one judge working for about three
months. The question we must face is whether the Court could have
been more efficient in its operation.
There is, admittedly, no easy answer and any proposed solutions must rest on a series of assumptions rather than demonstrated
fact. Let us assume, however, that 200 cases had been scheduled for
trial. If the ratio of cases settled to cases tried had remained the
same, approximately 130 cases would have been settled out of court
and 70 cases would have gone to trial. If these 70 cases had required an average of 1.5 days for trial (the average trial time
observed for cases in the crash program), slightly more than 100
judge-days would have been needed for their disposition. The number of cases eliminated from the backlog would almost have been
doubled.
Such a calendar of cases might seem much too venturesome. If
cases are not settled out of court as expected, the Court will face a
flood of irate attorneys who have been assured of a trial but for
15 See note 14 supra.
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whom no judge is available. Similarly, if cases tried take longer than
expected, the Court will find that its planned work exceeds its capabilities. But the creation of a court calendar is a gamble, and the
administrators of the Court must strike a balance between being too
daring and too cautious. The temptation, of course, is to err on the
side of caution, since unused judge time is far less public, far less
likely to arouse the criticism of attorneys who have been promised
a trial which they do not get. Such caution, however, if carried too
far, is all too likely to aggravate the problem we are trying to cure
- namely, the problem of court congestion.
CONCLUSION

It is our opinion, then, that if more effective remedies are to be
found for reducing the backlog of the Court, the Court must reconsider its calendaring of cases and be more willing to experiment.
This does not mean that the Court needs to rush to extreme innovations; small, tentative changes can be introduced, their effects evaluated, and further changes fed into the system based on experience.
Three possibilities suggest themselves immediately. First, the
prediction of length of trial should be made more accurate. This
would require a careful examination of the factors which are now
being used (perhaps on'an intuitive basis) to estimate the length of
trial, prolonged and systematic comparisons of estimates and reality,
the discovery of new factors, and the creation of prediction formulas
in which the factors could be given their appropriate weights. It
may turn out that informed judgments, without the use of formulas,
are a better device; but in that case, the element leading to the consistent overestimation of length of trial should be detected and
eliminated.
Second, an effort should be made to determine more precisely
which cases are most likely to settle out of court and which cases are
most likely to go to trial. This would require the same sort of empirical study, using observed cases and extrapolating to the future. The
determination could be rather crude, at least in the beginning; but it
would then be possible to construct a more rational pool of cases
scheduled to be tried in a given time period, since a better balance
could be achieved between cases likely and unlikely to reach the
trial stage. In any event, it seems quite possible that more cases could
be scheduled for trial than is true at the present time, if the procedures of the crash program are similar to those usually used by the
Court, on the expectation that the majority of these cases will not in
fact need to be tried.
Both length of trial and settlement out of court might seem to
be matters so filled with chance, so subject to imponderables, that
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greater accuracy of prediction is impossible. We do not believe this
to be so, however, and we believe that there are regularities to these
events which can be discovered and used by the Court. There will
remain, of course, some margin of error, but within this area of the
unknown the Court could be less wary of scheduling cases which
will have to be postponed. The discomfiture of attorneys, witnesses,
and so on must be weighed against delays in trial; and the latter
may be far more costly in the long run, in terms of the administration of justice.
Third, reserving the fifth day of the week for judicial duties
other than trial work may be leading to a serious loss of the Court's
efficiency, despite its apparent convenience for the judges. These
judicial duties might better be performed in the gaps left by cases
finished more quickly than expected or cases settled out of court so
near their scheduled trial date that a substitute cannot be found.
This point, however, is rather debatable since these nontrial duties
may require large blocks of uninterrupted time.1" The Chief Judge
has indicated that he does not believe such a solution is workable,
but the issue is worth examining more closely in light of the judges'
experience with such matters and their most efficient habits of time
management.
In short, the Colorado U.S. District Court, like any system of
administration can, we think, benefit from self-analysis, research,
and experimentation - and the willingness to take chances which is
a means of survival for modern organizations. Some of these experiments must inevitably fail and the Court will be criticized. The
ability to withstand such criticism is one portion of the courage
needed to provide our society with the highest levels of justice.

16 See Drucker, How to Manage Your Time: Everybody's No. 1 Problem, 233

HARPER'S,

Dec. 1966, at 56. Finding the appropriate time for the writing of decisions, preliminary hearings, etc., may be no less difficult than the scheduling of trials.

IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN LEASES: THE

NEED FOR CHANGE
By FRANK F. SKILLERN*
"Caveat emptor" as it is applied to leases under which the
lessee may use the demised premises for an express purpose is the
focal point of this article. The rule denies the lessee relief, either as
a defense or as a cause of action, for additionalcosts of repair or
construction if the premises are structurally unfit for the expressed
purpose or if changes must be made in the premises to conform to
local codes relating to that purpose. Mr. Skillern discusses the
development of the rule in these situations, the limited remedies
which are available to a lessee, and the inadequacies of these remedies in modern leasing transactions. He urges that changes in the
nature of leasing transactions necessitate that courts or legislatures
consider implying warranties of fitness for a particularpurpose and
of conformity to building codes in such leases. Mr. Skillern concludes by analyzing the nature of the proposed warranties, the prerequisites for their implication, and the new remedies which would
be available if they were breached.
INTRODUCTION

L

AW under the doctrine of stare decisis may become imbued with
legal principles which were practical when first developed but
which become inadequate at a later date to meet the demands of the
situations they were designed to encompass. The doctrine of caveat
emptor as applied to leases epitomizes such an anachronism. In the
early development of cases concerning real property leases, the courts
applied the strict limitations of property law and determined that
no implied covenants regarding fitness of the premises for a purpose
or habitation existed in a lease. The parties were expected to express
in the document exactly what the state of the premises would be at
time of possession as well as any other facts which the landlord might
guarantee to the tenant as to the condition of the premises.
However desirable such principles were when developed, today
with the growth of urban development causing an increase in leasing
transactions, and the development of unimproved land through leases
requiring construction, these principles are unrealistic and impractical.
Not only do the parties frequently intend a particular (and often
exclusive) use of the premises, but also that the landlord prepare the
*Member of the Colorado Bar; B.A., University of Chicago, 1964; J.D., University of
Denver, 1966.
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premises for the tenant's use. Under these circumstances, the tenant
should be allowed a remedy under the lease when the premises cannot
be used for the express purpose or can be so used only at additional
cost. A study of caveat emptor as it has been applied in specific cases
shows its inadequacy in leasing cases.
The general rule of caveat emptor has been succinctly stated in
Ph. Chaleyer, Inc. v. Simon.' The court, discussing an implied warranty defense, stated, "It has been recently held that a lessor does not
impliedly covenant that the demised premises are suitable for the use
which he is aware is intended by the lessee." 2 Although government
wartime regulations prohibited the lessee from engaging in the business stated in the lease, he was not allowed to rescind the agreement.
Caveat emptor also prevents the lessee from interposing unfitness as a defense to an action for rent. An Indiana case3 involving
the lease of lands on which the lessee wanted to build a drive-in
theater is typical of this principle. The court in awarding rent to
the lessor said,
There is no implied warranty that leased premises are fit for
the purposes for which they are let.... The rule of caveat emptor
applies in the relation of landlord and tenant unless material representations constituting fraud are specifically alleged, or there is
a showing of a fiduciary relationship between the parties. 4
The rule has also been applied to a situation where the lessee
could not occupy the leased premises because the building would
not support his equipment. In Soresi v. Repetti,5 the building
required structural changes before the lessee could install his heavy
equipment. The court disposed of the unfitness defense summarily,
saying, "[T]he tenant has the duty to examine the premises to determine its adaptability for the desired use."'
'91 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.J. 1950). See also 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
225 [2]
(recomp. ed. 1966); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45, at 267 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952), and cases cited therein, where the principle is expressed:
There is no implied covenant or warranty that at the time the term
._. commences the premises are in a tenantable condition or that they are
adapted to the purpose for which leased. The tenant, then, cannot use such
unfitness either as a defense to an action for rent or as a basis for recovery
in tort for damages to person or property. (Footnotes omitted.)
Accord, Davidson v. Fischer, 11 Colo. 583, 19 P. 652 (1888).
2 91 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.N.J. 1950).
3 Anderson Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 123 Ind. App. 388, 110 N.E.2d 506
(1953).
4
Id. at 393, 110 N.E.2d at 508.
- Soresi v. Repetti, 76 A.2d 585 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950).
6
Id. at 586. See also Plaza Amusement Co. v. Rothenberg, 159 Miss. 800, 131 So. 350
(1930) (structural changes at lessee's expense).
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Tort actions are also prohibited by the rule. 7 In Widmar v.
Healey,8 the lessee was denied recovery for injuries resulting from
a stove explosion which occurred due to frozen pipes. In dismissing
the claim the court said, "Inthe absence of fraud or of a covenant,
a lessor does not represent that the premises are tenantable and may
be used for the purposes for which they are apparently intended.'
At this point certain fact situations which are outside the scope
of this paper must be distinguished. The Soresi court denied the
lessee relief for required structural alterations to the leased premises,
which were under the control of the landlord, by adhering to a
questionable application of caveat emptor. It is another matter when
untenantability is caused by factors beyond the control of the lessor.
Recovery has been denied a lessee in this situation too, but the application of caveat emptor seems more appropriate. For example, the
New York courts have denied recovery to a lessee who could not
occupy a building because of noxious gases originating from outside
the building.1 ° Although the defense in that case was an implied
covenant of habitation, the court rejected it." The court discussed
the defense of implied warranty and concluded it was not available.
The point is that the proposed implied warranty should not extend
to defects beyond the control of the lessor. Nor would the doctrine
of implied warranty cover those defects or contingencies which are
foreseeable by the parties. A lessor is allowed to recover rent even
though his lessee could not get a liquor permit and use the premises
as contemplated.' 2 Such a contingency is foreseeable, and no condition will be read into the lease. Caveat emptor should continue to
7 See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 267, and cases cited therein.

See also Zatloff v. Winkleman, 90 R.I. 403, 158 A.2d 874 (1960).
8247 N.Y. 94, 159 N.E. 874 (1928).
9 Id. The court implies that recovery may have been allowed if the action had been
brought on the theory of a covenant to repair. For a discussion of a lessor's tort
liability for latent defects in the premises known to him or for liability when he
undertakes repairs of demised premises, see Shaw v. Butterworth, 327 Mo. 622, 38
S.W.2d 57 (1931), and Holzhauer v. Sheeny, 127 Ky. 28, 104 S.W. 1034 (1907).
See also Marx v. Standard Oil Co., 6 N.J. Super. 39, 69 A.2d 748 (1949), where
the court states, "There is no implied covenant by a lessor that the demised premises
are suitable for the use which he is aware is intended by the lessee. The lessor is
not liable to the lessee or to invitees of the lessee for injuries received by them in
accidents that may be attributed to the faulty planning or construction of the
premises." Id. at 41, 69 A.2d at 749.
"°Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889).
15 The court held, "It is not open to discussion in this state, that a lease of real
property only, contains no implied covenant of this character [habitation], and
that . . . unless there has been fraud, deceit, or wrong-doing on the part of the
landlord, the tenant is without remedy, even if the demised premises are unfit for
occupation." Id. at 113, 23 N.E. at 127.
12
Goodman v. Sullivan, 94 Ohio App. 390, 114 N.E.2d 856 (1952). But see Hyland
v. Parkside Inv. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1148, 162 A. 521 (1932) (zoning ordinance
prohibited use after possession -held,
restricted use in lease is express guaranty).
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control those cases in which the non-use is the result of a foreseeable
problem or of a defect caused by one other than the lessor. 8
It would be wrong to conclude that the doctrine of caveat emptor
means a lessee is always without a remedy if he is unable to use the
premises. Under contract law the tenant may rescind the lease if he
can prove fraud or mutual mistake. 4 In such cases the burden is
upon the lessee to show the statement, the materiality of the statement, and reliance. Frequently, as in the cases discussed here, this
burden is too great.'" The lessee usually does not receive a statement
about the suitability of the land, but rather assumes this from the
fact that the lease states the purpose and use of the demised premises.
Rescission on the grounds of mutual mistake was recently
granted by a California court. 6 The lease stated that the premises
were to be used for a bar-restaurant. However, the building would
not support the weight of a bar on the second floor. The court
expressly found that no structural changes were required on the
leased premises; instead they would have to be made on portions
of the building under the control of the lessor. Moreover, it found
that both parties thought the building, without modification, could
be used for the intended purposes, and the necessary costs were not
expected by either. The court allowed rescission because of the
mutual mistake.
Another remedy, derived from property law, is constructive eviction.' 7 One such case was Panagos v. Fox,'8 where the lessor had
built a restaurant, barbecue, and dairy bar for the lessee. The building when completed had defective walls which would not withstand
1 This situation must be distinguished from the facts in Economy v. S.B. & L. Bldg.

Corp., 138 Misc. 296, 245 N.Y.S. 352 (1930), where the court allowed the lessee
to recover advance rent when he was unable to obtain a cabaret license because the
building was not fireproof in accordance with the local building code. This result
was not based on an implied warranty of suitability even though there was an expressed purpose in the lease. The court held that the licensing authority had no discretion to waive the requirements of the building code, and l[t]he contract, therefore,
was incapable of lawful performance when it was made, although it is not to be
supposed that any illegality was contemplated by the parties to it." Id. at 297, 245
N.Y.S. at 354. Thus the illegality constitutes failure of consideration. The Goodman
result, discussed at note 12 supra, is an example of the situation in which the
licensing authority does have discretion. The court in Economy states that then "[i]f
the tenant chose to take a lease without conditions under such circumstances, and so,
to bind himself absolutely for the payment of rent, the court could not relieve him
from his contract." Id. at 297, 245 N.Y.S. at 354.
14 See Williams v. Puccinelli, 236 Cal. App. 2d 512, 46 Cal. Rptr. 285 '(Dist. Ct. App.
Cal. 1965).
lrSee, e.g., Soresi v. Repetti, 76 A.2d 585 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950) (lessee-defendant claim of misrepresentation denied); Ph. Chaleyer, Inc. v. Simon, 91 F. Supp.
5 (D.N.J. 1950) (lessee's action to rescind denied).
16 Williams v. Puccinelli, 236 Cal. App. 2d 512, 46 Cal. Rptr. 285 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal.
1965), which has been characterized by one writer as "an apt illustration of the
conflict" between property and contract law principles in leases. Note, A Contractual
Approach to Real Property Leases - A Strike at Caveat Emptor, 2 CALIF. WESTERN
L. Rxv. 133 (1966).
17 See, e.g., Leonard v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 577, 41 N.W. 695 (1889).
' 310 Mich. 157, 16 N.W.2d 700 ('1944).
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water. The lessee sued to recover his deposit because the building
was untenantable for his purposes. Recovery was granted on the
theory of constructive eviction which the court defined as "any disturbance of the tenant's possession by the landlord or by someone
under his authority whereby the premises are rendered unfit for
occupancy for the purposes for which they were demised, or the
tenant is deprived of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises, if the
tenant abandons the premises within a reasonable time. '"19
Rescission of a lease is not always a desirable remedy. Quite
often a long term lease is involved, and the demised premises have
been selected for reasons collateral to the issues which may be
raised in the rescission action. Hence, the premises are still desired
if the defects are corrected or the alterations necessary to enable the
lessee to use the premises are made. The appropriate remedy is not
rescission, but recovery of damages incurred due to the required
changes. Thus damages in the amount of the cost of alterations or
for any other harm is a more desirable solution for the lessee.
The remedy of constructive eviction is frequently unavailable
because the lessee usually can use the premises for some purpose so
that the premises are not deemed untenantable. Typically he is denied
the particular use he intended. The remedy is also undesirable
because it terminates the lease. Constructive eviction also is not an
adequate solution in those situations where only a portion of the
leased premises are unusable.
In addition to the foregoing remedies for the lessee, one exception has been grafted onto the general rule of caveat emptor. A lease
is not enforced against those lessees coming within its provisions.
The exception was first stated in Smith v. Marrable,20 where the
court said there is an implied condition of habitation in the letting
of a furnished house. This broad statement was qualified in later
cases. 2 The exception was limited to situations in which a furnished
dwelling was leased for a short and definite duration of time. The
warranty implied was that the premises were habitable. Thus, where
23
22
the basement was filled with water, the home infected with insects,
or vermin the warranty of habitability was breached and the tenant
could properly quit the premises.
19Id. at 161, 16 N.W.2d at 702.
20 11 M. & W. 6, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).

21 In two other cases in 1843 the English courts were asked to apply the rule as stated
in Smith. The limitations discussed later were found to be facts in Smith and prerequisites to the exception. Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W. 52, 152 Eng. Rep. 1108
(Ex. 1843); Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W. 66, 152 Eng. Rep. 1114 (Ex. 1843).

22For development of the exception see 11 BOSTON U.L. REv. 119 (1931), and authorities cited therein.
23See, e.g., Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). But see Davenport
v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947).
2

4 E.g., Delamater v. Foreman. 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931).
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The exception is apparently accepted universally in the United
States.2 5 It has, however, always been strictly limited in application."8
It has not been extended to letting unfurnished dwellings.2 7 It has
'
28
been recognized in leases for periods of the summer, a "season, 29
eight months, 0 and one year, 3 ' but apparently for no period longer
than one year. The basis of the exception is that the tenant has no
time to investigate as caveat emptor requires. Both parties know that
immediate occupancy for a specific purpose is desired, and the lessee
frequently is from out of town and is unable to inspect the house,
2
especially when the lease is for a short period of time.1
The remedies granted under the contract theory of implied
warranty have been rarely applied to leases. Few cases have been
found which allow a lessee recovery on this basis. In one such case,
f. D. Young Corporationv. McClintic,3 the lessee sued to cancel the
lease because the building which was prepared by the lessor was
defective and not complete at time of occupancy. The court held
there is an implied warranty in the lease of a building under construction or to be constructed that it will be suitable for the lessee's
purposes expressed in the lease if progress has not reached a stage
permitting inspection of the premises. 4 Another case, Woolford v.
Electric Appliances, Inc., 5 involved the lease of a stall under con25The
2

American cases are reviewed in 11 BOSTON U.L.REv. 119 (1931).

6See Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947), where the court
-- '-]

'WlTeth
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deedn

for the shse

a

he sevashore, he

impliedly agreed that the house was reasonably suitable for immediate use and
occupancy by the tenant. ... [But) a condition that the premises are fit for habitation
"isimplied only with regard to the state of the premises at the beginning of the
tenancy and does not cover defects which arise later... '" Id. at 632-33, 70 N.E.2d
at 794-95 (citations omitted). See also Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 756,
39 N.E.2d 644, 646 (1942), where the court states about Ingalls that "[t]his is a
departure from the general rule and should be confined within narrow limits." See
also 11 BOSTON U.L. REv. 119 (1931), where the author states that in applying the
exception to the rule of caveat emptor the American courts did so only insofar as
the warranty extended to the chattels, furnishings, or goods which were incorporated
into the real property lease; caveat emptor was still the rule if the defect of the
furnished premises was structural or related to the real property. Cf. Murray v.
Albertson, 50 N.J.L. 167, 13 A. 394 (1888).
2
7 Murray v. Albertson, 50 N.J.L. 167, 13 A. 394 (1888).
28
Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. &W. 6, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 '(Ex. 1843).
29
Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 349, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
30
Young v. Povich, 121 Me.141, 116 A. 26 (1922).
31
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). For criticism of the
one year period as too long a period for application of the exception, see 45 MARQ.
L. REV. 630 (1962).
32
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
33 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1933).
34 J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). See also
Hunter v. Porter, 10 Idaho 72, 77 P. 434 (1904) '(implied warranty in building
under construction) ; Hardman Estate v. McNair, 61 Wash. 74, 111 P. 1059 (1910)
(implied warranty premises to be arranged for tenant).
35 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938).
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struction in an open market at the time of leasing. When finished,
the refrigeration in the stall was inadequate to preserve meats which
the lessee offered for sale. The court held that under circumstances
where there is construction to enable the lessee to put the premises
to a particular use, a warranty that the construction will be adequate
to permit the use is implied in the contract. Here the refrigeration
unit was for one purpose - to enable the lessee to keep meats for
sale. Since the unit was inadequate, the lessee recovered on an implied
warranty that the stall as constructed would be reasonably suited for
the intended purpose. 6
It is important to note that in each of these cases caveat emptor
was rejected because there was no way to inspect the final fitness of
the premises under construction. The remedy in this situation is
analogous to the recent decisions rejecting the rule of caveat emptor
in the purchase of a new home and instead allowing recovery on the
implied warranty theory.3 7 The rationale under both circumstances
resembles that applied to the lease of a furnished home for a short
period of time. In these cases the lessee had little or no opportunity
to inspect the premises and hence could not be penalized for what he
could not observe. The warranty seems to be implied in the contract
to construct and not in the lease agreement. Only one case has been
discovered in which the theory of implied warranty was recognized
38
on leased premises not under construction.
Several reasons exist for extending the contract theory of implied
warranty concerning the condition of demised premises to leases.
In addition to the changes already mentioned in the nature of leasing
transactions, 39 other reasons exist for not strictly applying caveat
emptor to those transactions today. The lessee and lessor are not on
a basis of equal knowledge regarding the premises. The owner of
a building will usually be notified of building code violations present
36
37

Id.

E.g., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). For a discussion of
implied warranties in newly completed homes see Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales
of Real Property- Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961).
The application of the implied warranty to the builder-vendor of a newly completed
home is a logical extention of its application to a contract of sale of a home under
construction. Carpenter v. Donohoe, supra at 83, 388 P.2d at 403.
38
Hyland v. Parkside Inv. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1148, 162 A. 521 (1932). The court
held a lessee who was unable to use the demised premises due to a zoning ordinance
passed after possession could recover advance rent. The court said, "In this lease the
landlord specifically restricted the use to one purpose, and we think this was an
express guaranty of the fitness of the premises for that particular purpose. To hold
otherwise would be an absurdity. A lease for a single purpose is void if that purpose
is unlawful." Id. at 1149, 162 A. at 521. Not only is finding an express warranty
under such circumstances against the weight of authority, but also the court cited no
authority for the proposition that the warranty is present in a lease even though no
remodeling or further construction on the emis
remises is necessary. Accord,
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45, at 269 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
3
9 Text preceding note 1 supra.
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on his premises and also of special regulations regarding his land.4"
The lessee will not, without special investigation, know of these
violations, nor will he know of structural defects in the building
itself. It is not unreasonable to attribute knowledge of these facts
to the lessor. He should be able to alert the lessee to them or easily
discover if the use intended by the lessee is structurally feasible. To
protect the lessee in these leasing transactions it is necessary to consider and apply a limited doctrine of implied warranties in leases.
I.

THE IMPLIED WARRANTY

The nature of the implied warranty in the lease would be that
the leased premises are suitable for the purpose of the tenant and
that they are built in conformity to the applicable local codes. Thus,
the lessor would assure that the premises can immediately be put to
the use intended -by the lessee and that the lessee may do so lawfully.
If the premises do not conform to the code regulations or are structurally defective, the lessor would have to make the necessary repairs
or compensate the lessee for having them done.
The warranty is designed to protect a lessee in various situations,
although the usual one is where the lessor has superior knowledge.
It will provide a remedy when the lessor has a structually defective
building which is incapable of being used as the lessee planned 41
Frequently a lessor agrees to build on the premises to suit the tenant,
.nld the lease provides that the constr ctmon shail ronfnrm to the
building codes. But if the lessee is a restaurant owner, a special
plumbing system may be required by the plumbing code even though
it is not required by the building code to which the building would
conform. If the building is adequate for the building code requirements, the lessor has met the express covenant, but the premises are
not suitable for occupancy for the express purpose of the lease. The
lessee must install new plumbing facilities in order to use the premises in accordance with the lease terms. Under the implied covenant
that the premises conform to the code regulations applicable to the
intended use, the lessee could recover from the lessor the costs of
installing the additional system.
A.

Limitations

These warranties should be limited in application and would
not be implied in all leases. Certain prerequisites must be shown
4

°See Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961), where the
court discusses this point.
41The facts of Soresi v. Repetti, 76 A.2d 585 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950), and Anderson Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 123 Ind. App. 388, 110 N.E.2d 506
(1953), would bring both cases within the implied warranty theory.
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before the implied warranties would be imposed. First, the lease
must be for a stated purpose before the implied warranty of suitability should apply. If the purpose is known, the lessor is able
to determine whether the building is structurally adequate for the
expressed purpose. If the lessor is to build improvements on the
premises for the lessee, he must check the necessary regulations to
determine if his construction satisfies all local codes; he must also
make the lessee aware of defects such as inadequate plumbing or
electrical systems which may make the premises unsuitable for the
intended use. Failure to do so will forfeit his right to recover his
rent without penalty. However, if the purpose is not expressed in a
lease, actual knowledge of the lessee's intended purpose should be
sufficient to put the lessor on notice and bring the implied warranty
into action. Thus, if a lease mentions no purpose but the parties
only discuss a particular business of the lessee, the lessor should not
be allowed to claim that the implied warranty is inapplicable because
the purpose is not expressed. He should be held to have actual
knowledge sufficient to enable him to ascertain the suitability of
his building for that purpose.
A second limitation on the implication of these warranties is
that the defects causing the unsuitability must be within the lessor's
control. Thus, a dwelling rendered untenantable because of noxious
gases arising from the neighborhood 42 would not fall within the
implied warranty. The lessor should not be held accountable for
faults which he has no power to alter. Nor can the warranty apply
to cases in which the lessee before occupancy decides to alter his use.
The implied warranty of conformity with local code regulations
must be limited to situations in which the untenantability of the
premises is caused by violation of a specific code regulation relating
to the intended use. Thus, if the code is applicable to drug stores,
but not grocery stores, and the lease use is a grocery store, the warranty has not been breached even though use of the premises for the
sale of drugs is not possible. The lessor can only be held to assure
specific uses of the premises - not all uses. However, this warranty
does not cover the situation in which the lessee knows he needs a
particular permit to operate the intended business. If he is unable
to get the required permit and thus cannot put the premises to the
intended use, he cannot recover under this warranty. As under current law, 8 this example is a foreseeable contingency which the parties
can anticipate and provide for in the lease. The implied warranty
should not cover those contingencies which the parties can anticipate.
v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889).
Goodman v. Sullivan, 94 Ohio App. 390, 114 N.E.2d 856 (1952).

4Franklin
4
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The implied warranties can only apply to defects which are
latent and which make the premises unsuitable. Thus, the tenant
cannot claim that the implied warranty of suitability has been
breached if he leases land for a drive-in restaurant in a residential
area in which business uses are prohibited. This fact is readily
observable to him because zoning restrictions are a matter of public
record.
B.

Remedies
The remedy for breach of the implied warranty of suitability or
conformity to local codes must differ from the present law, i.e., the
lessee must be able to recover the cost of altering the demised premises to permit the intended use or to conform to the code provisions.
Since he may want to remain in possession, he must be allowed a
damage remedy. These additional costs should be recovered from
the lessor in a lump sum as damages. If the defect is the proximate
cause of personal injuries, damages should be recoverable for the
harm resulting therefrom.
Another remedy for the lessee should be reformation of the
lease. If only a portion of the leased premises is untenantable, or
if a portion does not meet the local code requirements, then the
lessee should be allowed to decide whether he can or cannot use the
remainder of the leased premises. If he can use part of them, the
lease should be reformed to cover only the area in use and then
be terminated as to that which is unsuitable. At that time, the rent
should be reduced in an equitable amount by deducting the value of
the portion returned to the lessor from the total rent due. Reformation would thus enable the lessee to recoup his losses on partially
adequate leased premises. It is an important remedy since leased
areas are frequently designed for dual purposes such as a cafeteria
in one area, kitchen in an adjacent one, or a bar on one floor of a
building and a restaurant on another.
The final remedy should be rescission and cancellation of the
lease. If the premises are totally unusable and unsuited for the
intended purposes, the lease should be terminated. However, this
remedy should be strictly applied, so that if the purposes of a lease
and the premises demised are separable, the lessor may enforce the
lease as to a suitable portion. For example, if the lease states that
one lessee will maintain a lounge on one floor and a cafeteria on
another, but the cafeteria cannot be put in the building, the lessor
should be able to enforce the lease and compel the lessee to put in
the lounge if it is economically feasible. In short, the lessee cannot
declare a lease rescinded merely because the warranties are not met
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as to a portion of the lease. This restriction is particularly pertinent
if the lessee has been granted remedies for partial breaches of these
covenants.
The remedies for the breach of the implied warranty of suitability or for conformity to local codes would fill the gaps in the
current legal remedies. Reformation of the lease provides something
less than complete termination of that contract. Damages enable
the lessee to recoup his losses and yet not sacrifice the lease. These
solutions are needed today because the lease is a long term arrangement which is entered into for multifarious reasons. It is no longer
simply for the occupancy of a building suited for one and only one
purpose; it may be intended to serve several functions. Today the
improvements may be built by developers for particular lessees and
with specific purposes in mind. The land may be desirable as a business location even in a suburban area, and even if one intended use
fails. The building may be constructed to suit the lessee or for his
business purposes.
II. CONCLUSION
Leasing law has been strict in applying the doctrine of caveat
emptor to a lessee who finds the demised premises unsuitable for
occupancy. The lessee has been held liable for rent of the premises
even though the lease stated that the premises were to be used for a
particular purpose. Under the rule of caveat emptor the courts have
held that the lessee had a duty to inspect the premises to determine
their suitability for his intended use. The only exception to this
rule was the case of a short term lease of a furnished dwelling.
As the lease law evolved, the lessee was provided relief if he
could prove fraud or misrepresentation, mutual mistake, or constructive eviction. However, this relief took the form of cancellation
or termination of the lease and allowed no recovery for damages or
additional expenses of the lessee. In a few other cases the lessee was
allowed relief on the theory of implied warranty that the premises
being prepared would be suitable for the lessee's purpose. The
warranties in those cases arose from the contract to construct or
remodel and from the fact the work had not progressed far enough
to allow adequate inspection. In each of them the lease was signed
prior to construction of the leased premises.
Modern leasing transactions necessitate reevaluation of the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to leases. The lessee no longer has
as much knowledge of the premises as the lessor. Building code
regulations or violations are made known to the lessor, not to the
lessee. The lessor is in a -better position to know of latent structural
defects in a building which might go unnoticed by the inspecting
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lessee since the plans and specifications of the building are not in
the latter's possession.
The nature of leases also warrants reevaluation of this rule.
Developers more and more frequently seek to obtain leases on an
area of land before building. The lessee usually invests much time
and money in determining that the area has good income potential
and in preparing the leased space for his business. He cannot afford
to discover after occupancy that a specific local code regulation regarding his business has not been met in construction of the building.
The additional cost to correct the defect is unexpected. He does not
want to cancel the lease, since he has built up good will and potential
for his business in this area in anticipation of a long term lease. He
needs the remedy which an implied warranty theory provides.
Moreover, the lessee, especially the small businessman, cannot
accomplish the inspection which caveat emptor requires. He rarely
will be familiar with wiring or plumbing, for example, and will not
know if these systems are adequate. Nor can he afford to hire a
professional engineer to investigate the site and make tests to determine the structural suitability of the building and land. The costs
of this expert would be prohibitive, and yet caveat emptor requires
the man who wants to engage in the laundry business to know that
the building can support his heavy equipment. Such information is
available to the lessor who can in turn inform the potential lessee
of the physical suitability of the premises and of costs required by
the lessee to adapt the premises to the use. The lessee must still
inspect for patent defects such as broken windows, cracks in the
wall, or unclean premises; he cannot recover under this theory for
defects which a reasonable inspection would uncover, and the latter
remains a question of fact.
Under circumstances in which the premises are unsuitable for
an express use because of structural defects or local code violations,
the lessee should be allowed relief against the lessor on a contractual
theory of implied warranty. If a lease expresses a use or if the lessor
knows of the intended use, the lessor should be held to impliedly
covenant that the premises are fit for the use and conform to all
local code regulations regarding the use. The warranty would be
breached only if the defect is the cause of the unsuitability of the
premises or if the code violation directly relates to the intended use.
The warranty should not extend to defects which are beyond the
lessor's ability to control or remedy. Contingencies which are foreseeable at the time of the lease should also be excepted from operation of the warranties.
The implied warranty of suitability for purpose and of con-
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formity to local codes regarding the purpose would provide the
lessee with a remedy less stringent than that available under current
leasing law. Remedies now available frequently involve fact situations which would be covered by an implied warranty, but require
proof of fraud, mistake, constructive eviction, or breach of the
implied warranty of quiet enjoyment to allow relief to the lessee.44
The relief under the theory of implied warranties would stop short
of cancellation of the lease, i.e., damages, proportionate reduction of
rent, or reformation of the lease. Not only are these remedies more
consistent with the intent of the parties, but they also enable the
lessee to remain in possession under the lease.
The application of an implied warranty theory to leases gives
recognition of the changes in leasing transactions today. The theory
acknowledges that a lease is in essence not only a demise but also a
sale, in the commercial sense, of an interest in land and, more
importantly, is a contractual relationship.45 The implied warranty
suggested here would conform more closely to the intentions of the
parties as well as to actual business expectations.

for the breach of implied warranty of quiet enjoyment has been occasionally
utilized to seek a remedy for situations where the premises are unsuitable. See, e.g.,
Croskey v. Shawnee Realty Co., 225 S.W.2d 509, 513-14 (K.C. Ct. App. Mo. 1949),
where the court, quoting from Shaw v. Butterworth, 327 Mo. 622, 628, 38 S.W.2d
57, 60 (1931), determined,
"In the absence of a covenant or promise, the tenant must take the premises
in the condition in which he finds them, for to a mere contract of letting
the rule of caveat emptor is relevant. An implied covenant on the part of the
landlord that the premises are suitable for the purposes for which they are
rented, or that they are in any particular condition, does not arise from the
mere renting of premises."
45 This idea is not meant to suggest that the court must find the leasing agreement was
a "sale" before the implied warranties should be enforced. Thc-warranties should be
the basis of a cause of action y decisional or statutory law and shou
aowed
when the1imhit~ tfins iscussed previously a-re preseT-fi-o-h
FtT
d not depend
upon the presence of technicalities such as a "sale," or the formal requirements in
the law of sales for implying warranties. The basis of the action is the leasing agreement under the conditions outlined above - not the fact that a "sale" occurred.
4Suit

THE "ToRREY CANYoN" DISASTER:
SOME LEGAL ASPECTS
BY VED P. NANDA*
The "Torrey Canyon" disaster in March 1967 emphasized the
need for effective preventive measures to avert such a disaster, and
for restorative measures should such a disaster occur. Professor
Nanda describes the extensiveness of the problem against the background of internationaland national norms that have haphazardly
developed to cope with the situation. Recognizing the deficiencies
in the present ability of nation states to combat oil pollution, Professor Nanda urges that nation states take the initiative through
international agreements, to develop minimum standards and effective safeguardsin this area.

T

HE Torrey Canyon wreck in March 1967,' has posed another
challenge of modern technology for scientists and lawyers alike:
how to prevent oil pollution of the seas and how to deal with the
problem effectively. The accident occurred off southwest England.
The tanker spilled approximately 80,000 tons of crude oil into the
sea which coated English resort beaches on the Cornish coast with oil
slicks,2 threatened the French coast across the channel,' contaminated
oyster beds and fisheries, 4 and caused extensive damage to bird life.5
*Assistant Professor, College of Law, University of Denver. The author wishes to

thank Charles 'Booth, second year student at the College of Law, for his research
assistance, and his colleagues William Altonin and Gary Widman for their helpful
suggestions.
1 For a report on the occurrence of the wreck and steps taken by the British Government to deal with the situation, see SEC'Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP'T, THE
"ToRREY CANYON," CMND. No. 3246 (1967).
2
Winds, tides and currents washed oil onto the British beaches. For an account see
C. GILL, F. BOOKER & T. SOPER, THE WRECK OF THE TORREY CANYON 60-71

(1967) [hereinafter cited as

GILL]; CHEMICAL WEEK,

Apr. 8, 1967, at 59.

supra note 2, at 81-87.
4 "[The fishing industry was virtually suffocated by the vast film of oil." LIFE, Apr.
14, 1967, at 31. But see I ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 273 (1967):
According to Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, fish in the Seven Stones reef
...were, several weeks later, untainted and seemed plentiful as ever. "Close
in shore," he added, "where shellfish might be affected, only very few
crabs and shore-haunting fish have been found dead. This was in areas
heavily polluted with oil and where substantial quantities of detergent have
been used."
5 It was reported that the oil or detergent ingestion or skin burns had caused the death
of 7,399 sea birds. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1967, at 51, col. 4, But see NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 10, 1967, at 51, col. 1: "[A]t least 100,000 sea birds ... had been killed by
the chocolate-brown ooze." See also id., at 110, col. 2-3. For a statement by the
director of public information for the National Audubon Society before the Senate
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution that of the 6,000 birds brought ashore
after the Torrey Canyon disaster, "less than 500 were saved," see N.Y. Times, June
9, 1967, § M, at 80, col. 1. See also id., June 11, 1967, at 55, col. 1; LIFE, Apr. 14,
1967, at 34. A British observatory is said to have estimated that 40,000 sea birds
died. 1 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 273 (1967). See also Rienow
3 GILL,
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The wrecked tanker, carrying a cargo of 117,000 tons of Kuwait
crude oil, was American-owned 6 and chartered, 7 Liberian registered,'
manned by an Italian master and crew, contracted for salvage to a
Dutch company,9 grounded on the Seven Stones reef in international
waters,' 0 abandoned by the owners,'1 and destroyed by the British
naval and air force bombers using rockets and napalm. 2 The pending legal battle" will raise several complex issues of international
maritime law, including the determination of liability for oil pollution
which is of primary concern to all parties involved in the controversy.
In addition to the imposition of liability, however, the Torrey
Canyon disaster has highlighted two other major needs - that effective preventive measures be taken to avert such a disaster, and that
effective restorative measures be devised to handle such a crisis if it
occurs. This article will discuss these issues by examining and appraising past practices and pertinent norms of national and international law. The discussion will conclude with recommendations
that measures be taken both on national and international levels to
deal with a future Torrey Canyon type of situation.
I.

THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM

Each year, more than 700 million tons of petroleum and petroleum products are carried over the seas' 4 by oil tankers that account
& Rienow, The Oil Around Us, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1967 (Magazine), at 24, 11011; A. Hawkes, A Review of the Nature and Extent of Damage Caused by Oil Pollution at Sea, Mar. 7, 1961 (paper presented at N. Am.Wildlife Conf., Wash., D.C.),
reported in Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. on Ex. C, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., at 21 (1961).
6 The tanker was owned by the Barracuda Tanker Corp., a subsidiary of the Union Oil
Co. of California, operating out of Bermuda. GILL, supra note 2, at 17. For a brief
statement attributed to a spokesman for the Union Oil Co. of California that the
Torrey Canyon was only under "long-term, bareboat charter" to the Union Oil Co.
and that there was "no corporate relationship between Union Oil and Barracuda
Tanker Corporation," see N.Y. Times, July 18, 1967, at 33, col. 8.
7 However, the ship was on single voyage charter to the British Petroleum Co., Ltd.
THE "TORREY CANYON," supra note 1, at 2.
8 The Liberian registry entitled the Torrey Canyon to fly the Liberian flag under which
she was sailing.
9 See GILL, supra note 2, at 18, 22.
10The accident occurred 15 miles west of the Cornish Peninsula. GILL, supra note 2,
at 12, 19-20.
"GILL, supra note 2, at 33, 41.
12 See THE "TORREY CANYON," supra note 1, at 6.
13 Prime Minister Wilson announced in the House of Commons the British decision to
sue the owner, The Union Oil Co. of California. N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1967, at 12,
col. 4. See also id., May 5, 1967, at 16, col. 1 ; Arrest of Torrey Canyon's sister ship,
Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 20, 1967, at 16, col. 2.
14Horne, Tanker Operators Strive to Avoid Pollution of Sea, N.Y. Times, June 11,
1967, at 88, col. 2. Recently Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, testifying before
the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public
Works in connection with proposed amendments to the Oil Pollution Act (S.1591,
S. 1604), put the figure at approximately one billion tons. WATER CONTROL NEWS,
June 19, 1967, at 1.
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for 40% of the world ocean traffic.' 5 Tankers built since the last
world war are considerably larger in size than earlier models. While
pre-World War II standard tankers carried about 15,000 tons, 16 at
present the Japanese tanker Idemitsu Maru has a 206,000 dead-weight
tonnage, six vessels of 312,000 dead-weight tonnage are now on
order,' 7 and super tankers of more than 500,000 dead-weight tonnage
capacity are already in the planning stage.' 8 Among other factors,
heavy traffic, congested sea lanes, and the human element in navigation' 9 would demand that the world be prepared to face the possibility of huge amounts of oil slick caused by an accidental collision,
grounding or fire even if effective preventive measures were rigidly
and faithfully followed.
Accidental pollution is only one source of oil pollution. In varying degrees deliberate discharges from bilge pumping, ballast dumping and tank cleaning operations, oil seeping and leakage, especially
spills resulting from carelessness during fueling operations, and the
trickle of refuse from oil-burning ships, add to the continuing pollution of the oceans.2 ° Yearly discharge of waste oil into the seas is
substantial, amounting to millions of tons.2 ' According to one estimate, yearly traffic to the American ports alone - approximately 100
15
16

Rienow & Rienow, supra note 5, at 24.

THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 29, 1967, at 4, 5.
For a report that these vessels were on order in Japanese yards for service under
charter to the Gulf Oil Corp., see N.Y. Times, July 22, 1967, at 40, col. 6; Kentfield,
Two Kinds of Tankers - Clean and Dirty, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1967 (Magazine),
at 24, 25. The Humble Oil and Refining Company and Esso International, Inc., have
both ordered new supertankers for their fleets. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1967, at 44,
col. 3.
18 For a report than tankers up to 500,000 dead-weight tons are both economically and
technically feasible, see OIL & GAs J., May 22, 1967, at 79. For a statement that the
British claim to have developed a structural method to build a ship of a million
tons, see Kentfield, supra note 17, at 24, 98.
1
0 It is reported that the Liberian Board of Inquiry found the Captain of the Torrey
Canyon negligent and blamed him for the wreck, recommending that his master's
license be revoked. See N.Y. Times, May 6, 1967, at 62, col. 1.
20
Hawkes, supra note 5, at 21:
The U.S. Coast Guard's proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council for
April 1960 lists the principal sources of oil pollution of the oceans. Two of
the commonest from shipping are spills during bunkering (fueling) operations and discharges from bilge and ballast tanks. Nearly half of all the oil
spills whose causes were determined by the U.S. Coast Guard from January
1, 1956 to September 22, 1959 originated while oil-burning ships were
taking on fuel. Bilge pumping ranked third as a traceable cause of oil
pollution.
During this period hull leakage is said to have accounted for 20% of the traceable
spills. See also Rienow & Rienow, supra note 5, at 112; Home, supra note 14.
21Admiral Richmond, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, and Chairman of the U.S.
Delegation to the 1962 London Conference convened by the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization [hereinafter IMCO] to amend the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, is said to have reported to the
Secretary of State: "' ...
recent estimates indicate that world shipping is discharging waste oil into the sea at the rate of one million tons per year .
Stubbs, Oil
Pollution:Penalty and Damage Aspects, 16 JAG. J. 140, 141 (1962).
17
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million tons of petroleum products22 -

rels of oil residue dumped into the

accounts for 2.8 million bar-

sea.23

Another potential pollutant is the emission of oil from loaded
tankers torpedoed and sunk in World War II. The United States
coasts alone are reported to have lying submerged as many as 150
such tankers 24 containing 5 million barrels of oil, 25 some of which
might have been responsible for the pollution of the New Jersey28
and Virginia2 7 beaches, and the recent black tides on Cape Cod.28
Since oil spreads fast and over vast areas, the problem assumes
serious proportions. According to a recent report the British have
demonstrated that even such a negligible amount as 15 tons of oil
"dropped into a calm sea can cover 8 square miles in less than a
week, and that oil slicks can be traced for many hundreds of miles." 2 9
A report two months after the Torrey Canyon disaster points

to the recontamination of some English beaches after the winds and
tides had washed away sand and exposed even further oil deposits.3
Another study to examine the effects of oil pollution on a beach
damaged in 1957 by two thousand tons of oil from a vessel run

aground off Baja California, showed that eight years later the damaging effects still continued."'
Oil pollution has destructive effects on the ocean's ecology. It
is widely accepted that surface slicks upset the immensely complex
chain of sea life.3 2 One study found that the growth of Nitzschia

-

Rienow & Rienow, supra note 5, at 111.
at 112.
2 From a statement by Representative Jim Wright before the House Subcomm. on
Rivers and Harbors, reported in N.Y. Times, May 23, 1967, at 10, col. 7. Deep sea
divers have recently been inspecting sunken tankers off the New Jersey coast to see
if their oil cargos pose a threat to the coast line. N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1967, at 12,
col. 5.
25 Home, supra note 14.
26
See editorial, Control of Oil Pollution, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1967, at 40, cols. 1-2;
Home, supra note 14.
2
7See statement by Secretary Udall, reported in N.Y. Times, May 27, 1967, at 51, col.
4. See also Chemicals vs. Crude Oil, CHEMICAL WEEK, May 20, 1967, at 49.
28 Three articles from daily newspapers reporting on the Cape Cod pollution are
reprinted in 113 CONG. REC. H4778-79 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1967).
2 Rienow & Rienow, supra note 5, at 24.
30
N.Y. Times, May 27, 1967, at 51, col. 4.
31 Reported by Clive Manwell of the Marine Biological Association in Plymouth, in 1
22

23Id.

ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 273 (1967).

Although no detergent

had been used in the study, it was reported that in laboratory tests where detergent
was used for experimental purposes, it had caused more harm than the crude oil.
3 For a summary of Secretary Udall's statement about the "vulnerability and importance
of the areas and forms of life which oil pollution damages," see WATER CONTROL
NEws, June 19, 1967, at 1. See generally on ecological aspects, PERSPECTIVES IN
MARINE BIOLOGY 3-186 (A. Buzzati-Traverso ed. 1960); C. DAVIS, THE MARINE
AND FRESH WATER PLANKTON 125-279 (1955); A. HARDY, THE OPEN SEA, ITS
NATURAL HISTORY: FISH AND FISHERIES (1959); A. HARDY, THE OPEN SEA, ITS
NATURAL HISTORY: THE WORLD OF PLANKTON 292-315 (1956); G. REID, ECOLOGY
OF INLAND WATERS AND ESTUARIES 211-340 (1961).
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a diatom food of the oyster- is seriously inhibited if oil remains
for more than one week on the water's surface. 3 To illustrate, in
September 1960, oil pollution is said to have caused substantial damage to the oyster fishery of Narragansett Bay.3 4 The destructive
effects of oil on sea birds have been repeatedly witnessed in several
coastal states including the United States, United Kingdom, Germany
and Canada,3" and were recently dramatized by the Torrey Canyon
disaster.3 6 Oil pollution may affect human beings even more directly
in the future if man is compelled to rely upon ocean water through
artificial desalination as a major source of his domestic and industrial
water supply3 7 and the adverse effects of oil and the materials used
to eliminate it, including detergents, are not confined to the surface
alone.3 8 However, the ecological effects of oil have thus far been
neither systematically studied nor widely publicized. The problem
is therefore hard to comprehend fully, which makes it rather difficult
to suggest meaningful preventive and remedial measures.
Within the narrow confines of the Torrey Canyon wreck, the
40
concept of the supremacy of the law of the flag on the high seas
33Dr. Paul Galtsoff, biologist for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, conducted the
study, which is reported in Hawkes, supra note 5, at 24.
34 Rienow & Rienow, supra note 5, at 110.
35 Hawkes, supra note 5, at 24-25.
38
See GILL, supra note 2, at 88-112.
37See, e.g., Dep't of the Interior, Water for Peace: A Report of Background Considerations and Recommendations on the Water for Peace Program, Mar. 1967 (recommendations on desalination), excerpt reprinted in 56 DEP'T STATE BULL. 761 (1967).
Addresses by President Johnson and Secretary Rusk at the International Conference
on Water for Peace, Washington, D.C., May 23-31, 1967, contain reference to the
need for desalination. See id. at 903, 905. A bill to authorize appropriations for an
expanded saline water conversion program is already before the Senate Subcommittee
on Water and Power Resources, Internal and Insular Affairs Committee. S. 1101,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967). See also a brief report in CHEMICAL WEEK, July 29,
1967, at 51, that the world's largest single-unit desalting plant, "rated at 2.62 million
gal./day," was recently dedicated in Key West, Florida.
38See Hawkes, supra note 5, at 26. The detergent industry has agreed to cooperate
with the Department of the Interior to develop "minimum-phosphate detergents."
Secretary Udall called it a "significant and giant step forward" in adopting preven-

tive techniques of pollution control.
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NEws, Aug. 7, 1967,

at 16.
39"There is some difference of opinion as to the exact nature and variety of the effects
of oil on different forms of marine life." Hawkes, supra note 5, at 23.
[Tlhose most aware of and concerned about oil pollution have failed to
present clear, well documented, and voluminous information relative to the
real extent of this problem. There is no question that the problem exists
and is of disastrous proportions in some areas but there is real need for
sound information making this clear to all concerned. Therein lies one of
the major contributions needed from the biologists and conservationists of
the world.
Id. at 26.
40
Article 6(1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas provides: "Ships shall
sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided
for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas ....
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6,
para. 1, [1962) 2 U.S.T. 2312, 2315, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 86 (effective Sept. 30, 1962), quoted in 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 842 (1958). See also id., art. 5
and 7.
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needs reevaluation. The problem is accentuated by the widespread
4
practice of the flags of convenience. 1
II.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The international community has a common interest in keeping
the oceans - the joint property of nations4" - free from pollution.
At the highest level of generality, this objective finds unanimous
acclamation by the leading participants - nation states,4" concerned

45
44
industrial enterprises, and interested groups.

In specific instances, however, the conduct of participants, which
is in varying degrees influenced by their conflicting and contending
interests, might result in defeating the overall objective. Thus economic expediency might dictate that a tanker dump slops in the ocean
instead of carrying around a tank full of it until it found shore
facilities for disposal. Similarly, the objective of attracting a larger
tanker fleet under its flag might result in a nation state's offering
the owners of different nationalities inducements in the form of
imposing less stringent national regulatory and enforcement measures.
In the same way, a state might choose to reject such international
regulatory norms as the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 46 thus freeing the owners from being otherwise

subjected to international standards and discipline.
Thus there might be a clash between the overall interest in the
prevention of oil pollution and the special interests sought by the
group of tanker owners and nation states unwilling to comply with
41 The International Court of Justice noted in an advisory opinion that notwithstanding

the foreign ownership of many vessels registered in Liberia and Panama, these countries are among the eight "largest ship-owning nations." Advisory opinion on Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMCO, [19603 I.C.J. 150. See
generally RIENOW, THE TEST OF NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL

(1937);

Harolds, Some Legal Problems Arising out of Foreign Flag Operations, 28 FORDHAM
L. REV. 295 (1959) ; McDougal, Burke, & Vlasic, The Maintenance of Public Order
at Sea and the Nationality of Ships, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 25 (1960) ; Pinto, Flags of
Convenience, 87 JOURNAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (CLUNET) 344 (1960) ; Note,

The Effect of United States Labor Legislation on the Flag-of-Convenience Fleet:
Regulation of Shipboard Labor Relations and Remedies Against Shoreside Picketing,
69 YALE L.J. 498 (1960). See also M. MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC
ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1112-40 (1962); N.Y. Times, June 28, 1967, at 73, col. 5.
42

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 473 (1792).

43The 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil and the
1962 Amendments are an expression of this common interest. See notes 46-59 infra
and accompanying text.
"See,

e.g., Home, supra note 14, at 88, cols. 2-6.

45 See, e.g., statements by the officers of the American Humane Education Society, the
Audubon Society, and National Wildlife Federation in Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 5, at 15, 21 and 31 respectively.
4The 1954 Convention has been in force since July 26, 1958, but it entered into force for
the United States on December 8, 1961. Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
of the Sea by Oil, opened for signature, May 12, 1954, [1961] 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S.
No. 4900 (effective Dec. 8, 1961) [hereinafter cited as the 1954 Convention].
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the international standards. The urgency of the situation might
demand that in the near future these special interests be controlled
by an international agreement prohibiting the pollution of the seas
by oil, irrespective of the reason therefor, 4 7 and imposing more
severe penalties. The agreement might also establish an international
agency to provide the structure and machinery for enforcement and
determination of the conflicting claims.
Notwithstanding the maritime practice widely accepted heretofore and reflected in the international norms that the regulation,
control and enforcement of antipollution measures on the high seas
be exclusively administered by the state of the flag, 48 a first step
might be taken to recognize the equally strong claim for concurrent
jurisdiction when events occurring in the contiguous zones of a coastal
state are likely to affect its interests. The British action of bombing
the Torrey Canyon is one such instance.
III.

TRENDS IN DECISION

Pollution of waterways caused by leaking oil-carrying wooden
vessels can be traced back to the mid-18th century. 9 However, it was
not until the first World War when vessels had started switching
from steam to oil and oil tankers began plying the oceans that oil
pollution came to be recognized as a serious problem, necessitating
national and international preventive and regulatory measures. This
section will briefly examine the prevalent international norms and
relevant measures undertaken by two maritime powers, the United,
States and Great Britain, to deal with oil pollution. This will be
followed by a discussion of the jurisdictional aspects.
A. InternationalNorms
As the first major effort ol an international scale to regulate the
discharge of oil and oily wastes into the seas, the 1954 Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil5" is applicable to
"sea-going ships registered in any of the territories of a Contracting
Government."'" Since the purpose of the Convention was to prevent
the pollution of the sea by oil, it sets up areas generally extending
47 For exceptions, recognized by the 1962 Amendments to the 1954 Convention, as not

constituting an offense under the Convention, see Amendments to the Convention of
1954, adopted Apr. 4-11, 1962, art. IV (a), (b), (c), [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523,
T.I.A.S. No. 6109 (effective May 18, 1967) [hereinafter cited as the 1962 Amend48 ments].
Id.art. VI(1).
49Hawkes, supra note 5, at 21. For the report that in 1754 the Caspian Sea off Baku
was polluted by leakage of bulk oil cargo in wooden bottoms, see 16 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL 199 (1959) cited in Stubbs, supra note 21, at
140.
10 1954 Convention, supra note 46.
51 Id. art. II.
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50 miles from land as prohibited for the discharge of oil and oily
wastes.5 2 It contains requirements that ships be fitted with oily-water
separators "8 and that skippers keep oil record books on board the
ship. 4 It pledges the signatory nation state to enforce the prohibition against the dumping or spilling of oil within those prohibited
zones in offshore international waters. 5 Although the Convention
does not prescribe specific penalties for violation, it says they shall
be no less stringent than the penalty for a comparable discharge
within the signatory's territorial waters.5
In 1962 the Convention was amended5" to extend its scope and
to strengthen it by bringing within its purview new categories of
ships, extending the restricted zones where no oil or oily wastes may
be discharged, and amending the prescribed penalties and enforcement procedures. Amendments were also adopted to meet the United
States' reservations pertaining to the amendment procedure of the
Convention" and her objection concerning the Federal Government's
responsibility for providing shore facilities for the reception of oil
59
residues.
The 1958 United Nations Geneva Convention on the High
Seas 6" provides that taking account of the existing treaties on the
prevention of pollution of the seas, each state shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution "by the discharge of oil from ships or
pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the
sea bed and its subsoil . 6...1
B. The United States Action
Following the long-established and unchallenged practice of
maritime nations to have a nation state prescribe and apply norms
to all ships, irrespective of their nationality, entering its territorial
and internal waters,6" federal legislation enacted in 1886 dealt with
52 Id. art. III, annex A.

531d. art. VII.
Id. art. IX.
551d. art. III and VI.
5
1d. art. VI.
57
The 1962 Amendments were adopted by the Conference of Contracting Governments
to the Convention of 1954, held at London, April 4 to 11, 1962.
8 Compare the 1954 Convention, art. XVI, with the 1962 amendments, art. XVI.
59
Compare the 1954 Convention, art. VIII, with the new article VIII, which merely
obligates a nation state to "take all appropriate steps to promote" the shore facilities..
1962 Amendments, art. VIII.
60
Adopted Apr. 29, 1958, [1962) 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82
(effective Sept. 30, 1962). See U.N. Doc. A./CONF.13/L.53 (1958). The text of
the convention is contained in 52 AM. J. IN'r'L L. 842 (1958).
61 1958 Convention, art. 24, quoted at 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 842, 848 (1958).
e See generally M. McDoUGAL. & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS
89-304 (1962).
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the problem of water pollution in New York harbor.6 3 The statute,
preventive in nature, made it unlawful to discharge refuse into New
York harbor.6 4 In 1888, it was superseded by another Act, broader
in scope, which made the act of dumping refuse "in the tidal waters
of the harbor of New York, or its adjacent or tributary waters, or in
those of Long Island Sound," a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
ranging from $250 to $2,500 and a prison sentence from 30 days
to a year.6 5
The purpose of the Act was to prevent the discharge of any matter which would tend to obstruct navigation or would injure boats in
the harbor. 66 Although oil waste was not specifically mentioned in
the Act, the courts have consistently held that discharging waste fuel
oil6 7 or dumping oil " into the tidal waters is within the provisions
of the Act.
Further legislation was adopted in 189069 and 1894,70 controlling the deposit of refuse in the United States navigable waters generally. These Acts were superseded by the River and Harbor Act
of 1899, 71 which also provided for penalties for violations similar
to the ones prescribed by the 1888 Act. Construing the Act of 1899,
the Court held the discharge of oil from vessels to be "refuse matter"
under the Act and hence considered the discharge punishable.72
The first comprehensive legislation dealing with oil pollution
was adopted in 1924. Entitled the Oil Pollution Act, 1924, 7 3 the
Act is an addition to the laws already existing "for the preservation
and protection of navigable waters.' '7 It prohibits the "discharge
of oil by any method, means, or manner into or upon the coastal
navigable waters of the United States from any vessel using oil as
63 Act of Aug. 5, 1886, ch. 929,

§

3, 24 Stat. 329.

64 Id.
65 Act of June 29, 1888, ch. 496, § 1, 25 Stat. 209, superseded by New York Harbor
and Adjacent Waters Act, 33 U.S.C. § 441 (1964), as amended Aug. 28, 1958, Pub.
L. 85-802 § 1(1), 72 Stat. 970.
66
Warner-Quinlan Co. v. United States, 273 F. 503 (3d Cir. 1921).
67 The Albania, 30 F.2d 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
68 S.S. Nea Hellis, 116 F.2d 803 '(2d Cir. 1941).
69 Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 6, 26 Stat. 453, prohibiting the obstruction of
navigation by deposits of refuse, etc., in navigable waters.
70 Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 299, §§ 6-8, 28 Stat. 363, which prohibited the depositing of refuse in navigable waters for the improvement of which money had been
appropriated, and prescribed penalties for violations.
71 Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152, which prohibited discharge of "any
refuse matter of any kind or description whatever . . . into any navigable water of
the United States." See also River and Harbor Act of 1966, S. 3906, tit. 1; 33 U.S.C.
§§ 411-12 (1964).
72
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966). See also United States
v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369, 370-71 (2d Cir. 1952) ; La Merced, 84 F.2d 444,
446 (9th Cir. 1936).
73
Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316, 43 Stat. 604, 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1964).
74
1d. § 8, 43 Stat. 606, 33 U.S.C. §437 (1964).
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fuel . . . or any vessel carrying or having oil thereon in excess of

that necessary for its lubricating requirements .. . ."" The penalties
provided by the Act are similar to the ones mentioned earlier.7 6 The
77
United States Coast Guard is the enforcing agency.
More recently Congress adopted major legislation in 1966 to
fight water pollution. Called the Clean Waters Restoration Act of
1966,78 the Act amends the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 9
and the Oil Pollution Act, 1924.80 It requires the person

81

discharg-

ing oil from a vessel in the navigable waters of the United States to
remove the same, failing which the Secretary of the Interior may
arrange for its removal and the person responsible for such discharge
shall be liable for the costs of such removal. It also provides for
penalties: in addition to a fine of up to $2,500 and imprisonment up
to a year, the vessel is liable for a penalty of up to $10,000.82
Since the passage of the Act, further efforts to strengthen it are
already underway. Under the 1966 Act the "discharge" meant "any
grossly negligent, or willful spilling, leaking, pumping, emitting or
emptying of oil."18 3 There was no provision for dealing with acciden-

tal discharge of oil. Now amendments have been proposed to make
accidental discharge into coastal waters subject to the penalties mentioned above. The proposed bill, called the "Navigable Waters Pollution Control Act of 1967,"184 would substitute "accidental, negligent" for "grossly negligent" in defining discharge,8 5 thus making
the owners liable for cleaning up the oil slick if there is even an
accidental spilling or leaking of oil. It would also raise the limit
of the penalty to $50,000.86
In the hearings before the Senate Public Works Committee on
the bill,8 7 the officials of the Federal Government enthusiastically
5

Id. § 3, 43 Stat. 605, 33 U.S.C. § 433 (1964).
The minimum fine is $500. Id. § 4, 43 Stat. 605, 33 U.S.C. § 434 (1964).
77
1d. § 7, 43 Stat. 605-06, 33 U.S.C. § 436 (1964).
78 Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 '(1966). For full text see WATER CONTROL
NEWS, Oct. 24, 1966, at 9. See also Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-234.
79 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66K (1964).
80 Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316, 43 Stat. 604, 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1964). See WATER
CONTROL NEWS, Oct. 24, 1966, at 31, for the amendments.
81 Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316, 43 Stat. 605, 33 U.S.C. § 432(b) is amended to define
person as "an individual, company, partnership, corporation, or association; any owner,
operator, master, officer, or employee of a vessel; and any officer, agent or employee of
the United States." Pub. L. 89-753, § 211 (a), 80 Stat. 1252 (1966).
82
Id., amending 33 U.S.C. § 434 '(1964).
3 Id., amending 33 U.S.C. § 432 (1964)
(emphasis added). See WATER CONTROL
NEWS, Oct. 24, 1966, at 31, § 2(3).
8 S. 849, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced in the Senate on Feb. 6, 1967, and referred
to the Committee on Public Works.
85
Id. § 2(e), amending 33 U.S.C. § 432 (1964).
6Id. § 4(b), amending 33 U.S.C. § 434 (1964).
87 For brief reports on the hearings, see N.Y. Times, June 9, 1967, at 80, col. 1; id.,
June 8, 1967, at 30, col. 4; id. May 15, 1967, at 40, col. 1.
7

76
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endorsed the amendment saying that its passage would assist them
in enforcing the basic federal law on the subject - the Oil Pollution
Act of 19248 - while the representatives of the oil industry have
strongly opposed it. The industry's main arguments are that (1)
covering of accidental discharge under the Act would not be fair or
equitable;89 (2) Congress should defer action until the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization has done a thorough
study on the subject; 90 and (3) the United States should not act
unilaterally.91
Finally, the Oil Pollution Act of 1961,92 the implementing
legislation for the 1954 International Convention, should be mentioned. It may also be noted that the United States' delay in ratifying the Convention and adopting the implementing legislation
stemmed primarily from the oil industry's response that since the
Convention did not provide means for effectively enforcing antipollution measures, no useful purpose would be served by joining it.
Instead, voluntary arrangements by industry were considered to be
more effective.9 8
In 1961, however, the Convention was ratified by the United
States subject to an understanding, reservations, and recommendations. The understanding concerned the supremacy of the United
States' action in United States territorial waters. The reservations
pertained to the amendment procedures of the Convention and its
provision that the Federal Government be obligated to provide adequate shore facilities for receiving oil and oily wastes. Recommendations were made for future amendment of the Convention.94 The
1961 Act prohibits discharge by ships of American registry of oil
or oily wastes beyond the United States territorial waters in specified
zones. It also provides for the maintenance and examination of oil
record books and for penalties. Subsequently, the United States
accepted the 1962 Amendments to the Convention,"8 and the 1961
8 N.Y. Times, June 9, 1967, at 80, col. 1.
8 Statement by Ralph Casey, President, American Merchant Marine Institute, reported
in N.Y. Times, June 8, 1967, at 30, col. 4.
90 Statements attributed to Ralph Casey, General Manager of the Marine Dep't of the
Gulf Oil Corporation, and W.C. Brodhead, Chairman of the American Petroleum
Institute's Central Committee on Transportation by Water, cited in N.Y. Times,
June 8, 1967, at 30, cols. 4, 5.
91
Statement by W.C. Brodhead, cited in N.Y. Times, June 8, 1967, at 30, col. 5.
92 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-15 (1964).

93 See, e.g., statement by Abram Chayes, former legal advisor, Department of State, in
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., on
Ex. C, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1961).

4Id. at 2.
9s Entered into force for the United States May 18, 1967, except for Article XIV which
entered into force June 28, 1967. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text;
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8188, TREATIEs iN FoacE 277 (1967).
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Act was amended 6 to implement the amended Convention. The
provisions of the Act are in addition to those of the 1924 Act, which
with some modifications, are still applicable to all ships within the
territorial waters.
C. The United Kingdom Action
The United Kingdom adopted its first major legislation dealing
with the problem of oil pollution in 1922. Entitled the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1922, the Act made the discharge or escape of
oil into the British territorial waters,9" from a vessel capable of carrying more than 25 tons of oil" an offense punishable with a fine not
exceeding £100 to be imposed upon the owner or master of the
vessel. 100 It also provided for keeping records with respect to transfer
of oil.1 °1
The next step was the implementing legislation for the 1954
Convention. Entitled the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1955,02 it
repealed the 1922 Act.' 03 The provisions of the new Act are similar
to those in the United States Oil Pollution Act of 1961.104 The new
Act is wider in scope since it also covers the regulation of oil pollution from all vessels within the British territorial and inland
waters."0 5 Pursuant to the 1962 amendments to the 1954 Convention,
the 1955 Act was amended in 1963."' The Board of Trade is the
enforcement agency under the Act.'0 7
Finally, the Continental Shelf Act, 1964,08 makes an offense
the discharge or escape of oil into any part of the sea as a result of
operations for exploring the sea bed and subsoil or the exploitation
of the sea's resources in designated areas. Under the Act the owner
of the pipeline or the person carrying on such operations is liable
and may be fined.'0 9
96Pub. L. 89-551 (Sept. 1, 1966). The Act was passed by the House on June 20,
1966, and the Senate on Aug. 19, 1966. See also H.R. REP. No. 1479, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966) ; S. REP. No. 1620, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
97 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 39 [hereinafter cited as the 1922 Act].
98

d. § 8(3).
1d. § 8(2).
1
00 Id. § 1.
99

§ 3(1).
& 4 Eliz. 2, c. 25.
1o Id. § 24.
104 33 U.S.C. § 431 (1964).
101Id.
102 3

10

5 3 & 4 Eliz. 2, c. 25, §§ 2(3) and 3(2).

106 Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1963, c. 28.
107 Statutory Instrument 1965, No. 145.
108 Statutes 1964, c. 29. On the possibility and the technique of laying deep pipelines,

see DeLarvelle, French install submarine pipeline at depth of 1,080 ft., OIL & GAS J,
Aug. 7, 1967, at 118.
109 The Continental Shelf Act, 1964, c. 29, §§ 5 (1) (2).
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ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

While each nation state enjoys an almost exclusive competence
to prescribe and apply norms to events occurring within its territorial
waters, it has to share this competence with other nation states with
respect to events occurring upon the high seas. Thus, among others,
the law of the flag, the nationality of the participants involved, and
the impact upon the coastal state may all be relevant factors in asserting competence regarding occurrences on the high seas."1 However,
the admiralty jurisdiction exercised by nation states, including the
United States and the United Kingdom, is quite broad and would
extend to the damage caused by the oil pollution from a vessel.
A. The United States Practice
The United States federal courts exercise a broad admiralty
jurisdiction."' While maritime torts have always been considered a
principal subject of admiralty jurisdiction, 2 until 1948 the traditional test of jurisdiction in torts was the locality of the damage,
injury, or occurrence. Thus, to confer admiralty jurisdiction on the
courts, the damage or injury must have occurred on the navigable
waters. The court's jurisdiction did not extend to injuries caused
to persons or property on land.1

3

Since 1948, pursuant to a statute adopted by Congress, the
Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act,"' the admiralty jurisdiction
of the United States extends to all ship-to-shore torts committed on
navigable waters. It includes "all cases of damage or injury, to person
or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding5
that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land,""1
and is not limited to injury actually caused by the physical agency of
the vessel or a particular part of it." 6
Thus in a case dealing with claims for alleged damage to shore
waterfront and beaches" 7 caused by the negligent overflow of a cargo
0
See
11

generally M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS
730-1007 (1962).
"'See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 137 (1814) (separate
opinion).
112 See, e.g., The Clarita and the Clara, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 1 (1874) ; The Belfast, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 624 (1868).
113 The Russell No. 6, 1941 A.M.C. 1610, 42 F. Supp. 904, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
114 Act of June 19, 1948, ch. 526, 62 Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
"15 Fematt v.City of Los Angeles, 196 F. Supp. 89, 93 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
116 Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), rehearing denied,
374 U.S. 858 (1963). See also Interlake Steamship Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879
(6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965), rehearingdenied, 382 U.S. 873
(1965); R. & H. Development Co. v. Diesel Tanker, J.A. Martin, Inc., 2 Conn. Cir.
622, 203 A.2d 766 (app. div. 1964). On the effect of the Act see Petition of N.Y.
Trap Rock Corp., 1960 A.M.C. 429, 172 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
7
"1p
etition of New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925, 938-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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of heating oil in harbor waters, admiralty jurisdiction was accepted
and damages awarded in "such situations of claimed injury.""" 8
B. United Kingdom Practice
The Administration of Justice Act, 1956,19 is comprehensive
legislation dealing with the admiralty jurisdiction of the English
20
courts. The Act extends to any claim for damage done by a ship.
The Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890,"' extended the
admiralty jurisdiction to the colonial courts, under which the Bermuda Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the Torrey Canyon con22
troversy, and that is where the case is pending.'
V.

LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION

The issue of alleged liability for producing an oil slick may be
conveniently examined under the following heads: (1) international
conventions and the implementing legislation; (2) municipal oil
pollution statutes; and (3) at common law. The first two deal with
criminal liability and the third, civil liability.
A. International Conventions and Implementing Legislation
The amended 1954 Convention 2 3 provides that it shall not
constitute an offense under the Convention if (1) discharge of oil
or oily mixture from a ship was done to secure the safety of the ship,
prevent damage to the ship or the cargo or save life at sea;' 2 4 or (2)
the escape of oil or oily mixture resulted from damage to the ship
or unavoidable leakage, provided all reasonable precautions had been
taken "after the occurrence of the damage or discovery of the leakage
for the purpose of preventing or minimizing the escape"; 2 5 or (3)
the discharge of residue resulted from the "purification or clarification of fuel oil or lubricating oil," provided that such discharge was
'26
made "as far from land as is practicable.'
In other cases of "any discharge or escape" of oil' 2 7 and oily
mixture,' howsoever caused, the Convention requires the state of
118d. at 932.
119 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 46. For the various Acts that it repeals see id. § 57, sched. 2.
120id.
121

§ 1(d).

53 & 54 Vict., c. 27. See generally id. § 2 for admiralty jurisdiction of such courts.

2

See Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 20, 1967, at 16, col. 2, for a brief report on
the case.
123 See notes 46-59 supra and accompanying text.
124 1962 Amendments, art. IV (a).
125 Id. art. IV (b).
1 2

26

Id. art. IV (c).
art. I (1), defines oil as "crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil."
128 d. art. I (1), defines oily mixture as "a mixture with an oil content of 100 parts
or more in 1,000,000 parts of the mixture."

1

127 Id.
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the registry of the vessel to impose penalties upon the offender making such discharge outside the territorial waters of the state. The
penalties shall be imposed "adequate in severity to discourage any
such unlawful discharge and shall not be less than the penalties
which may be imposed under the law of that territory in respect of
the same infringement within the territorial sea.'1 9 The implementing legislation in the United States, the Oil Pollution Act, 1961,"'0
and the British acts of 1955 and 1963,1"' contain similar provisions.
B. Municipal Statutes
A trend toward stricter regulations for the purpose of controlling
oil pollution from vessels within the territorial waters is increasingly
in evidence. To illustrate, while the purpose of the proposed "Navigable Water Pollution Control Act of 1967" which was recently
introduced in the United States Senate 3 2 is "to expand and improve
existing law,' 8 3 its effect would be to make even accidental or negligent spilling of oil punishable, and to increase the penalty for such
spillage. 34 Cases of "emergency imperiling life or property, or
unavoidable accident, collision or stranding" are saved from the
application of the Act.' 3 The statement of policy announced in the
bill is instructive. It says, "The Congress further finds that to abate
and prevent such pollution [of the navigable waters by oil, sewage,
and refuse of every kind discharged or dumped by vessels plying
them] in the public interest, it is necessary that the disposal by vessels of oil, sewage, and refuse on these waters be controlled by forbidding it to the greatest practical extent ....186
Similarly the British legislative measures, Oil in Navigable
Waters Acts of 1955 and 1963,"' and the Continental Shelf Act,
1964,138 make the discharge of oil a punishable offense with a few
exceptions. Following the lead of the 1954 Convention and the
amendments thereto, it is a defense under the 1955 and 1963 Acts
to prove that (1) the discharge of oil was necessary and a reasonable
step "for the purpose of securing the safety of the vessel, or of preventing damage to the vessel or her cargo, or of saving life,"' 139 or
12 Id. art. VI (2).
130 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-15 (1964).
1313 & 4 Eliz. 2, c. 25; Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1963, c. 28.
132 Introduced in the Senate on Feb. 6, 1967. S. 849, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
133 Id. at 1.

134 1d, § 2(e).
13 Id. § 3(a).
'36 Id. § 2.
137 3 & 4 Eliz. 2, c. 25 ; Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1963, c. 28.
138 Statutes 1964, c. 29.
'3

3 & 4 Eliz. 2, c. 25 § 4(1).
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(2) the escape of oil was caused by damage to the vessel, or by leakage which "was not due to any want of reasonable care," and that as
soon as practicable after the damage occurred or the leakage was
discovered "all reasonable steps were taken for stopping or reducing"
140
the escape of oil.
However, the Acts make it an offense even in these emergency
cases if the owner or master of the vessel discharging oil into waters
of the British harbors did not report his action to the harbor offi14 1
cials.
Under the Continental Shelf Act, 1964, it is a defense if the
person owning the pipeline or carrying on drilling operations proves
that he took all reasonable care to prevent the leakage and that after
it was discovered "all reasonable steps were taken for stopping or
reducing it."'' 4' The trend in England is also toward stiffer penal4
ties.' 3
C. Civil Liabilitiesat Common Law
Oil spillage by a vessel, resulting in damage to oyster beds,
fisheries, rowboats, or property on the beaches and waterfront may
cause liability in tort. Civil actions pertaining to such damage will
generally lie in negligence or nuisance. Although there is lack of
sufficient authority in case law on various aspects of the subject, a
few representative cases from the United States and the British jurisdictions will be examined here before looking into the civil aspects
of the Torrey Canyon case.
1. The United Kingdom Case Law
In Southport Corp. v. Esso Petroleum Co.,' 44 a 680 ton oil tanker
was stranded while approaching an estuary after developing steering
trouble. The master discharged over 400 tons of oil to lighten the
vessel which he considered necessary to save the vessel and the crew
from grave danger. The oil became deposited on the respondents'
foreshore, causing damage. In an action brought for trespass and/or
nuisance and/or negligence, the trial judge found that there was no
trespass or nuisance and held that since the plaintiffs had failed to
prove negligence, they could not recover. 4 ' It may be noted that the
plaintiffs had pleaded as negligence, negligent navigation and nothing more. The defendants had denied negligence in addition to the
0
§ 4 (2).
141Id. § 10.

14 Id.

§ 5(1).
See, e.g., an Associated Press report from London dated May 12, 1967: N.Y. Times,
May 14, 1967, at 14, col. 2.

142 3 & 4 Eliz. 2, c. 25,
143

144[1953) 2 All E.R. 1204 (Q.B.).
145Id. at 1213.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 44

denial of trespass and nuisance, pleading that the steering had gone
out of control.
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the defendants negligent
because they had failed to sustain the burden of explaining how
the well-found vessel came to be stranded and the stern frame fractured, an accident not in the ordinary course of events.' 4 6 Denning, L.J., considered the discharge of oil a public nuisance for
which he would hold the defendants liable, unless the defendants
could show that such discharge was an inevitable accident, that is, "a
necessity which arose utterly without their fault."'1 4 7 He would hold
them liable for negligence, too, but not in trespass.' 4 8 Finally, the
House of Lords heard the appeal in Esso Petroleum Co. v. Southport
Corp. Overruling the Court of Appeals, it held that the trial judge
had rightly determined that the master was not negligent, and that
therefore the vicarious liability allegations against the shipowners
must also fail. 149 The House of Lords however only considered the
cause of action for negligence and did not pass on the issues of trespass and nuisance. Nevertheless, Lord Tucker 50 and Lord Radshared the view of Denning, L.J., that on the facts of the
cliffe'
case trespass did not lie. Lord Radcliffe also said that the appellants
were not responsible for private nuisance.' 52
In Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Engineerin an appeal from the decision
ing Co. (the Wagon Mound case),
of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the Privy Council
expressed itself on the negligence aspects of oil spillage. Substantial
damage to a wharf was caused by the carelessness of the servants of
the charterer of a ship, in allowing bunkering oil to spill into Morts
Bay in the port of Sydney. The oil spread to the respondents' wharf
where it was subsequently ignited by molten metal falling from the
wharf and setting fire to cotton waste floating on the oil. It was
found as a fact that the charterers "did not know and could not
reasonably be expected to have known that it was capable of being
set afire when spread on water."' 5 4 The court held them not liable
as they could not reasonably have foreseen that the damage would
have resulted from their servants' action.
148

Southport Corp. v. Esso Petroleum Co. [1954) 2 Q.B. 182.

147Id. at 199.

148 Id. at 200.
149
150
51

1

152
153
154

[1956) A.C. 218 (1955).
Id. at 244.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 242.
[1961) A.C. 388 (P.C.) (N.S.W.).
1d. at 391.
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In this case, apart from the damage to the wharf by fire, the
escape of the oil had also damaged the respondents' slipways and
caused interruption to their operations. Although the respondents
had not initially pressed any claim in respect of this damage, the trial
judge said:' 5 5 "The [respondents'] failure to press a claim for this
damage is not an admission that it was not actionable damage....
It follows, since foreseeable damage was caused to the [respondents],
that the [appellants'] careless act became impressed with the legal
quality of negligence and the case therefore is covered by the principles of Re Polemis['5 6 ] and not those laid down in Hay (or Bourhill) v. Young.["' 7 ]" Later, the respondents sought to place their
claim in nuisance. The Privy Council left the question open.' 5 8
In another case, Miller Steamship Co., Pty. v. Overseas Tankship (U.K. Ltd.),159 a large quantity of oil in a harbor was held to
be a public nuisance.
2. The United States Case Law
In Petition of New Jersey Barging Corp.,'"0 damages were
granted for nuisance caused by an oil slick. There, the spilling of oil
in the harbor was alleged to have caused damage to property ashore.
Claims pertained to damages "for loss of use of the beach and shore
...for loss of use of littoral or riparian rights
i.e., swimming, sunbathing, fishing, boating, picnicking, etc......1' The Commissioner's report,' 6 2 confirmed by a federal court,' 63 discussed the
admiralty law rules with respect to damages. Stating that in
admiralty the general rules of damages are applicable,' 1 4 the Commissioner relied upon earlier cases allowing for compensation based
on the element of annoyance, inconvenience and discomfort, 6" and
made awards for compensation "for such annoyance, inconvenience
and discomfort suffered by particular claimants to the extent of and
in an amount commensurate with the annoyance and discomfort
proven."' 6 6
In Salaky v. Atlas Tank Processing Corp.,' an action was
brought to recover damages to various small craft -motorboats,
155 [19611 1 All E.R. 404, 407 n. 1.
156 [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
157 [1943] A.C. 92 (1942).
158

[1961] A.C. 388, 427 (P.C.) (N.S.W.).

159[1963) 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 402 (Sup. Ct. of N.S.W.).
160 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
161

Id. at 938.

162Id. at 926-40.
163

Id. at 940.

164
Id. at 934.
165Id. at 934-37.
166 Id. at 937.
167 120 F. Supp. 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1953)

(supplemental opinion).
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sailboats and rowboats- caused by oil sludge allegedly discharged
from barges into the waters of a bay in New Jersey where these craft
had been moored. The court found that since the damage could be
traced to the oil slick from a barge, it would assume admiralty juris168
diction and award damages.
D. Civil Aspects of the "Torrey Canyon"'6 9
The oil slick from the Torrey Canyon hit the Cornish coast
hardest. Besides the British 17 and the French' 71 suits for cleaning up
the slick/sludge, claims pertaining to damage to oyster beds and
fisheries, shore fronts and beaches, hotels and restaurants are likely
to arise. Counterclaims from the owners of the ship and the cargo
owners against the British Government for the bombing of the ship
and destroying the ship and the oil cargo may also arise, although the
cargo owners could not sue the shipowners on any other grounds than
72
the alleged unseaworthiness of the vessel.'
The British have brought the action in Bermuda, the headquarters of the Barracuda Tankers Corporation, the owners of the
ship. However, the suit could also have been brought in Liberia, the
state of the ship's registry, or in Italy, whose nationals the skipper and
crew were, especially since the skipper's negligence had caused the
ship to run aground.' 78
At least three main questions would arise. First, how can the
damage be ascertained? For example, how much is a shore front
worth? Does the loss of economic opportunity amount to damage?
If so, how can it be measured? Secondly, how can negligence be
proven? And, thirdly, what are the possible defenses? In their
defense, for example, the ship owners could prove that they took all
reasonable precautions after the occurrence of the damage to the
ship.'17
They could perhaps also plead Act of God. The British
Government could plead the necessity of their action and thus escape
liability for bombing the ship and the oil.
168 Id. at 227-28.
169 For a rather cursory treatment of the subject, see GILL, su.pra note 2, at 113-22. The

authors rely heavily upon newspaper accounts and on a report in
10, 1967, at 51.
70

1

NEWSWEEK,

Apr.

See N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1967, at 12, col. 4; id., May 5, 1967, § C1 at 16, col. 1;

Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 20, 1967, at 16, col. 2.
171 See for a Reuter's report from Singapore on the futile effort of the French Government agents to serve a writ on Lake Palourde, the sister ship of the Torrey Canyon,
N.Y. Times, July 21, 1967, at 3, col. 3.
72
1 0n unseaworthiness generally, see 35 HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND 401-10 (3d
ed. 1961).
173 See N.Y. Times, May 6, 1967, § C, at 62, col. 1 (finding of the Liberian Board of

Inquiry).
174 See, e.g., the exception recognized by the 1954 Geneva Convention, and incorporated

by the British legislature in the 1955 Act, discussed in the text accompanying notes
124 and 139 supra.
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As a sanction, the Administration of Justice Act, 1956,1 confers
the right to arrest any other ship which, at the time the action is
brought, is in the same ownership as the ship in respect of which the
cause of action is alleged to have arisen."' This explains the arrest
of the Torrey Canyon's sister ship, Lake Palourde,by serving the writ
on her in Singapore when she made a one-hour stop to "take on two
coils of wire rope.""7
Finally, the law pertaining to the limitation of liability should
be noted. Under the recent British Statute, the Merchant Shipping
(Liability of Ship Owners and Others) Act, 1958,178 the provisions
pertaining to the limitation of liability apply to master, member of
crew, or servant of the owner 179 as well as to the charterers, manager
or operator. 8 The limitation of liability is applicable in the case of
an act or omission done in the capacity of master or member of the
crew or by one in the course of employment as a servant of the owners,
causing damage to vessels, goods, or other property or rights without
the owner's fault or privity. The limit on liability in respect of loss
of vessels or goods is the equivalent of 1,000 gold francs per ton, or
£23, 13s., 9 27/32d.' 8 ' Thus the liability in the Torrey Canyon case
would amount to about £4% million.
VI. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently, widespread concern is being felt about the inadequacy
of the prevalent norms of international maritime law to handle the
liability aspects of a Torrey Canyon type of case, and the lack of
satisfactory attention given thus far on national and international
levels to deal with the preventive and restorative aspects of oil pollution in general. President Johnson's appointment of a special committee headed by the Secretaries of the Interior and Transportation
to make an urgent study to determine how the United States could
best "cope with the danger that oil spillage and other hazardous substances pose for shoreline areas and inhabitants,"" 2 Prime Minister
Wilson's call for international agreements to control the movement of
1'54 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 46.

176Id. § 3(4b). See also St. Elefterio, [1957] 2 All E.R. 374, 377A (P.D.A.).
'"7For a brief report, see N.Y. Times, July 18, 1967, at 33, col. 6; Manchester Guardian
Weekly, July 20, 1967, at 16, col. 2. For a Reuter's report that after an $8.4 million
bond was posted, the ship sailed from Singapore, see N.Y. Times, July 21, 1967,
at 3, col. 3.
178 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 62. See for an earlier Act, Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58
Vict., c. 60. The 1958 Act has modified and repealed provisions in several earlier
Acts. See 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 62, § 8 and sched.
'796& 7 Eliz. 2, c. 62, § 3 (2) (a) (b).
180Id. § 3(1).
11Id. §
18

1'(1).

See N.Y. Times, June 11, 1967, at 55, col. 1; id. May 27, 1967, at 1, col. 3.
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giant tankers, 8 3 and the recent recommendations by the IMCO, meeting in London, 8 4 the American Institute of Underwriters, 8 5 and the
oil industry, 86 are indicative of such concern.
A. Preventive Steps
Changes in future construction of ships, better equipment and
technological devices, stricter navigational regulation, sea traffic
supervision and control, international licensing of captains and officers of merchant marines, further amendments to the 1954 Convention, improved municipal enforcement measures, and special research
projects, are a few steps that might reduce the potential harm by oil
pollution to water, wildlife, and shore fronts.
1. Future Design and Construction of Ships
Better compartmentalization by building stronger and smaller
compartments could limit the total loss of oil even if the ship ran
aground, or was rammed or torpedoed, since oil would be lost only
at the point of impact.' 87 Inner epoxy coatings in the tanks would also
minimize the amount of oil left coating the surfaces, and simplify the
cleaning process.' 8 8 The size of the tankers could perhaps be limited
by international agreements. The industry may be responsive to this
idea as indicated by the recent observation by the chairman of the
Japan Tanker Owners Association that a number of practical considerations of costs and risks might limit the tanker size."8 9
Better Equipment and Technological Devices
Modern giant tankers are being equipped with oil separators
and slop tanks that would reduce the discharge of oil. More recent
developments such as the use of demulsifiers for breaking up oil
residues, refined processes of tank washing, for example, Standard's
and Mobil's "load-on-top" technique' 9" which segregates tanker
2.

18 LIFE, Apr. 14, 1967, at 35.
184
185

For a brief report, see N.Y. Times, May 6, 1967, at 62, col. 1.
Reported in Denver Post, July 28, 1967, at 54, col. 2.

See, e.g., the report in N.Y. Times, May 17, 1967, at 74, col. 5.
At present only military ships are equipped with better compartmentalization; otherwise, the trend is in the opposite direction. The cost involved in building smaller
and stronger compartments would perhaps deter the industry from accepting this
recommendation. New supertankers' compartments will be so large that internal
inspection will be performed by men in small boats inside partially flooded tanks,
rather than by using ladders and scaffolds.
188 According to a recent report, most modern tankers provide for it. N.Y. Times,
June 11, 1967, at 88, col. 2.
18 The statement was made in a paper presented before the Seventh World Petroleum
Congress in Mexico City, Apr. 17, 1967. Reported in Disappearing cost advantages
may end rise in tanker sizes, OIL & GA.s J., Apr. 17, 1967, at 183.
190 See, e.g., a brief report in Hearings on House Resolution 8760 to Amend Oil Pollution Act, 1966, Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey,
and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,89th Cong.,
18

187

2d Sess., ser. 89-33, at 25-27 (1966) ; N.Y. Times, June 11, 1967, at 88, col. 2;

N.Y. Times, May 15, 1967, at 42, col. 1.
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washings and ballast water into a single tank and allows them to
remain distributed until the oil and water have separated naturally
and thus results in "95 per cents of oil formerly discharged during
tank washings and deballasting all vessels"' 91 being retained, show
a healthy trend. So does the newly introduced system by Cities Service
for burning crude oil and "slop" in place of more expensive bunker
"C" fuel which will eliminate the need to flush tanks and discharge
bunker fuel between voyages.' 9 2 The Cities Service system has the
added attraction of being economically advantageous. Reportedly
calculations show that close to one million dollars over the 20-year
economic life of a tanker could be saved by employing it. Such a
system could perhaps be made mandatory on all tankers.' 3 Improved
harbor and terminal facilities should also be provided to handle huge
tankers safely.'
3. Navigational Regulation, Sea Traffic Control, and International Licensing of Officers
It is desirable to have an international body supervise and inspect
ships' navigation equipment regularly. This body could also administer international licensing of big ships' officers and provide training
schools and refresher courses for them so that they keep abreast of
the latest developments in the art of navigation, especially in view of
the enlarged size of the tankers and the rapidly changing technology.
As a first step, this body should at least establish international standards for licensing such officers.' 5
As tankers get larger and more numerous, it will also be essential
to provide well-defined routes and new mandatory sea lanes for
them,' 9 6 since huge tankers of 500,000 dead-weight tonnage cannot
travel the normal shipping lanes nor enter many harbors. Furthermore, their travel as well as the routes of smaller dry-cargo ships
should be controlled from the shore. Thus, the "rampant individualism" in this field, that is, the lack of any obligation on the master of
191 Reported in N.Y. Times, June 4, 1967, at 115.
92
1 OIL & GAS J., May 22, 1967, at 79; N.Y. Times, May 17, 1967, at 74, col. 5.

193The enforcement procedure could be similar to the one currently followed by some
states in denying entry to their harbors to vessels that do not meet certain health
safety standards.
194 See N.Y. Times, July 22, 1967, at 40, col. 6. It is also reported that "the Japanese
port authorities, as well as Japanese oil companies, have been concerned for some
time by the potential disaster hazard of supertankers unloading in congested harbors."
OIL & GAS J., Mar. 20, 1967, at 102.
195 See for brief report on the IMCO Council's proposed study of such proposals, N.Y.
Times, May 6, 1967, at 62, col. 1.
196 See, e.g., a report on the recomendations of the American Institute of Marine
Underwriters which include the use of mandatory sea lanes, Denver Post, July 28,
1967, at 54, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, May 15, 1967, at 40, col. 1. A subcommittee
of IMCO recently recommended that sea lanes be established, especially in congested waters. N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1967, at 76, col. 2.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 44

the ship to report his course, speed and position to coastal stations,
should be replaced by control systems similar to the aircraft control
systems. 19 7 Present technology, using LORAN type equipment with
identification attachments, long-range, shore-based radar equipment
or Doppler systems could perhaps efficiently track all vessels from
port to about 500 miles offshore. Computerized control could be
established and ships approaching ports could be regulated as aircraft are when they approach metropolitan airports. 198 This device
could be used to warn ships of collisions or navigation errors that
might cause disaster on congested sea routes. The cost of controlling
and operating such a system could be borne by the maritime nations
alone or be shared with the industry - shipowners and charterers.
4. Amendments to the 1954 Convention
Further amendments to the 1954 Convention 99 are recommended which would ban the dumping of all kinds of oil products
including the nonpersistent ones,2 00 and provide severe penalties for
violations and stronger enforcement machinery.
5. Municipal Enforcement
Enforcement of existing norms on a national level may be improved by the enforcing agencies, such as the United States Coast
Guard, by setting up a regular patrol system to keep a constant watch
in strategic areas. Current practice in most nation states is similar
to that of the United States Coast Guard which relies for its information about oil slicks on random sightings by ships and planes.2 0,
In many instances such sightings will be made too long after the oil
slick has formed to enable the patrolling agency to trace the oil slick
to a particular ship.
6. Research Projects
A common objective in preventing oil pollution of the seas
would suggest that regional and international research projects,
staffed by competent scientists and technical experts, be undertaken
to study both the preventive and restorative aspects of the problem.
A beginning could be made by establishing two regional arrange'9

See, e.g., THE

NATION, May 1, 1967, at 549; Prime Minister Wilson's proposal,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 17, 1967, at 47.

198 See for a brief report from London on the IMCO meeting discussing a similar
proposal, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1967, at 16, col. 1. The United States government
has just released the Navy's transit satellite navigational system for use by any
United States merchant ship. Although the system is expensive it allows a ship to
plot its position with pinpoint accuracy. TIME, Aug. 11, 1967, at 56-57.
1954 Convention, supra note 46.
2 0
0 See, e.g., a report that the industry endorses such an agreement, N.Y. Times,
supra note 186.
201 N.Y. Times, May 15, 1967, at 40, col. 1.
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ments, one for Britain and other European states and the other for
the United States and Canada, or an international body, to conduct
such research and provide technical expertise- information, knowhow and assistance- to the parties in need.20 2 Each participating
nation state could contribute to this fund according to its resources. 203
B. Restorative Measures
Although adequate preventive steps could decrease the probability of accidents, human error and equipment failure will still
result in accidents. A tanker might get off course, collide with other
ships in narrow passages, run aground, or be torpedoed. Thus further
improvement of post-disaster restorative measures is urgently needed.
The two major problems, clean-up techniques and the liability and
compensation aspects, will be studied in this section.
1. Clean-up Techniques
Since the Torrey Canyon disaster, effective techniques of detection, recovery, neutralization, and dispersal of spilled oil, are being
widely explored. 0 4
In the aftermath of the Torrey Canyon the British introduced
floating booms of urethane foam and polystyrene to protect harbors
and estuaries2 0 5 and detergent agents to emulsify the oil slick, and
tried methods of coagulating and absorbing the oil with such materials as straw and verniculate. 20 6 The French used sawdust which
soaked up oil and was later scooped up by ships, and rigged airpumps which sucked floating oil into specially built containers that
were later disposed of ashore. 0 7
Later developments include a bill introduced in the United
States Senate, 08 which is aimed at developing chemical procedures
for neutralizing spillages after future disasters. Furthermore, several
firms are experimenting with products for discharge, sinking, dissolution, or sweeping the oil. Among other possibilities are the use of
202 Federal investigators appointed to study the aftermath of the Torrey Canyon wreck

are reported to have suggested NATO as a proper vehicle for such study. N.Y.
Times, June 11, 1967, at 55, col. 1. The British weekly, The Statist, suggested a
West European cooperative solution. British Information Services, British Weeklies,
Mar. 31, 1967, at 1.
203 The British newspaper Sunday Telegraph recommended such action. See British
Information Services, Today's British Papers, Apr. 2, 1967, at 4.
204 See for a report on the President's concern with this aspect, N.Y. Times, May 27,
1967, at 1, col. 3, and at 51, col. 4.
205 The wreck of the Torrey Canyon, CHEMICAL WEEK, Apr. 8, 1967, at 59, 62.
206 British Information Services, Policy Background, Torrey Canyon, Apr. 7, 1967, at 2.
See generally SEc'Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP'T, THE "ToRREY CANYON,"
CMND. No. 3246 (1967).
207 Chemicals vs. Crude Oil, CHEMICAL WEEK, May 20, 1967, at 49.
2W Senate bill S. 1585, sponsored by Senator Warren Magnuson and seven other senators. CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, May 1, 1967, at 27.
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rotating drums," °9 oil solubilization agents,21 0 digesting culture capable of "eating petroleum" like natural bacteria, 1 1 silicone treated
fuel ash,2 12 and cargo solidifications or jelling compounds.21 3 . However, the possibility of biological hazards of some of these products
to marine, shore, and bird life cannot be ruled out. 21 4 Among other
measures, stockpiling of cleaning materials at strategic locations and
free use of salvage vessels to enable rapid salvage of a tanker and/or
its oil would be helpful.2 15
Still another device to handle the oil pollution effectively is to
set up coordinating bodies at both national and international levels.
Recently federal investigators who studied the British and French
operations in dealing with the Torrey Canyon wreck have found
that the absence of such bodies in both Britain and France had hampered the clean-up operations. 1 8
2. Liability and Compensation Aspects
Compulsory insurance,2 17 strict liability laws prescribed by international agreements, improved enforcement means by the state of
registry of the vessel, and recognition under an international convention of a coastal state's right to take the protective action such as
access to and destruction of a damaged ship and/or its cargo in international waters in case of a threat to its coastline,2 1 are further
measures to be explored. Notwithstanding the traditional deference to
the law of the flag, concurrent jurisdiction of interested nation states
in emergency situations should be recognized. A reevaluation of the
widespread practice of the "flag of convenience" should also be
undertaken.
Rienow & Rienow, The Oil Around Us, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1967 (Magazine)
at 115.
210 See CHEMICAL WEEK, supra note 205; TIME, July 28, 1967, at 68.
211 Rienow & Rienow, supra note 209, at 115.
212 CHEMICAL WEEK, supra note 207.
213 Id. See also N.Y. Times, June 11, 1967, at 55, col. 1.
214 -[T]he American Petroleum Institute usually cautions against the use of chemicals
to remedy oil spills. Among the reasons: the chemicals cause foam, possibly harmful
effects on shellfish and other marine life. And coagulated oil is often a problem if it
should wash up on the beach."The wreck of the Torrey Canyon, CHEMICAL WEEK,
Apr. 8, 1967, at 59, 62. The British had studied the problems of the reduction of
the biological hazards to marine, shore and bird life from the use of detergents
after the Torrey Canyon wreck. THE "TORREY CANYON," supra note 206, at 8.
215 For a brief report on such suggestions, see N.Y. Times, June 11, 1967, at 55, col. 1.
209

216

Id.

217 See, for the comment made by the Chairman of the IMCO Council that he could

not foretell if any Council recommendation on the "sensitive, complex" issue of
compulsory insurance would be forthcoming soon, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1967, at
62, col. 1.
218
See generally M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS
ch. 6: "Claims to Authority in Ocean Areas Adjacent to the Territorial Sea," 565-729
(1962).

1967

THE TORREY CANYON

Another suggestion for dealing with the damages of such disaster is to establish an international fund, into which all shipbuilders,
owners, and charterers would be obligated to pay. As experience
builds up showing that ships manufactured by certain firms, or operated by certain companies had fewer accidents, their contributions to
the fund per ton built or carried would decrease. Simultaneously,
those builders or shippers with higher accident rates would be forced
to contribute heavily to the fund to maintain their privilege of entering the ports of participating nations. Those persons or nation states
harmed by oil pollution would be paid from the fund, rather than
having to collect from the ship that caused the damage, whether there
was negligence or fault or lack of it. Such a system, which is similar
in concept to the state and federal unemployment compensation funds
in the United States, will require setting up an international administrative body to serve as trustee of the funds paid in, and as arbitrator
of how much to pay out, and to whom in case of an accident. Such
a system will also act as an economic deterrent and perhaps be helpful
in curing the shipping industry of what Secretary Udall called,
"sloppy habits and poor standards."21' 9
CONCLUSION

Some of these recommendations are necessarily predicated upon
a common interest of nation states and oil and shipping industries
to find effective means to avert the hazards of oil pollution if possible, and to deal with them more economically and swiftly when such
pollution occurs. For both prescription and implementation purposes,
an international body such as the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization will be a necessary vehicle.22 0 But its structure
and machinery will need further strengthening. If nothing else, the
Torrey Canyon wreck has certainly highlighted the need for interna22
tional cooperative measures in this field. 1

219 N.Y. Times, May 27, 1967, at 51, col. 4.

2On a voluntary basis, an international non-governmental organization, International
Maritime Committee (IMC), founded in Brussels in 1897, has been active in drafting
conventions on collisions at sea, limitation of shipowners' liability and salvage and
assistance at sea. The purpose of the IMC is to contribute to unification of maritime
law by means of conferences, publications and other activity. For a brief description,
see YEARBOOK
221

OF INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS 719

(llth

ed. 1966-1967).

That is, until nuclear power replaces oil as fuel. See for a report on the growing
potential and problems of nuclear power, Nuclear Power Goes "Critical," FORTUNE,
Mar. 1967, at 117.

THE LAW REVIEW- Is IT MEETING THE
NEEDS OF THE LEGAL COMMUNITY?*
INTRODUCTION

O

VER 35 years ago, Mr. Justice Cardozo observed that leadership
in legal thought had passed from the benches of the courts to
the chairs of the universities, thus stimulating a willingness to cite
more law review essays in briefs and opinions in order to buttress a
conclusion. He noted that the advance in prestige of university life
had been accompanied with a corresponding advance in the prestige
of their law reviews.'
The law review occupies a unique position in the legal system
today. Most law reviews are largely student-run institutions, publishing a variety of articles authored by professors, practitioners and
students, and covering many facets of the law. Indeed, it might be
said that the law review has the unique quality of allowing both
"master and apprentice" to express their views. In few, if any, other
professional periodicals does the student author have the opportunity
to have his research and conclusions published for distribution to the
profession.
If one accepts the proposition that the law review is somewhat
analogous to the judicial opinion or the attorney's brief as an expression of the law, that is, the "legal opinion" of the academician, and
if one accepts Mr. Justice Cardozo's observation concerning the rise
in prestige of the university in legal thought, then the position of
the law review is indeed an enviable one.
The law review as an institution is not new. The oldest continuously published American law journal today is the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review.2 To date there are approximately 102
student-run periodicals listed in the Index to Legal Periodicals.
*This article represents the culmination of a one-year survey of the content of law
reviews and their evaluation by the legal profession, conducted by the Denver Law
Journal. The initial results were presented at the Thirteenth National Conference of
Law Reviews in San Francisco, California,in March, 1967. The authors wish to express
their appreciation to the staff for its participation in the collection of initial data
and to the Administration of Justice Program of the University of Denver College of
Law for its assistance in data compilation.
'Cardozo, Introduction, in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS ix (Ass'n.
Am. L. Schools ed. 1931).
'Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REv. 227, 228 (1965).
426
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Given the increasing number of law reviews, and the proposition
that the legal periodical has achieved a position of authoritative
value within the legal community, it follows that the editors of a
law review are presented with a great responsibility for the articles
that they publish. Few students have accepted editorial positions on
a law review without stopping to realize that it is their responsibility
to select the best topics, types of articles, and authors if they are
going to contribute significantly to legal journalism. This responsibility is not to be taken lightly.
Yet, upon what bases can such determinations be made? Where
can the law review editor go to find out what is of value to his
readers? If he consults Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and the other
"established" law reviews, intending to copy their "successful" format, how is he to be certain that their formula will be of real value
in his own particular situation?
It has been said that the legal community has been oversaturated by the law reviews. Critics argue that Harvard, Yale, Columbia,
and a handful of others cover all that is necessary to legal journalism.
The rest of the law journals are more or less "excess baggage." If this
is true, the law review editor who looks to these "established"
reviews for guidance may be doing the profession more harm than
good. Indeed, who can be certain that, although Harvard, Yale,
Columbia, and a few others have received national recognition, they
are doing all that needs to be done by a law review?
The point is simply that the law review editor has very little
more than his own intuition upon which to base his important policy
decisions with regard to the function of his journal. Until recently
no one had taken the trouble to empirically examine the law review
as an institution in order to determine its value to the legal community and its purpose for existence.
The question of crucial importance is, "How can the profession
best be served by the law review?" The answer to this inquiry lies
not in intuition alone, but rather in empirical analysis of what the
law reviews are doing and what the legal community considers valuable in a law review in terms of its content, scope of material, types
of authors, and overall approach.
In this way the law review editor can see the merits and shortcomings of the law review as an institution and his own law journal
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in particular. He can find out some of the reasons for the success
of the so-called "better law reviews" and even see areas where they
are missing the boat in their treatment.
In 1966, the Denver Law Journal conducted such an empirical
research project in the form of a survey concerning the value of the
law review and its purpose within the legal community. The emphasis was on (1) the content of the various law reviews and (2) the
expectations of the legal profession. It is hoped that the results will
provide law review editors with that essential frame of reference in
which to make their policy decisions - a frame of reference heretofore unavailable.
I.

THE SURVEY AND ITS METHODOLOGY

The survey was designed to provide empirical data relating to
four basic policy questions normally facing editors of a law review:
(1) What is the proper substantive content of a law review in terms
of topics to be covered and types of articles to be published? (2)
What is the proper scope of treatment of a law review in terms of
local vs. national emphasis? (3) Who are the most desirable authors
for a law review and how can we get them to write? (4) Should a
law review specialize in particular areas of the law?
In order to provide data for these questions the survey was
approached in two ways: first, to determine what the law reviews
listed in the Index to Legal Periodicals were actually publishing
during 19658; and second, to find out what the profession (judges,
attorneys and professors) expected from the law review and how
they utilized the legal periodical in practice. In other words, both
the specific content of the law review and the expectations of the
profession were examined in depth.
In order to determine the content of the various legal journals,
all law reviews listed in the Index to Legal Periodicals during the
calendar year 1965 were surveyed. From the student-run journals
examined, over 4100 separate articles were analyzed.
In order to find out the expectations of the profession concerning the law review, the second phase of the survey was conducted by
mailing questionnaires to a random sample of attorneys, judges, and
'At the time the survey was commenced all of the legal periodicals examined bad
completed publication of their reviews for 1965. This was the most recent full year of
law review publications available.
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professors throughout the United States. Approximately 1000 questionnaires were mailed and nearly 400 returns were received.
It might be doubted that such a small number of random responses represents a true picture of the views of the legal profession.
It is well known, however, that most professional opinion polls, such
as the Gallup Poll, are conducted in a similar manner, using a small
random sample to represent a total population. The survey was
conducted under the guidance of Dr. Gresham Sykes,4 an experienced
behavioral scientist, skilled in research methodologies of this nature.
He has analyzed the data extensively and given assurance that the
responses received are sufficiently random to provide a legitimate
basis for the conclusions drawn.
In any attitude survey the researcher must run the risk of unreliability in the responses. The questions were designed to minimize
this risk, yet we are not so naive as to assert that the responses received present a conclusively reliable picture of the opinions of the
legal profession concerning the law review. Rather, we regard the
similarity of the responses as illustrative and suggestive of the views
of the legal community. Indeed, the answers to the questionnaire
take on added significance when compared to the survey of the content of the law reviews.
II.

EVALUATING THE REVIEW

A. The Profession's Opinion
In a survey of law reviews and their value to the profession,
the most logical starting point is to obtain the opinions of the members of the profession regarding the merits of the various reviews.
The survey indicated not only that there is a wide range of opinion
on this matter, but also that professors seem to be familiar with far
more of the reviews than are the attorneys or judges. This increased
familiarity is to be expected insofar as it is the professors who have
the greatest access to the reviews. Few attorneys or judges have
convenient access to large law libraries which carry a significant
number of the many law reviews being published.
Because the average professor was able to evaluate so many
of the reviews being published, while the judges and attorneys seldom
'Director, Administration of Justice Program, University of Denver College of Law.
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evaluated more than seven or eight, Table No. 15 must be viewed
as having been highly influenced by the professors. A substantial
TABLE No. 1:

RANKING THE LAW REVIEWS

This table lists the 102 law reviews surveyed in the order of the ranking which
they received by the attorneys, professors and judges with regard to their value
as legal research tools.
100
80
60
40
20
0

= Very Helpful Most of the Time
= Very Helpful on Some Occasions
= Reasonably Helpful Most of the Time
= Reasonably Helpful on Some Occasions
= Better Than Nothing
= No Value

Law Review
Harv. L. Rev.
Colum. L. Rev.
Mich. L. Rev.
Yale L.J.
U. Chi. L. Rev.
U. Pa. L. Rev.
Calif. L. Rev.
Stan. L. Rev.
Wis. L. Rev.
Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
Cornell L.Q.
Minn. L. Rev.
N.Y.U.L. Rev.
Va. L. Rev.
Duke L. J.
Wash. L. Rev.
Temp. L.Q.
Texas L. Rev.
Fordham L. Rev.
U.C.L.A.L. Rev.
Hastings L.J.
Ark. L. Rev.
U. Ill. L.F.
Iowa L. Rev.
Geo. L.J.
Ky. L.J.
Vand. L. Rev.
W. Va. L. Rev.
N.C.L. Rev.
Nw. U.L. Rev.
Marq. L. Rev.
Wash. U.L.Q.
Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
N.Y.L.F.
Tul. L. Rev.
Md. L. Rev.
St. John's L. Rev.
U. Pitt. L. Rev.
Sw. L.J.
Notre Dame Law.
Ohio St. L.J.
Drake L. Rev.
S.C.L.Q.
Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
Mercer L. Rev.
Ind. L.J.
La. L. Rev.
So. Cal. L. Rev.
Tenn. L. Rev.
Dick. L. Rev.
Syracuse L. Rev.

Score
85.5
84.4
83.9
82.6
81.0
80.6
79.5
79.2
77.7
76.9
76.6
76.3
76.2
74.7
73.3
73.0
71.9
71.5
70.8
70.5
70.0
69.2
69.1
67.9
67.9
67.6
66.5
66.2
65.8
65.7
65.6
65.5
65.3
65.0
63.8
63.8
63.8
63.5
63.0
62.4
62.4
62.2
62.2
62.0
61.7
61.6
61.3
61.3
61.3
61.1
61.0

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Law Review
U. Fla. L. Rev.
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
Neb. L. Rev.
Rutgers L. Rev.
St. Louis U.L.J.
Washburn L.J.
Wyo. L.J.
Utah. L. Rev.
Kan. L. Rev.
Mass. L.Q.
U. Cin. L. Rev.
Tulsa L.J.
Vill. L. Rev.
Ore. L. Rev.
Den. L.J.
Okla. L. Rev.
Idaho L. Rev.
Willamette L.J.
U. Det. L.J.
U. Colo. L. Rev.
Wayne L. Rev.
B.U.L. Rev.
How. L.J.
Inter-Am. L. Rev.
Mo. L. Rev.
S.D.L. Rev.
U. Miami L. Rev.
Catholic U.L. Rev.
Mont. L. Rev.
Baylor L. Rev.
Buffalo L. Rev.
Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
Ariz. L. Rev.
U. Kan. City L. Rev.
Miss. L.J.
N.D.L. Rev.
Loyola L. Rev.
W. Res. L. Rev.
Houston L.J.
S. Tex. L.J.
Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
Ala. L. Rev.
Catholic Law.
De Paul L. Rev.
San Diego L. Rev.
Brooklyn L. Rev.
Duquesne L. Rev.
Maine L. Rev.
Santa Clara Law.
Albany L. Rev.
Am. U.L. Rev.

Score
60.9
60.0
60.0
60.0
60.0
60.0
60.0
58.9
58.5
58.3
57.9
57.4
57.3
57.0
56.7
56.2
56.0
56.0
55.6
54.7
54.6
54.4
54.0
53.3
52.5
52.5
51.8
51.7
51.7
51.0
49.5
49.3
48.6
48.6
48.0
47.3
46.7
45.7
45.0
45.0
44.8
44.5
44.5
44.5
44.0
43.2
42.5
40.0
40.0
38.3
30.0
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number of judges and attorneys also responded to this portion of the
questionnaire, but had their opinions alone been used, Table No. 1
would appear significantly different. For example, while Harvard,
Columbia, Michigan and Yale are at the top of the list when the
responses of all the members of the profession are combined, it is
interesting to note that these particular reviews attained this position
of notoriety primarily because of the tremendous numbers of professors casting ballots in their favor. The attorneys and judges do
not regard them as highly. These reviews have won more respect in
the academic community than with the practitioners and jurists. This
is not to say, of course, that the latter find the Harvard Law Review
or the Yale Law Journal to be of questionable value, but the people
who work every day with the practical application of the law have
a different opinion about the relative values of the various law
reviews than do the people in the halls of academia.
In spite of these qualifications, Table No. 1 does reveal some
interesting information. Based on a 100-point scale, it indicates the
relative values of the law reviews in terms of their usefulness as
tools for legal research. For the most part, it seems to reinforce
what one might have predicted about such an evaluation, but there
are some notable exceptions. It was surprising, for instance, that the
Northwestern Law Review was in 30th place behind a number of
reviews which one might have expected to receive less favorable
comments.
Perhaps most significant here is the wide range of scores,
coupled with the fact that no review was ranked at either extreme
of the spectrum. Not a single review was considered "very helpful
most of the time" nor was any dubbed "no value." Nearly 80%0o of
the law reviews were said to be at least "reasonably helpful most of
the time," and this would seem to be a feather in the caps of the law
reviews. In spite of some stinging criticisms that have been handed
down over the years, here is some glimmering hope that the law
reviews have not been for naught.
B. The LSAT Classes
Not being satisfied to rank the law reviews solely on the basis
of the evaluations by the attorneys, professors and judges, we undertook to classify the various reviews according to the Law School
Admission Test scores' of the students at the schools where the re' Median Law School Admission Test scores
1964-65 were not available at the time of
have increased in the time that has passed
has been uniform among the law schools
been substantially affected.

for 1963-64 were used, since the scores for
the survey. Admittedly, these scores may
since, but it is expected that this increase
and that their relative rankings have not
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views were being published. This classification was initially based
on the hypothesis that schools with high median LSAT scores would
be producing high quality law reviews due to the caliber of students
serving on the staffs. As our research progressed, the hypothesis
began to prove to have been well founded. A glance at Table No. 2'
indicates the high degree of correlation between this type of classification and the ranking in Table No. 1. We are not so naive as to
contend that each law review in Class A is superior to every review
in Class B or that the Class C reviews are superior in all cases to
those in Class D. But, allowing for a reasonable number of exceptions in each case, it does seem proper to conclude that if each group
TABLE No. 2:

CLASSIFICATION OF LAW REVIEWS BY

LSAT

SCORES.

This table divides the 102 law reviews surveyed into five classifications, according
to the median LSAT scores of the entering students at the schools where they are
published.
Harv. L. Rev.
U. Chi. L. Rev.
Yale L.J.
Colum. L. Rev.
Stan. L. Rev.
Calif. L. Rev.
U. Pa. L. Rev.

(654)
(631)
(631)
(619)
(614)
(600)
(599)

CLASS A (654-541)
Inter-Am. L. Rev.
(589)
N.Y.U.L. Rev.
(589)
Mich. L. Rev.
(584)
Va. L. Rev.
(582)
(577)
Wis. L. Rev.
Nw. U.L. Rev.
(575)
Wash. U.L.Q.
(565)
Cornell L.Q.
(563)

Geo. L.J.
U.C.L.A.L. Rev.
So. Cal. L. Rev.
B.C. Ind. & Com.
L. Rev.
Fordham L. Rev.
U. Colo. L. Rev.

(559)
(553)
(549)

U. Pitt. L. Rev.
RutgersL. Rev.
U. Ill. L.F.
Minn. L. Rev.
Vand. L. Rev.
Notre Dame Law.
Santa Clara Law.

(540)
(535)
(535)
(533)
(532)
(530)
(525)

CLASS B (540-506)
Temp. L.Q.
(525)
(524)
Ind. L.J.
UtahL. Rev.
(524)
AlbanyL. Rev.
(517)
Den. L.J.
(517)
Dick. L. Rev.
(516)
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (515)
St. Louis U.L.J.
(512)

Buffalo L. Rev.
OhioSt. L.J.
Sw.L.J.
SanDiego L. Rev.
Texas L. Rev.
U. Fla. L. Rev.
W. Res. L. Rev.

(511)
(511)
(511)
(509)
(509)
(509)
(508)

B.U.L. Rev.
CatholicU.L. Rev.
Maine L. Rev.
Kan. L. Rev.
Wayne L. Rev.
Loyola L. Rev.
Iowa L. Rev.
Syracuse L. Rev.

(505)
(505)
(505)
(505)
(505)
(503)
(501)
(501)

CLASS C (505-481)
Vill. L. Rev.
(501)
DePaulL. Rev.
(500)
Catholic Law.
(499)
St. John'sL. Rev.
(499)
(499)
U. Miami L. Rev.
(493)
Idaho L. Rev.
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. (493)
(489)
N.D.L. Rev.

Wm.& Mary L.Rev.
Md.L. Rev.
Ariz. L. Rev.
S.D.L. Rev.
N.C.L. Rev.
Marq. L. Rev.
Ore. L. Rev.
U. Kan. City L. Rev.

(488)
(487)
(484)
(483)
(482)
(481)
(481)
(481)

Brooklyn L. Rev.
Okla. L. Rev.
Ala. L. Rev.
Drake L. Rev.
DuquesneL. Rev.
Wyo. L.J.
La. L. Rev.
Ky. L.J.

(480)
(476)
(475)
(475)
(475)
(475)
(474)
(472)

CLASS D (480-417)
U. Cin. L. Rev.
(472)
(470)
Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
(469)
MercerL. Rev.
(463)
Tenn. L. Rev.
(461)
Mont. L. Rev.
U. Det. L.J.
(461)
Tulsa L.J.
(458)
(457)
S.C.L.Q.

Washburn L.J.
S. Tex. L.J.
Am.U.L. Rev.
Ark. L. Rev.
Houston L.J.
N.Y.L.F.
W. Va. L. Rev.
How. L.J.

(457)
(445)
(439)
(439)
(433)
(433)
(426)
(-17)

Baylor L. Rev.
Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
Duke L.J.
Hastings L.J.

CLASS E (No Score Available)
Tul. L. Rev.
Mass. L.Q.
Miss. L.J.
Willamette L.J.
Wash. L. Rev.
Mo. L. Rev.
Neb. L. Rev.

(547)
(547)
(544)
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is considered as a whole, the Class A reviews tend to outrank those
in Class B, etc. It is for this reason that we felt justified in analyzing
all of our collected data in terms of these LSAT groupings. Thus,
in most of the tables which appear in this article, it will be noted
that information has been classified to indicate the different trends,
if any, among these various classes of reviews.
C. Comparison With Other Research Materials
While attorneys, professors and judges seemed to regard the
law review quite highly as a legal research tool, it is significant
that they consider a number of other sources to be of even greater
value. Thus, Table No. 38 indicates that law reviews rank in sixth
place behind such materials as Shepard's Citations, case digests,
annotated statutes, etc. This is rather disconcerting at first glance,
but it must be noted that all of the research tools in Table No. 3
received relatively favorable evaluations and that law reviews, in
particular, were only about 13 percentage points below the highest
ranking research tools. Furthermore, it is significant that it was the
attorneys who pulled the law reviews down into sixth place. Both
the judges and professors indicated a considerably higher regard for
the reviews. This is not an unexplainable result since one would have
expected that the busy attorney, caught up in the day-to-day routine
of his practice with its accompanying pressure, deadlines and workload, simply does not have the time to consult law reviews when
researching a problem. For him it is considerably more expedient to
refer to the local digest or a good treatise. Furthermore, it is undoubtedly true that the practitioner's library is seldom of sufficient
size to allow him to stock it with a number of good law reviews a problem less likely to confront a judge, who ordinarily has ready
access to a centrally located and government-financed law library,
or the law professor, whose domain is the law school library which
stocks nearly every review published.
'TABLE

No. 3:

RELATIVE VALUES OF RESEARCH TOOLS

This table indicates the relative values of eight legal research tools as established
by the attorneys, professors and judges who are using them.
LITTLE OR

QUITE VALUABLE
TotaI
Judges
%
% Attorneys
% Professors
%

Judges

%

No

VALUE

Attorneys Professors Total*

%

%

%

2.9
9.9
15.3
13.5
33.9

13.3
10.7
12.4
16.3
18.2

Shepard's Citations
Digests
Annotated Statutes
Treatises
A. L. R.

83.1
62.0
64.9
41.5
80.2

50.8
90.0
78.3
85.7
63.3

84.4
68.8
62.8
65.9
37.8

72.7
69.9
68.8
63.2
62.4

5.0
14.3
11.5
28.3
5.7

31.6
7.4
10.7
4.9
19.1

Law Reviews

62.7

38.3

78.6

59.1

16.7

40.8

5.7

21.6

Encyclopedias
Loose-Leaf Services

64.1
29.1

67.4
57.4

30.9
59.1

55.8
47.2

16.0
21.1

14.9
20.0

45.5
9.6

24.0
17.4

*This column represents the cumulative response of all members of the profession
surveyed.
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Thus, we conclude that for most research purposes, the law
review is of the most value to the professor and of least value to the
attorney. However, this is quite probably due, not to the inherent
quality of the review, but to the accessibility of the review to the
researcher. People who can conveniently use it usually find it a
valuable aid; those who are pressed for time and are not able to
maintain a large private library simply are not able to put it to its
best advantage.
Perhaps this says something to law review editors about ways
to make their publications valuable to the greatest number of people.
Since it is apparent that professors already find the law review to be
of considerable value, the emphasis should be on ways in which the
practitioner can reap more benefits from it. The first suggestion which
comes to mind is that a good index is absolutely essential. Certainly
every law review has a large contingent of subscribers who are practicing law locally and who subscribe to that particular review only
(or perhaps to one or two others at most). Whether these persons
are motivated by the fact that the review is published locally, and
therefore treats local legal matters, or by some other factor, the fact
remains that the review can be a good reference work on their library
shelf only if they can get into it easily. A carefully organized, detailed
index appearing at least once each year is the key here, and a cumulative index should be provided at least every ten years. If this
service is provided, the attorney practicing in a rural community many
miles from the metropolitan law library can subscribe to his local
school's review and actually use it conveniently in his research.
When the law reviews fail to index their volumes, or when they
provide only haphazard substitutes where quality is needed, they do
a great disservice to those of their subscribers who do not have access
to the large law library carrying the Index to Legal Periodicals. It is
probable that this is one of the primary reasons for the attorneys'
indication that the law review was less valuable to them than any
other research tool listed in Table No. 3. Until he can consult the
law reviews on his shelf as easily as he can a digest, he will continue
to rely on the latter.
D. Conclusion
Certainly, all of the information presented thus far points in
one direction: as a research tool, the law review is currently most
valuable to the professors, somewhat less valuable to the judges. and
least valuable to the practicing attorneys. Measured against a number
of other research aids, the review holds its own reasonably well,
although once again the practitioners expressed their misgivings.
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Measured against each other, the various reviews distribute themselves over a relatively broad continuum, with the best among them
finding favor with the profession, while others were categorized
as being only slightly better than nothing. We must now attempt to
determine what distinguishes the good from the bad.
III.

CONTENT OF THE

REVIEW

A. Substantive Emphasis

It is undoubtedly true that few, if any, student editorial boards
consciously plan in advance for the number of pages to be devoted
to various legal subjects. It simply is not possible to determine the
perfect ratio of constitutional law articles to family law articles, or
the number of pages which should be devoted to wills and trusts as
opposed to contracts or torts. Instead, most law review editors solicit
articles from many authors, consciously making requests from persons
in a wide variety of legal fields, but ultimately accepting articles in
almost any area, provided they are well-written and timely. If a
disproportionate number of excellent articles dealing with labor law
are received for a particular issue, it would be surprising to find a
law review which would decide to publish only one of these in order
to leave room for a mediocre article on taxation merely to maintain
a "balance" of subject matter. In other words, most editorial boards
look first at the quality of the articles received, and secondly at the
relative merits of the substantive areas treated.
Furthermore, although most editors would say that they attempt
to avoid publishing an excessive number of articles on any given
subject, they probably would have some difficulty in setting forth
what they believe to be the ideal distribution of subject matter in
their publication. Except for those very few law reviews which have
chosen to specialize, the relative desirability of the various subject
areas is probably seldom considered.
Nevertheless, it is very interesting, and somewhat surprising,
to note the amazing similarity among the various classes of law
reviews in the distribution of subject matter. For example, with only
a few exceptions, they all seem to devote the most space to articles
on constitutional law, less space to property articles, still less to
criminal law, a very insignificant amount of space to wills and trusts,
and little or no treatment of insurance or creditor's rights. Now, it
certainly comes as no shock to learn that constitutional law is more
popular than insurance, but the real phenomenon here is this almost
identical distribution of emphasis in all of the reviews. This seems
to reinforce the theory that all of the reviews simply publish what is
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available, and there are a lot more authors doing things in the areas
of constitutional law and property matters than in insurance law,
for instance. Table No. 49 illustrates this similarity between the
different classes of law reviews in the twenty areas receiving the
most attention.
The general picture of consistent emphasis is dotted intermittently with some interesting variances from the main theme. For instance, it was found that the lower classes of reviews were devoting
substantially more articles to tort law than were the higher classes.
In fact, Table No. 4 reveals that with each increase in the classification of the reviews, there is an accompanying decline in the treatment of tort law. Definite trends also appear with regard to articles
in labor law, business associations and antitrust. In these latter areas,
the emphasis increases correspondingly with the classifications of the
reviews. Thus, the Class A reviews are doing the greatest number of
articles on these subjects, while the Class D reviews are publishing
a significantly fewer number of these kinds of articles. Obviously,
business and commercial law plays a much bigger role in the upper
classes of law reviews than in their counterparts in Classes C and D.
Of course, the mere fact that these trends exist is of little import
unless they have real meaning. If we were to conclude that the better
reviews had risen to their positions in the legal community because
of this increased emphasis on business and commercial law, we
would have indeed uncovered a startling bit of information which
9 TABLE No. 4:

SUBSTANTIVE EMPHASIS

This table lists the twenty substantive areas of the law which are appearing
most often in the law reviews, and indicates the percentage
of articles devoted to each area.
LSAT CIASSIFICATIONS
Class A

1. Constitutional Law
2. Property
3. Courts& Procedure
4. Torts
5. Taxation
6. Labor Law
7. Criminal Law
8. Contracts
9. International Law
10. Evidence
11. Business Associations
12. Attorneys
13. Family Law
14. Antitrust
15. Conflicts
16. Patents
17. Wills & Trusts
18. Administrative Law
19. Insurance
20. Creditor's Rights
Totals

%
9.8
7.3
9.2
3.8
6.9
8.5
4.6
3.8
3.8
3.3
4.9
2.5
1.9
4.9
1.9
2.9
1.1
2.8
.5
1.2
85.6

Class B

%
11.9
8.6
7.6
6.9
8.6
7.3
7.7
3.1
4.4
2.5
4.2
2.2
2.7
2.2
.8
2.3
2.2
2.2
1.7
.6
89.7

Class C Class D Class E Average

%
12.1
9.3
6.8
7.5
5.8
4.6
5.8
3.6
3.6
5.5
3.7
4.3
5.1
1.3
1.4
2.3
2.2
.8
1.9
1.6
89.2

%
11.9
8.3
7.7
8.4
4.4
2.9
5.6
5.5
4.0
3.9
2.4
4.0
3.6
1.3
5.3
1.1
2.8
1.4
1.4
.9
86.8

%
10.8
9.9
7.1
7.4
3.4
4.3
5.7
4.3
3.7
5.1
2.8
2.5
1.7
.3
1.7
1.4
1.7
1.1
2.0
.8
77.7

%
8.8
8.2
7.8
6.5
6.3
6.0
5.9
4.0
3.9
3.8
3.8
3.1
3.1
2.4
2.2
2.2
1.9
1.8
1.4
1.0
84.1
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law review editors would seize upon immediately. However, the unfortunate truth would seem to be that success does not really hinge
on the amount of space devoted to commercial and business articles.
Nor would a de-emphasis on tort law be likely to have any noticeable
effect on the reputation or status of a law review. The road to success
is not so easily found.
On the other hand, this is not to say that the trends are of no
value at all for our purposes. If law review editors are to make
intelligent decisions when charting the future of their publications,
it is axiomatic that they should ground their decisions on as many
relevant facts as they can gather, and that is exactly what we have
attempted to do here-present some relevant facts to be digested
and used in helping to paint a more vivid picture of the law review
and its purpose. Admittedly, editorial decisions relating to law
review content should not be governed by mere attempts at mimicking the substantive content of Harvard, Yale, Columbia or any
other Class A reviews. This course of action has already given us
far too many law reviews whose editors are so busy imitating the
ivy league that they have forgotten to give any serious thought to
what would be best for them in their own particular situation. But,
neither does it seem very wise to disregard some of the trends indicated in Table No. 4. Here the editor can see what his review should
do to get in step with the better reviews if it desires to do so. Likewise, he can see how to be a non-conformist if he believes that nonconformity holds the key to success. Only if he knows what is being
done can he make an intelligent decision about what needs to be
done.
A closer look at what is being done is now in order. We have
already noticed the general similarity of approach among the various
classes of reviews and the trends in the areas of torts, labor law,
antitrust, and business associations. In addition to these we can
find some noticeable divergent emphasis in other areas. The two
upper classes tend to publish more articles on administrative law

than do Classes C and D, but the latter give broader coverage to
conflicts, family law, and evidence.
Of all the areas where there are observable trends of one kind
or another, which ones concern areas of the law that are relatively
new and rapidly advancing? Obviously, it is the fields of labor law,
antitrust and administrative law. Fifty years ago there was hardly
any law at all in these areas. In fact, these fields, as we know them
now, were virtually non-existent. Unlike some of the long-established
fields, such as torts, domestic relations, conflicts, and evidence, the
most significant legislation and decisions governing these areas are
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of relatively recent origin. Admittedly, tort law and conflicts have
undergone some degree of refinement and development since the
turn of the century, but substantially less than these new fields which
have virtually risen from nowhere overnight.
The really significant developments in these areas are happening
right now. This is where the current law is being made, and this is
precisely where the better law reviews have outshown their less
illustrious brethren! In all three of these areas the Class A and Class
B reviews are providing much broader coverage. It is in the old and
well-established areas of torts, domestic relations, conflicts, and
evidence that the Class C and Class D reviews have become slightly
bogged down. The really important thing to remember is not that
there is anything magic about concentrating on labor law instead of
tort law, but rather that the most successful and influential reviews
have recognized the need for treating the emerging areas of the
law. Thus, the law review must face the fact which confronts all
institutions in our civilization today - he who remains stagnant in
the face of inevitable change will surely be forgotten. To be sure,
the point has been dramatized somewhat, but the point is sound
nevertheless.
Legal literature should reflect the current state of the law.
Rehashing the basic tenets of the common law must yield, even if
ever so slightly at first, to increased discussion of some of the frontier
areas of the law. The sooner law review editors come to recognize
this fact, the sooner they will be able to upgrade their publications.
B. Types of Articles
Regardless of the substantive areas which are ultimately treated
in a particular law review, the editors should give some thought to
the relative merits of the different types of articles which can be
used as the vehicle for conveying ideas. In addition to book reviews,
which will be considered later, there seem to be eight basic approaches
which an author may take. It is often difficult, if not impossible, to
determine which of these eight pigeonholes best characterizes a
particular piece, but for purposes of this survey we nevertheless did
so whenever reasonably possible. In order that the reader may better
understand the meaning implicit in these eight labels, a brief discussion of each is in order.
1. Traditional Case Comment
The case comment or case note has traditionally appeared in
the law review as a very brief synopsis of a recent case, considered
by the editors to be of some significance. The usual format includes
a statement of the facts, the court's holding, and the rule for which
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the case stands. Although the author (nearly always a student) may
venture a few remarks about the wisdom of the decision or the logic
of the court's rationale, very little is offered in terms of creative
thought. The obvious and primary purpose is to report to the reader
an important case which has been decided.
2. Analytical Case Comment
Unlike the traditional case comment, the analytical comment is
not a report of what happened. Instead of being limited to summary
treatment of a particular case, the analytical comment often makes
only passing reference to the case while the author concentrates his
efforts on a thorough discussion of a particular issue implicit in the
case. It might be said that the emphasis is vertical rather than horizontal. The author takes his narrow issue and, without discussion of
all the related or semi-related issues, exhausts his topic.
3. Descriptive Article
The most noticeable distinguishing factor between the two types
of comments just discussed and the six types of articles to follow is
scope, and therefore, length. Although the analytical comments will
usually be somewhat longer than the traditional comment because of
the increased depth of treatment, neither of them approach the length
or breadth of most articles.
The descriptive article is analogous to textual hornbook material.
Heavily footnoted and carefully organized, it sets forth the basic
rules of law governing a particular field or portion thereof. It contains very little in the way of commentary by the author and is seldom
addressed to unsettled areas of the law where the rules have not yet
been formulated. It is a very extensive compilation of what the law
is, and thus its primary value is as a reference work.
4. Historical Article
While the descriptive article is best characterized by comparing
it to a hornbook article, the historical article finds its counterpart in
an ALR annotation. The emphasis is on tracing the history, trends
and developments in a particular area of the law. If it deals with
matters of policy or relative values of available alternatives, it does
so only in an historical perspective. It looks at precedent and provides
a background for the rule of law in a particular area.
5. Analytical Article
Included here are the articles in which the author not only sets
forth the state of the law, but also includes his commentary upon
the value of the rules. This is what has probably come to be thought
of as the traditional law review article (if there is such a thing).
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It is not so much a report as it is a well-reasoned study of unresolved
issues and possible solutions. It employs the intuitive, rather than
the empirical, approach. It may, of course, include some of the
elements of a descriptive or historical article but its uniqueness lies
in the fact that it does more - it analyzes the law instead of simply
reporting it. The approach is similar to that of the analytical case
comment, except that the scope of coverage is much broader.
6. Empirical Article
This type of article usually involves field research rather than
library research and employs statistical data, tables, and charts in the
presentation of the material. The author will often pose a problem
which he then atttempts to solve by drawing conclusions from the
collected data. Empirical articles are usually concerned with the
application or impact of the law, rather than with what the law is
or should be. Typical topics would be: the effect of Miranda on
police conduct; jury studies; studies of penal institutions; or a law
review survey.
7. How-to-Do-It Article
The name speaks for itself. The author takes what the practitioner would undoubtedly refer to as a "very practical" approach.
He may explain how to prepare a will with a revocable trust provision, how to handle a probate estate, how to cross-examine an adverse witness, or how to draw a collective bargaining agreement.
The author must be thoroughly familiar with his topic and should
have had considerable experience in doing what he is telling others
how to do.
8. Supreme Court Reviews
These are not unlike a compilation of excerpts from "Judicial
Highlights" found in the advance sheets of the West Reporter
System. Law reviews will typically summarize the important decisions by their local supreme court during the preceding year, and
thus give the reader a very cursory synopsis of how, for example, the
law of torts, evidence, or property has changed or developed in that
time. Occasionally there is a review of legislative enactments as well.
Perhaps best known in this area is Harvard's annual review of
United States Supreme Court decisions.
C. Article Distribution
Each of the various types of articles and comments has its
merits, but it could hardly be said that they are of equal value. We
were particularly interested in determining which type is most often
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selected by the review editors, and which the attorneys, judges and
professors found most valuable.
As might be expected, the analytical article is appearing most
often, although the traditional case comment is also quite popular.
In view of the fact that the analytical article is nearly always much
longer than the case comment, it is obvious that more pages are being
devoted to the analytical article than to the case comment. Again
there is an amazing consistency between the four classes of reviews.
For example, they all devote almost exactly one-third of their published pieces to the analytical approach, 1%70 or less to the how-to-doit article, and less than 2%o to empirical material.
Only a couple of discernable trends exist. First, Table No. 510
reveals that the distribution of the two types of case comments varies
among the classes of reviews. Although the traditional approach still
seems to be predominant in most cases, it is apparent that in Class A
the two types are very nearly equal. This might very well be one area
where the better reviews have recognized the value of creative writing
more quickly than have the reviews in the lower classes. The relative
merits of these two types of comments will be discussed later. 1
Secondly, there was a slightly increased tendency for the better reviews to shy away from the historical article, although none of the
reviews seem to be particularly interested in this approach.
These trends, although they do in fact exist, are considerably
less significant than the overall picture of uniformity. Law review
editors are obviously not interested in empirical research, historical
essays, or how-to-do-it articles. At least, if they are interested, they
have not been very successful in obtaining these kinds of pieces for
their publications. Before venturing an opinion on the wisdom of
this apparent non-interest, it is appropriate to consider briefly the
reactions of the attorneys, professors and judges who were asked to
evaluate these various types of articles.
"TABLE

No. 5:

ARTICLES BEING PUBLISHED

This table indicates the relative frequency of appearance of the various types of
articles and comments published in the law reviews surveyed.
LSAT CLASSIFICATIONS

Class A Class B Class C Class D Class E Average
%
%
%

Analytical Article
Traditional Comment
Analytical Comment
Descriptive Article
Historical Article
Supreme Court Review
Empirical Article
How-to-Do-It Article
II

See discussion pp. 443-44 infra.

33.6
24.3
22.5
13.1
2.4
1.2
1.6
.4

30.6
31.2
16.6
15.6
2.6
.8
.9
.5

30.4
30.7
22.6
6.6
3.6
3.3
1.6
.8

%
32.9
36.0
11.5
11.1
4.0
2.9
.3
1.0

%
50.3
17.4
18.0
6.6
1.5
1.5
3.3
.9

%
33.5
29.0
18.6
11.4
2.9
1.9
1.3
.7
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As Table No. 612 indicates, there is rather keen interest in the
analytical and historical articles, as well as in the traditional case
comment. The law review editors seem to be in agreement with the
profession as to the value of the analytical article, but they apparently
do not see eye-to-eye on the merits of the historical approach. While
most of the reviews are devoting less than 3%6 of their articles to
historical essays, most of the attorneys, judges and professors found
these articles to be very valuable. In fact, the attorneys put it in first
place. Perhaps law review editors should sit up and take notice of
the fact that there are other kinds of valuable articles in addition
to the analytical article. As mentioned earlier, this has undoubtedly
come to be the traditional law review article, but the survey would indicate that more variety is needed. Not only did the profession express
interest in the historical article, but they also let it be known that
empirical research is of considerably more value than the editors
have realized. The professors are particularly fond of this empirical
approach.
The law reviews have been derelict in the area of empirical
research. In the United States there are more than 100 law reviews
whose staffs range in size from 20 to 90 persons or more. These
are the people who are skilled in research, proficient in legal writing,
and presumably the real "scholars" at their particular schools. They
are capable of undertaking extensive studies of the law and its
institutions; they are equipped to gather the information that has
never been gathered before, to evaluate it, interpret it, and present
it to the profession. These are the people who should be shouldering
the responsibility for doing collectively what one or two authors
simply do not have the time or resources to do individually. Yet, in
1965, of more than 4100 articles published by these reviews, only 54
involved empirical research of any kind; and only 10 were staff
"TABLE No. 6: MosT DESIRABLE

ARTICLES

This table lists the eight types of articles in the order of their value as
determined by the responses of the attorneys, professors
and judges in the survey.
VALUABLE
Judges Attorneys Professors Total*

Analytical Article
Historical Article
Traditional Comment
Descriptive Article
Analytical Comment
Supreme Court Review
Empirical Article
How-to-Do-It Article

%
83.8
78.7
79.5
70.0
54.0
62.0
40.8
26.2

%
70.8
80.0
82.4
68.3
62.5
49.9
29.9
53.3

9%
96.0
84.4
74.6
60.1
71.7
61.1
74.6
15.5

%
82.9
80.7
79.1
66.6
61.9
57.7
46.8
32.2

LITTLE OR No VALUE
Judges Attorneys Professors Total'

%
4.3
5.8
8.0
15.3
20.4
23.3
30.6
53.8

%
19.1
10.0
11.6
20.8
24.1
32.5
42.5
26.7

%

.9
8.7
21.3
36.8
15.5
33.0
12.6
64.5

%

8.3
8.0
13.0
23.3
20.2
29.1
29.4
47.8

*This column represents the cumulative response of all members of the profession
surveyed.
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projects involving the very students who have the time, ability and
resources to do this kind of work. The facts speak for themselves it is time for law review editors to realize that their responsibility
extends beyond exhaustive research and writing in their local libraries. As important as the latter may be, empirical studies have
simply been bypassed for too long.
At a minimum, every law review should undertake one empirical research project each year. Once a topic for investigation has
been selected, an appropriate number of staff members should be
assigned to gather the necessary data. When this tedious process has
been completed, it is necessary to evaluate and interpret the information compiled. Computer analysis will often prove invaluable, and
when available should be employed. Finally, of course, there is the
task of preparing an article which clearly and concisely informs the
reader of the results of the study. The work required is extensive,
but the end product is unique and valuable. It offers the reader
information usually unavailable in the law library. It is only through
these kinds of studies that the profession can be kept informed of the
impact of the law on society. It is not sufficient that we simply report
what the law is or purports to accomplish; we also have a responsibility to investigate and report on the ends being achieved by the
means employed.
D. Case Comments
The case comment is sufficiently unique to warrant special
discussion. As mentioned earlier, there are two very different approaches to preparing a comment: (1) traditional and (2) analytical.
While reference has already been made to their popularity with law
review editors and with the profession in general, the relative value
of the two approaches should be considered.
The case comment has traditionally appeared in law reviews as
a very brief report of a recent decision, its impact on the law, the
author's reactions to and conclusions from it, and little else. However,
in recent years, the tide has begun to turn away from this traditional
approach, and a number of law reviews have begun to publish what
is categorically termed the analytical case comment. As the name
implies, the emphasis is no longer on merely reporting a recent
decision - a task already being performed quite adequately by other
publications. Law review editors are slowly beginning to realize
that if they are going to justify publication of pieces dealing with
current decisions, mere regurgitation of the facts and rule of law
will no longer suffice. If there is to be any attempt at making a
positive contribution to legal journalism, there must be analytical and
creative thought; there must be in-depth treatment of an issue which
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confronted the court. The student author will not ordinarily use the
particular case as the ultimate subject of his comment, but rather as
a point of departure into a thorough discussion of the significance
and future implications of the ruling. There may be instances where
the issue addressed by the court is not the issue which the student
writer believes to be most important. In such case, he should not feel
constrained by the case itself, but should concentrate his efforts on
the issue he deems most relevant.
This is not to say that the facts of a particular case are never
worthy of discussion or that a newly pronounced rule of law should
be overlooked entirely. The point is simply that a comment is only
of real value if it does something more than this. Unless law reviews
do something in addition to reporting cases, they might just as well
publish the citation and have their readers consult the headnotes in
the advance sheets.
E. Book Reviews
The book review is distinct from all other forms of legal writing
appearing in law reviews, and thus also requires separate treatment
here. Although the style of book reviewers varies a great deal, nearly
all book reviews can be fitted into one of two broad categories which
might be labeled as (1) "editorializing," and (2) "reporting."
The "editorialized" book review is the one which in its most
frequently used format devotes only the first couple of paragraphs
to telling the reader about the book itself. From that point on, the
emphasis is on the reviewer's thoughts about, and reactions to, the
subject matter covered. Occasionally it will include one of his pet
theories that can somehow (whether legitimately or not) be tied to
the book. This type of book review allows the writer freedom of
form in legal writing. Unhampered by the requirement for footnoting, he is given a chance at imaginative writing. The editorialized
book review is refreshing reading, and the less it reviews the book the
more refreshing it seems to be.
The "reporting" book review can best be characterized by quoting from what one book reviewer stated he intended not to do:
I could write in greater detail of the size of the book, what I
believe to be admirable restraint in the editing of cases, the wise
choice of many recent cases, the possible overbalance of 'liberal'
decisions, the unlikelihood of covering all the cases in the short
time given to most tort teachers these days ... the esthetic quality
of West's comparatively new format, changes which have been made
[from an earlier edition], possible errata, the size and sufficiency
of the index, the possible value of a teacher's manual, and so on.
Other reviewers will undoubtedly comment on these and lesser
matters....
...I think the problem for most people who have attempted to judge
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this book, either publicly or privately, has been that they have done
little more than look at the table of contents.' 3
This is precisely the point. The reporting approach to reviewing a
book is usually the result of little more than a brief look at the table
of contents. This kind of book review may have a legitimate place
in a law review if kept exceptionally short (perhaps only a few paragraphs). If it helps the reader to stay informed of the significant
books being published, there is some value in such a service.
However if the purpose is to print something which is a piece
of journalism in its own right, then only the editorial approach will
suffice. The survey indicated that attorneys, judges and professors
are all interested in reading book reviews, and as Table No. 714
indicates, this is particularly true of the professors. Various reasons
are given for this interest, ranging from a simple desire to know what
books have been published to a quest for pure enjoyment. Some of
the respondents called it the most valuable part of the law review,
and others found it usually better than the book itself since it combines the book's thesis with the reviewer's analysis thereof.
IV.

SCOPE OF THE REVIEW

A. The Problems
Once the editorial board of a law review has arrived at some
conclusions about the substantive areas most deserving of treatment
and the types of articles best suited to that treatment, there remains
another basic question to be answered: what is the proper scope of
the law review in general, and of each article in particular? Should
the emphasis be on matters of national concern, or should local issues
receive the most attention? Integrally related to this question is one
still more basic: whom does the law review serve, and how does this
affect the scope of the material to be published? Ultimately, it seems,
this questioning leads the law review editors to ponder the justification for their existence: what is the purpose of the law review?
Unfortunately the first question cannot be answered intelligently
without first considering the last one.
Probert, Book Review, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 295 (1957).
No. 7: READER INTEREST IN BOOK REVIEWS

"TABLE

This table indicates the interest of the attorneys, professors and judges in
having book reviews published. The answers given were in response to the
question: "Do you read book reviews appearing in law reviews?"

Judges
Attorneys
Professors
Total*

Yes

No

No Answer

61.3
45.8
84.4
62.7

30.6
45.7
12.6
31.6

8.1
8.5
3.0
5.7

*This total represents the cumulative response of all members of the profession surveyed.
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Before attempting to delve into these very fundamental questions
concerning the purpose of the law review and the proper scope
dictated by that purpose, it is appropriate to consider some results
of the survey pertaining to these questions. We initially determined
the current scope of the law reviews. Table No. 8' indicates what
is being done in two areas: constitutional law and legislation. These
particular topics were chosen to illustrate some of the very definite
trends among the various classes of law reviews.
For example, in the area of constitutional law, the ratio of
nationally-oriented articles to locally-oriented articles is significantly
higher among the Class A and B reviews than among those in Classes
C and D. While the Class A publications publish about 34 federal
constitutional articles for every one dealing with state constitutional
law, the Class D reviews maintain a ratio of about 10-to-I in favor of
federal issues. This only verifies what one would have suspectedthe better reviews have very little time for state constitutional questions. With few exceptions, their efforts are concentrated on federal
matters. However, it is noteworthy that even the Class D reviews are
publishing ten times as many articles on federal constitutional questions as on state matters. It must be remembered that there are simply
not as many state constitutional questions confronting the courts, and
one would suspect that devoting one article out of every eleven to
state issues would probably result in coverage as good as or better
than publishing ten articles on the federal matters.
In the area of legislation, the trend is even more pronounced.
While the Class A reviews continued their emphasis on federal
issues by a ratio of more than 2-to-1, Class D has reversed its emphasis in favor of state matters by nearly the same ratio. Note, however, that all four classes are doing substantially more articles on
state legislative questions than they were on state constitutional
issues. This is undoubtedly attributable to the increased number of
"TABLE No. 8:

SCOPE OF THE REVIEWS

This table indicates the percentage of the various classes of reviews being
devoted to state and federal aspects of selected issues.
LSAT

CLASSIFICATIONS

Class A

%

Class B

%

Class C

%

Class D

%

Class E

%

Average

%

Constitutional
Questions

A. (Federal)
B. (State)

13.7
.4

15.0
.8

16.1
3.6

12.1
1.2

12.8
1.4

14.1
1.4

Legislation

A. (Federal)
B. (State)

15.9
6.7

21.7
16.8

6.6
9.6

6.6
11.5

3.7
8.3

12.6
10.8

A. (Federal)

29.6

36.7

22.7

18.7

16.5

26.7

7.1

17.6

13.2

12.7

9.7

12.2

Constitutional Questions and Legislation
Combined

B. (State)
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significant questions arising under state statutes as opposed to state
constitutions.
An even better picture of this dichotomy of emphasis is seen if
the data on constitutional law and legislation is combined. The last
two lines in Table No. 8 illustrate that emphasis on federal problems
is greater in Classes A and B than in the other classes. One might
ask at this point whether this varied emphasis is a function of the
status of the reviews. Have the Class A reviews achieved their enviable positions because they concentrated on matters of national
concern, or do they emphasize national matters because they have
achieved positions of prominence? No positive answer is available,
but a logical explanation is easily formulated.
In the first place, the law reviews at Harvard, Yale, Columbia,
Pennsylvania, etc. have been around for a long time, and they are
associated with law schools that established themselves early as
excellent institutions in the field of legal education. It is primarily
because they were the first in the field to do a good job (or any
job at all) that they initially rose to positions of leadership. Of
course, the quality of the schools and the caliber of students attending
was a significant factor. Suffice it to say that it is doubtful that the
ratio of nationally-oriented articles to locally-oriented articles played
a significant role in the early days of their development.
Whatever the initial scope of these early reviews, as the alumni
continued to scatter across the country, it must have become increasingly clear that such a growing diversity of subscribers required
publication of highly diversified material. As more and more nationally-oriented articles appeared, the national reputations of the
reviews grew. It cannot be said, then, that national emphasis was
solely a cause or effect of prominence for these law reviews; it was
obviously both. If it was a substantial cause when Harvard and Yale
were on the rise, it is probably less so today. When there were only
a few law reviews in existence, it is undoubtedly true that those who
appealed to the most people grew the fastest; but when there are
well over 100 reviews being published, merely concentrating on national issues will hardly suffice in a quest for excellence and resulting
prominence.
The decision of law review editorial boards concerning the
scope of their publications is certainly a fundamental and important
one. It would be questionable for them to reason that, since Harvard
and Columbia emphasize national issues and are extremely successful,
any other law review which seeks prominence must also emphasize national issues. The solution is not so simple.
In fact, the survey revealed some surprising, but interesting,
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indications that just the opposite may be true. For example, both the
attorneys and judges felt quite strongly that there should be increased emphasis on state law and other matters of local concern.
As Table No. 916 indicates, only the professors were reluctant to
make this recommendation, and even they were about evenly split
on the question. In all, the response was about 5 to 3 in favor of
increasing the space being devoted to matters of local interest.
Perhaps this says something to the law review editors who have fixed
their wagons to a star and are convinced that the only route to the top
is via national emphasis. It is just possible that the law reviews would
better serve the needs of the legal profession if their editors would
face the fact that there simply isn't room for 60 or 70 nationallyoriented professional journals, all trying to outdo each other in
covering exactly the same material.
This conclusion is substantiated by the fact that the attorneys,
professors and judges pointed out that, although national emphasis
and reputation, renowned authors, and demonstrated excellence motivate interest in the Harvard, Yale, Columbia and Michigan law
reviews, subscriptions to other reviews are much more likely to be
a result of the fact that (1) the review is published by a local school,
(2) the review publishes material of local interest, or (3) the subscriber is an alumnus of the school. Of these three factors, local
emphasis was said to be most important. Again the finger points
at those editors who have forgotten their local subscribers. It is
exactly at this point that these editors should face the second question
raised earlier: whom does the law review serve? Does it serve only
its subscribers, a large portion of whom usually are local practitioners? Does it serve only the researchers in the big law libraries
where all the reviews are carried and the Index to Legal Periodicals
is readily available? Does it serve only the students who participate
as members of the staff and editorial board? Obviously, the answers
to each of these questions must be in the negative. No law review
serves only one of these interests. Hopefully, they are all served in
varying degrees. It is in an attempt to determine how and to what
extent each is to be served, that the final question is raised concerning
the purpose of the review. Perhaps, then, this is an appropriate place
e TABLE No. 9:

MOST DESIRABLE SCOPE

This table indicates the response of the attorneys, professors and judges when
asked their preferences on the issue of national vs. local emphasis.

Publish More National & Regional Material
Publish More Local Material

Judges

Attorneys

Professors

Total*

36.4
54.6

20.8
63.3

34.8
32.9

30.8
51.3

*This column represents the cumulative response of all members of the profession
surveyed.
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to address the questions in reverse order so as to get back to the
initial question of the proper scope of the law review.
B. The Purpose of the Review
Certainly the primary, if not the only, reason for the existence
of so many law reviews is their alleged value as educational institutions within the law school itself. It is certainly not an economic law
of supply and demand which has fostered more than 100 of these
associations of students which are seldom able to pay more than 50%
of their total operating costs at best. The law schools are willing
to pick up the tab for the deficit because the students are believed
to be gaining so much from law review experience. Admittedly, intensive participation on a law review for two years is of tremendous
educational value, but that is not sufficient justification for the
existence of this unique and expensive institution. The law review
must serve the profession directly as well. Every issue published
should contribute something more than useless verbiage to the evergrowing volume of legal journalism. If no contribution is made, the
entire printing and mailing cost might just as well be eliminated, and
the money diverted to helping educate the less fortunate, non-review
students.
The two purposes of the law review are thus inextricably bound
together - both are necessary; neither is sufficient. There must be
educational value for the student, and there must be a positive contribution to legal journalism.
C. Deciding Whom to Serve
The law review provides a very real service to three groups of
people: (1) the student participant, (2) the subscriber, and (3) the
library researcher. The service to the student participant has just
been discussed and need not be explained further. The other two
beneficiaries receive different kinds of service from the law reviews.
The subscriber very probably relies upon the reviews he receives as
his prime source of information about current developments in the
law. Unless he has convenient access to a large law library, he must
depend upon the editors of the particular reviews to which he subscribes to separate the wheat from the chaff and give him the best
of what is new.
The library researcher might be a law student, a professor or a
metropolitan attorney. In any event, he is someone with ready access
to a major law library. The library researcher does not rely on any
particular law review to present the total picture on recent developments in the law. Instead, he relies on all of the law reviews to collectively exhaust all of the topics, cases, developments, etc. By using
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the Index to Legal Periodicals he is able to find everything that has
been written concerning 'his particular problem.
Trying to serve both the subscriber and the library researcher
puts law review editors on the horns of a dilemma. If every review
published only articles dealing with the most significant developments in the law, there would be tremendous duplication of effort
and a noticeable lack of depth in legal writing. If every review felt
compelled to explain the effects of cases like Miranda or Sheppard
or to analyze the Uniform Commercial Code, a lot of pages better
used for other topics would be lost. The library researcher would
suffer in such a situation; he would be able to find 102 articles on
the U.C.C. or Miranda, but nothing on the slightly less significant
legal problems thereby precluded from treatment. Clearly this is not
a desirable result.
But neither does the other extreme present very inviting results.
If the law reviews are published with only the library researcher in
mind, they would tend to turn out only material which was of national
interest and which had not already found its way into the Index to
Legal Periodicals from some competing law review. In this situation
the subscriber relying on the review to update the total picture for
him finds only bits and pieces of national issues, and seldom, if ever,
does he receive anything relating to the developments in the local
law. Insofar as he is paying between $5 and $10 annually for this
service, the result is hardly justifiable.
Finding both extremes to be undesirable, the law review editors
must look to the middle ground and hope to find solution in compromise. They must bring together the best of two worlds and cater
to the needs of both the local subscriber and the library researcher.
It is in this context that they must determine what the scope of their
review will be.
D. Choosingthe ProperScope
Since the proper scope of any law review is determined by the
people it serves, the editors must carefully analyze their position in
this regard. The number of subscribers in the local state is a factor to
be considered. If the only law review published in a particular state
is patronized by a substantial number of local attorneys and judges,
there can be very little doubt about the review's obligation to keep
these people informed on matters of local interest. Except for those
subscribers in the metropolitan areas having access to large law
libraries, these local attorneys and judges will undoubtedly rely upon
this local review to treat significant aspects of both state and national issues.
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Thus, when we talk about the obligation to publish material of
local interest, we do not mean to imply that the emphasis should
necessarily be on state law. Rather, the scope of the review should
be sufficiently broad to include any article which has appeal for the
local members of the legal profession, whether it be federal or state
law. The only requirement relating to publishing articles on local
state law is that the really significant developments in this area not
be allowed to slip by unnoticed. Unless the local law reviews treat
the important local issues, they will probably not be treated at all.
While there may be very few really significant developments in local
law, the fact remains that a law review should never get so caught up
in imitating Harvard that it forgets whom it serves. It will usually
be possible to provide adequate service to the local subscriber without devoting large portions of each issue to matters of local state
law; and the remaining pages can legitimately be used for material of broader scope which will not only be of interest to the local
subscriber, but will make a contribution to the composite whole of
legal journalism on which the library researcher relies as he pours
through the ILP, hoping that someone somewhere has published an
article on the exact problem he is trying to resolve.
Each law review must establish its own magic ratio of stateoriented to nationally-oriented articles. This determination will
necessarily be based on the number of local subscribers, the corresponding number of subscribers in other states, the number of other
law reviews serving these same people, and the past history of these
reviews in terms of emphasis. In most cases it would seem probable
that at least two-thirds of each issue could be devoted to nationallyoriented material; but unless another law review has assumed some
responsibility for coverage of local matters, it is questionable that
substantially less than one-third of each issue should be locally
oriented.
V. AUTHORS

AND SOLICITATION

A. The Best Authors
Another problem which seems to plague every law review
editorial board is the solicitation of articles from good authors. This
is undoubtedly due to the super-abundance of law reviews in comparison with the number of capable authors. Because not every review can always obtain good articles, but is determined to publish at
any cost, there is a resultant wealth of second-class material.
In the survey, we attempted to determine not only who was
doing the most writing for the law reviews, but also who was doing
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the best writing. As Table No. 1017 indicates, students are doing the
most, while Table No. 1118 suggests that professors are doing the best.
Let us consider each of these in turn.
In the distribution of authors, as with so much of the data
already considered, the similarity between the various classes of law
reviews is the most prominent feature. In each of the four classes,
students are writing two-thirds of the pieces being published, with
professors in second place, judges third, and attorneys fourth. However, since this ranking is based on number of articles published, and
not number of pages, there is reason to believe that the usual brevity
of student-written case comments would result in the page prize
going to the professors.
Since there were no trends among the various classes of reviews,
there is no indication that the better reviews have different preferences for particular authors. While they publish a few more articles
by professors and slightly fewer articles by attorneys than do the
other reviews, the difference is hardly significant. In order to get
some idea of the relative merits of the various authors, then, it is
necessary to consider the evaluations made of them by the profession.
Table No. 11 points out that of the four most common authors of
law review articles, the professors are preferred and considered to be
the most reliable. The attorneys, professors and judges all seemed
to agree on this point, but the opinion was especially strong among
the professors themselves. Although the attorneys were in second
place, they certainly do not owe this honor to the ratings given them
TABLE No. 10:

AuTHoRs PUBLISHING

This table indicates the percentage of articles being written by each of the
various types of authors.
LSAT

CLASSIFICATIONS

Class A Class B Class C Class D Class E Average

%

Student
Professor
Attorney
Judge
Other
TABLE No.

66.5
17.8
9.5
2.0
4.2
11:

%
67.6
13.1
11.2
1.9
6.2

%
68.6
16.9
8.8
1.5
4.2

%

%

%

68.1
14.8
11.3
2.1
3.7

63.1
18.3
13.5
.9
4.2

67.2
15.9
10.5
1.8
4.6

MosT DESIRABLE AuTHoRs

This table indicates the relative merits of the various authors according to the
responses of the attorneys, professors and judges in the survey.
Judges
Attorneys Professors
Total*
Students
Professors
Attorneys
Judges
No Answer

5.8
38.6
10.9
16.7
27.7

6.6
36.6
20.8
5.0
30.8

1.9
73.7
.0
.9
23.3

5.0
48.0
11.1
8.3
24.7

*This column represents the cumulative response of all members of the profession
surveyed.
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by the professors. In fact, not a single professor expressed a preference for attorneys as authors. It was primarily the attorneys themselves who were responsible for their being in the number two spot.
They are not unlike the professors in having a high regard for themselves as authors, however, and the judges appear to have some
tendency in this direction as well.
The message for law review editors is relatively clear: if other
things are equal and if there is an opportunity to be selective, the
professors should be the first choice as contributing authors. However, this is not to say that attorneys, judges and students are totally
unreliable authors. The ranking in Table No. 11 is a comparative
one only, and there is no indication that even the students are not
highly respected as authors. While student opinion of what the law
should be admittedly holds little sway with the legal community, the
student can nevertheless make a significant contribution. He is perfectly capable of exhaustive research and compilation of authority
which will support his propositions, and in this type of writing he is
as reliable as the professor.
B. Multiple Authors
Very few articles appearing in law reviews are written by more
than one author, but, as shown in Table No. 1211, this is definitely
being done more frequently by the better reviews, particularly those
in Class A. The relative merits of the single-author article and the
multiple-author article are difficult to determine. It is suspected that
neither is inherently better or worse than the other. And there is very
little that law review editors can do to encourage or discourage this
kind of collaboration by contributing authors. The increased number
of multiple-author articles in the better reviews is presumably not
the result of specific requests by the editors, but is due to the fact
that when authors collaborate on an article it is usually done for a
reason - namely, that the article is extensive and involves extraordinary amounts of time and effort in preparation. It is only logical that
"TABLE

No. 12:

MULTIPLE AUTHORS AND STAFF PROJECTS

This table indicates the number of articles being published which are written by
more than one author or which are projects of a substantial
portion of the law review staff.
LSAT CLASSIFICATIONS

1. Two or Three Authors

Class A

Class B

Class C

Class D

46

31

20

20

2
0
4

14

1

1
5

4
5

2
5
0

2. Staff Projects

A. Symposiums
B. Sup. Ct. Reviews
C. Other
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these super-articles would be first submitted to the better reviews in
hopes of publishing them there.
When we consider the student-written material, the number of
authors per article is a bit more significant. Multiple-authored student articles are most often staff projects - the joint efforts of
many persons, not just two or three. Although this kind of teamwork
is employed in researching and writing many types of articles, it
seems to be most popular in symposium issues and for compiling the
annual reviews of supreme court decisions discussed earlier.20 In
fact, 70% of the staff projects being published are one of these two
types (See Table No. 12).
The staff project has more to offer than most law review editors
have recognized. First, it makes sense that a group of six or seven
competent students can make a much more significant contribution
if they pool their research and writing efforts and concentrate on one
major project instead of each turning in their individual work products on less substantial topics. And, since an article by six or seven
persons will seldom, if ever, approach the combined length of their
individual articles, the editors are able to allow more students to
achieve that much sought-after goal of having published. While this
is hardly a legitimate end in and of itself, it is certainly one of the
desirable side effects of employing the staff project. Occasionally
conflicts will arise when a number of people attempt to reach agreement on how the results of their combined research should be interpreted and presented, but in most cases the benefits derived from
this interchange of ideas and from the give-and-take involved in
group effort will far outweigh any of the difficulties.
C. Solicitation
It is not enough that law review editors know who the most
reliable and desirable authors are; they must then persuade these
individuals to take the time and expend the energy necessary for the
preparation and submission of an article. This is the solicitation
problem, and a very real problem it is. There are a number of techniques employed, most of which have some merit, but none of which
seem to adequately solve the problem. Many law reviews routinely
mail hundreds of form letters every year asking professors (and
sometimes attorneys and judges as well) to contribute material to
their publication. It would seem a fair guess that 95% of these
letters go immediately into the recipient's waste basket and are not
even given 60 seconds of careful consideration. Of the remaining
5%, some produce a hurriedly-scribbled, "Thank you, but I'm already
20See discussion p. 440 supra.
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committed," and a very few result in an article actually being submitted. The value of the articles received under such circumstances
is open to question, since one must be suspect of anyone who responds to such a form letter. The better reviews, of course, can use
this technique to better advantage since even a form solicitation letter
from Harvard or Yale will probably spark some interest occasionally.
But, for the most part, this attempt at soliciting articles seems to be
a waste of time and money.
A much more intelligent variation on this same theme requires
the cooperation of the professors at the school where the review is
being published. With their help, contact can be made with other
professors (or attorneys or judges) with whom they are familiar.
Abolition of the form letter in favor of a personal letter which
opens with "Prof. Jacobs has told me that you are engaged in some
research in the area of. . ." will improve the percentage of favorable
responses considerably. Occasionally this technique will put the law
review editors in touch with some of the recognized experts in a
particular area - people who would never have considered writing
for the Podunk Law Review but for the fact that good old Bill Jacobs
is teaching at Podunk University Law School now and has asked for
a favor.
A third technique which has some merit involves establishing
contact with the directors of the various graduate legal programs and
asking their cooperation in uncovering material being written there
by participants in the program. The reactions to such requests are
varied, but the response is usually favorable.
Many other methods are also employed, but regardless of how
solicitation is handled, the time when it is done is most important.
There is no substitute for planning well in advance in order to give
authors plenty of time to write and to allow for thorough editing
and any necessary re-writing.
VI.

THE TOPICAL APPROACH, SPECIALIZATION AND SYMPOSIUMS

This is an age of specialization, and few industries, professions
or institutions have failed to conform to this new pattern of progress. In law, we find people specializing in personal injury litigation
(perhaps only as defense or plaintiff's counsel), tax, natural resources, labor law, domestic relations, etc. This tide of specialization
has not, and will not, pass by the law reviews unnoticed. As special
fields have developed, a number of editorial boards have responded
by concentrating their efforts in one or more of these areas. A law
review may specialize in one of two ways, each requiring a different
degree of exclusion of all material not related to the particular
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specialty. Only one of these can legitimately be termed "specialization" in the purest meaning of the word. This is the selection of one
topic to the total exclusion of all non-related material from every
issue of the publication. The other approach involves specializing a
particular issue of the law review, but choosing a new specialty for
each succeeding issue. This is the symposium approach.
A. The Symposium
In ancient Greece, a symposium was the discussion following a
banquet or social gathering, at which there was a free interchange of
ideas. Plato, in one of his dialogues, reported such a symposium on
the subject of ideal love. Since that time, the symposium has developed into a literary vehicle - a collection of opinions on a selected
subject having as its purpose a composite analysis of the significant
aspects of that topic.
Reference to Table No. 1321 shows that in 1965, 39 law reviews
published symposium issues, but the fact remains that 90% of the
issues being published were not symposiums. Although these
schools are putting out one or two symposiums per year, they still
concentrate their efforts on the traditional approach, which results
in issues containing unrelated articles on many different subjects.
The survey raises some serious doubts about the merits of this
traditional approach. If the profession had one sweeping recommendation to make to law review editors, it was for a substantial increase
in the number of symposiums being published. The attorneys, judges
and professors all were in agreement on this point, although the most
emphatic statement came from the professors. In view of this keen
interest in symposiums, law review editors should give serious
thought to increasing their efforts in this area.
Publishing symposium issues of a law review has advantages
and disadvantages. A symposium possesses a unity of theme not found
21 TABLE

No. 13:

LAW REVIEWS PUBLISHING SYMPOSIUMS

This table lists the various law reviews that published symposiums in 1965,
by LSAT class.
CLASS A
Calif. L. Rev.
Colum. L. Rev.
Cornell L.Q.
Harv. L. Rev.
Mich. L. Rev.
N.Y.U.L. Rev.
So. Cal. L. Rev.
U.C.L.A.L. Rev.
U. Chi. L. Rev.
U. Colo. L. Rev.

CLASS B
Albany L. Rev.
Ind. L.J.
Minn. L. Rev.
Norte Dame
Law.
Ohio St. L.J.
Sw. L.J.
Temp. L.Q.
Texas L. Rev.
U. Ill. L.F.
Vand. L. Rev.
W. Res. L. Rev.

CLASS C
CLASS D
Iowa L. Rev.
Ark. L. Rev.
N.D.L. Rev.
How. L.J.
Okla. L. Rev.
La. L. Rev.
Syracuse L. Rev. Mercer L. Rev.
Wayne L. Rev.
N.Y.L.F.
Wm. & Mary
S.C.L.Q.
L. Rev.
Tenn. L. Rev.
Tulsa L. J.

CLASS E
Baylor L. Rev.
Clev.-Mar.
L. Rev.
Mo. L. Rev.
Willamette L.J.
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in the traditional issue. As in Plato's dialogue, the opinions of the
different authors may vary, but throughout the symposium the theme
appears, like a musical refrain, to weave their ideas into a single
strand of legal inquiry. The symposium is the one issue of a law
review that can offer "scope" to legal journalism. Concentrating on
a particular area within the vast sphere of legal activity, the symposium can probe the depths of interrelated problems and provide a
compendium of inquiry and suggested resolution to issues involved.
In the more "established" areas of the law, the symposium can serve
as a valuable research tool- a synthesis of important developments
in that field.
Unfortunately, there are some very real hardships involved in
putting together a symposium issue. Each of the articles must be
related to the others, and they must all be relevant to the chosen
theme. When articles are solicited for the traditional non-symposium
issues, no particular problem results if the author takes a slightly
different approach than the editors had expected; if the article is
timely and well-done, it is still publishable. But when an article
solicited for a symposium issue turns out to be focused on a different
theme than the one agreed upon, problems arise. Similarly, while
publication of a traditional law review permits considerable flexibility in rescheduling an article from one issue to another if problems of space limitations, unexpected necessary re-writing, or other
delays arise, no such luxury is afforded the editors of symposiums.
Each article must go in the designated issue or simply not be published; there are no alternatives available. If the decision is made
to publish more symposiums, these potential problems must be compensated for in advance.
B. The Topical Approach
One solution to the dilemma posed by the need for more symposiums on the one hand and the resultant difficulties in publishing
them on the other, is to adopt a somewhat more flexible scheme the topical approach. The topical approach is different from the
symposium in degree only, not in kind. A unifying theme is still
used, but greater divergence is allowed, and occasional articles totally
unrelated to the theme are permissible. This might simply be called
the lazy man's symposium, but it would seem to be more accurately
characterized as a practical approach to the need for more specialization. It offers the advantages of the symposium (unity of theme,
scope and in-depth treatment), but its form is more free and flexible.
The editors select a topic well in advance of the scheduled publication date, and articles are solicited from persons in the selected

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 44

field. However, the potential contributors are allowed more latitude
in their choice of a specific subject relating to the general theme of
the issue. Admittedly, this looser organization will result in a slight
sacrifice in unity, but in most cases there will be sufficient interrelation between the articles so that a reader who is interested in one
will be interested in the others as well. There is no longer a problem
if one author takes a slightly different bent in his article than the
editors had expected. In most cases he will still be within the broader
theme used. Furthermore, an occasional article which is totally
unrelated to the theme of the particular issue is not taboo here as it
was in a symposium issue.
Succinctly stated, under the topical approach the editors strive
to relate each issue of their review to a particular topic, but they
clearly do not preclude themselves from publishing timely, wellwritten articles on an unrelated, but significant, subject. It is really
a matter of being realistic and leaving the back door open just in
case.
C. Specialization
Although the publication of symposium or topical issues is
specialization of a kind, a truly specialized law review is one which
devotes itself entirely to one topic. In recent years, for example,
Boston College has specialized in commercial and industrial law,
the University of Detroit in urban law, the University of Louisville
in family law, and the University of Wyoming in natural resources.
The editors at these various schools are attempting to establish their
reviews quickly, and there is good reason to believe that they will
be successful. Furthermore, it is probable that there will be even
more reviews pursuing this course in the future. Those who do so
are virtually assured of immediate interest (and subscriptions)
from members of the legal profession involved in the particular area
of specialization.
Since the rewards from this kind of complete specialization are
so obvious, perhaps this discussion should point out some of the
disadvantages, most of which are not so obvious. In the first place,
a law review which abandons its efforts to cover many different areas
of the law will certainly lose many of its previous subscribers - the
people who relied on the review to keep them apprised of legal
developments in general. Of course there is nothing inherently wrong
in a law review's relinquishing its local clientele in favor of a new
nationwide clientele of persons specializing in a particular field. But
it is not a question of inherent wrong; it is a question of achieving
optimum return from the law review. Each board of editors con-
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templating specialization must simply decide for itself what it considers to be optimum return - a question very much like those previously discussed concerning the purpose of the review and whom
it is meant to serve. If the only law review in a particular state (and
many states have only one) suddenly begins to specialize, it is doubtful that the significant developments in that state will ever receive
law review treatment unless, of course, the development has repercussions in other jurisdictions as well. This is not intended as a lament
for the state whose law review decides to specialize; it is only meant
to point out one factor to be considered when specialization is contemplated.
Another factor relevant to a decision to specialize is the effect
it will have on the student members of the law review. Will the
educational value of participation on the review be enhanced, hindered or left unchanged by this kind of innovation? Law school
curriculums have avoided specialization in the past, presumably because it was deemed necessary that the student receive a "total" legal
education. The same theory seems equally applicable to the law review insofar as it is intended to be, partially at least, an educational
institution. Even where the law schools have begun to allow students
to specialize during their senior year, a choice of specialties is provided. Participation on a specialized law review would, in fact, result
in a degree of specialized education; but not necessarily the specialty
of the student's choice. Although specializing in a student's chosen
field enhances his education, is it possible that specializing in a field
not to his liking would be detrimental?
It is because of this reluctance to discontinue service to present
subscribers and a feeling that students gain more in a broader educational setting that we tend to question the merits of completely
specializing a review. It is because we recognize the value in providing something more than issue after issue of unrelated articles
that we tend to favor it. Perhaps it is because of these countervailing
impulses that we find the topical approach so desirable. Combining
the advantages of specialization with those of diversification, the
topical approach nevertheless does not preclude serving the local
subscriber. It appears to be the most desirable alternative providing a
maximum combination of benefits to all concerned.
CONCLUSION

Whatever is to be concluded concerning the value of the law
reviews currently in operation, one fact is obvious - they are here
to stay. There is no reason to believe that any of them will be dis-
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continued, and it is indeed probable that additional legal periodicals
will be established at the few law schools where they do not already
exist. Instead of suggesting the abolition of a substantial number of
these publications, as some critics have done, it appears more realistic
to make proposals for maximizing the returns from the existing
reviews.
Of course, it would be impossible for the editors of more than
one hundred publications to coordinate their efforts in such a way
that optimum value could be achieved from their cooperative endeavors. The most that can be expected is that each editorial board
be aware of the nature of the basic problems and attempt to make
intelligent decisions in order to be assured that their publication is
performing the best service possible, not only to the student participants, but to the profession as well. Since service to the profession
has become a stated and empirically verified goal, a second basic
question is essential to editors of a law review. How can the law
review best serve the members of the profession, practitioner and
academician alike? Hopefully, the results of this survey will provide
a frame of reference for the determination of the basic policy questions which face every editorial board from time to time.
There is good reason to believe that a law review can increase
its value by concentrating on the newly emerging areas of the law.
Confronted with the ever-present solicitation problem and the resultant tendency to publish any reasonably well written article that
is available, editors will not find it easy to locate an adequate source
of material on these most desirable subjects. Yet, if the editors of a
law review are to fulfill the expectations of the legal community, this
problem must be overcome.
Directly related to the need for updating substantive content is
the desirability of innovation with regard to the types of articles
published. The empirical research article and the analytical case
comment are only two examples of approaches that have appeared
too seldom in the law reviews. Law review editors, like everyone
else, can easily fall into a rut, being contented to follow the path of
their predecessors who consistently treated the same subject matter
via the same types of articles. In an age where rapid change is the
touchstone of existence, there is no room for this apparent lack of
creativity on the part of people whose basic abilities are greater than
their work product reveals.
No question facing law review editors requires greater understanding of fundamental goals and values than that of the proper
scope of their publication. Whenever this question is answered glibly
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and without careful and prolonged consideration of its implications,
it will surely prove to be detrimental to the law review. Whenever a
decision is made to "go national" or to "go local," without first
weighing the effect such a determination will have on the ultimate
service rendered to local subscribers and non-local readers or library
researchers, the editors will have betrayed an important obligation.
A delicate balance between national and local emphasis must be
maintained in order to give the law review its proper scope. The
editors must analyze their journal's position carefully in the context
of the legal community which it serves. The proper scope of a law
review should be broad enough to cover any national issue which
might be of value to local readers, yet narrow enough so as not to
let important local issues slip by.
Second in importance only to the question of proper scope is the
issue of whether to specialize. Recognizing that the specialist is one
who limits the breadth of his endeavors and concentrates instead on
depth, editors must make a basic choice between the horizontal and
the vertical approach. The horizontal, or non-specialized approach
will often provide the greatest service to the practitioner who relies
on the local law review to keep him abreast of recent developments
in the major areas of the law. The vertical, or specialized approach
is more likely to attract a nationwide following of readers associated
with the area of specialization. Yet it may be of little value to the
local practitioner who must turn to another local review or, if there
be none, simply do without the services of a legal periodical which
treats matters affecting his day-to-day practice.
Both of these approaches render a valuable service, but each
poses serious policy problems for the law review. Serving the local
profession offers little hope for national recognition and specialization may leave the local practitioner with no service at all in many
cases. Compromise by way of devoting each issue of the law review
to a particular topic offers the most desirable solution. It enables
the reviews to deal with many areas of the law, thus painting a broad
picture for the local practitioner. At the same time, the topical approach lends itself to specialization in each topic treated, thus attracting national interest from readers who are particularly interested in
the area of concentration. The result is a law review which is of
service to an optimum clientele.
In the last analysis, the value of the law review lies in the
answers given to all of these basic policy questions. The answers no
longer need be based on intuition alone. Empirical data is available
for study and reflection. The law review editor of tomorrow will
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undoubtedly face new and different policy problems than the editor
of today, but the basic question of the value and purpose of the law
review in service to the profession will always remind him of his
responsibilities.
LOWELL

J. NOTEBOOM

TIMOTHY B. WALKER

NOTE
EXTRAJUDICIAL TRUTHFUL DISCLOSURE OF
MEDICAL CONFIDENCES: A PHYSICIAN'S

CIVIL LIABILITY
"[A] physician can, in a gossip session in the locker room at
the Country Club, tell all present that John Doe, a married man,
has contracted some loathsome disease. John Doe has no remedy."'

f] True

LI False

INTRODUCTION

answer to the question, of course, is easy if the physician told
Ta damaging
lie. But what if he told the absolute truth? The
THE

real difficulty would arise if one were asked to explain, in 25 words
or less, or in a concise appellate brief, the legal- not the moral basis for one's answer. In attempting such an explanation one would
encounter some firmly entrenched legal myths and considerable
confusion concerning the question of the physician's liability or
non-liability in a civil action.
This note examines a physician's civil liability for extrajudicial
truthful disclosure of medical confidences. Is the physician liable?
If so, under what theory of law? Is there a common law liability,
or is a statute necessary? If a statute is necessary, precisely what
type is required? What is, or should be the function of the statute?
Does it create a statutory right to a civil action, or does it serve some

lesser purpose?
The following analysis of the American cases indicates that
primarily during the last decade there has developed a coherent body
of American judicial opinions which would hold a physician
pecuniarily liable, in a civil action, for extrajudicial truthful disclosure of professional secrets or medical confidences, absent an
overriding duty to society or third parties to make such disclosure.
In order to avoid hopeless entanglement in irrelevant bodies
of law, it is necessary to limit the analysis severely. First, the scope
of the analysis is limited to extrajudicial disclosures. There is an
entirely separate body of law, mostly statutory, dealing with testiI Lipscomb,

Privileged Communicaions Staute 181, 182 (1944).

Sword and Shield, 16 Miss. L.J.
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mony by physicians during judicial proceedings. Second, the discussion is restricted to truthful disclosures. The law of libel and slander,
which concerns itself with falsehoods, is only tangentially relevant.
Third, cases on invasion of privacy by publication in newspapers,
magazines, professional journals and other media have been excluded
from consideration. The physician's duty not to disclose professional
confidences to anyone is not the sole controlling question in such
cases, and this basic issue is much too easily obscured by the other
issues inherent in invasion of privacy litigation. Fourth, the discussion
is limited to situations where a patient-physician relationship exists
between the plaintiff and defendant. Thus, a case is beyond the
scope of the analysis if the court did not consider the plaintiff to
have been a patient of the defendant physician,' or if the disclosures
were made by servants or officials of medical institutions, acting in
some administrative capacity, rather than by a person acting truly
in the capacity of a physician.' In essence, then, this note is limited
to cases in which a doctor, out of court, tells a third party the truth
about his patient.
I. THE

SPECULATIVE PERIOD:

1920

TO CIRCA 1960

Prior to 1920 no American court seems to have been confronted
with the issue of a physician's liability for extrajudicial truthful
disclosure of medical confidences. Smith v. Driscoll,4 decided in
1917, is often cited because of its eloquent dictum that a patient
has a cause of action for extrajudicial disclosure of medical confidences. However, in that case the disclosure was actually made
during a judicial proceeding. The first case in point 5 was Simonsen
v. Swenson,0 decided in 1920. The next reported decision on this
issue did not occur until Berry v. Moench7 in 1958, followed by
Clark v. Geraci8 in 1960. For the forty intervening years, the dialogue on the question of a physician's liability for extrajudicial
truthful disclosure of medical confidences was left to the legal
scholars. A sampling of the writings of these gentlemen, some of
them giants in their field, gives an illuminating insight into the atti2
3

Hammer v. Polski, 36 Misc. 2d 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Special Term, N.Y. County,
1962).
Tooley v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617 (La. Ct. App. 1963);
Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div.
970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1945).

4 94 Wash. 441, 162 P. 572 (1917).
5 Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the
Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 617 (1943).
6 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W.831 (1920).
78 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
8 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960).

1967

MEDICAL CONFIDENCES

tudes which prevailed for some forty years before all but one of the
cases in point were decided. Also, it is only reasonable to assume
that some of the thoughts and theories of the scholars influenced at
least the arguments of counsel in later litigation if not, directly, the
decisions of the courts.
Earlier skepticism regarding the ability of a patient to maintain
a successful action against his physician for disclosure of medical confidences slowly gave way to guarded and moderate optimism.
In 1943, Chafee was quite pessimistic when he said: "While the
law has been so solicitous about the doctor's duty to keep silent on
the witness-stand, it has done little to protect the patient's medical
secrets from disclosure to the world in general." 9 Nine years later,
Guttmacher and Weihofen still saw little hope for the patient's
protection under existing law: "In the main, the patient's confidences
are protected against disclosure outside the courtroom primarily by
the code of professional ethics rather than by the law.' " °
In 1953, DeWitt saw a legal basis for civil liability in the statutes which govern the licensing of physicians, where the statute
provides for revocation of the license for unprofessional conduct
such as willful betrayal of a medical confidence.11 DeWitt reasoned:
"Statutes of this type impose a positive duty upon the physician not
to voluntarily disclose the confidences of the patients; accordingly,
a breach of this duty may under certain circumstances afford redress
in a civil action .
12 However, six years later he still felt obliged
to make the over-all assessment that "[t]here are today [1959] few
medical confidences that can really be kept secret except, of course,
in a court of law where justice cries out for the facts."'" This statement was probably not intended as a reappraisal of his earlier views
concerning the significance of statutes which govern the licensing
of physicians. Professor DeWitt was writing on a statute of an entirely different type, the physician-patient privilege statute, under
which the patient can have his physician's testimony excluded during
a trial.1 4 He had earlier in the article made the point that such
statutes do not control a physician's extrajudicial behavior, 1 5 and in
9 Chafee, supra note 5, at 616.
10 M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 276 (1952).

11 DeWitt, Medical Ethics and the Law: The Conflict Between Dual Allegiances, 5 W.
RES. L. Rav. 5 (1953).

12 Id. at 21.
13 DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient, 10 W. RES. L.

REv. 488, 500 (1959).
14 For a discussion of the relevance of the two types of statutes, see the text accompanying notes 64-73 infra.
15 DeWitt, supra note 13, at 491.
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the last sentence of the article he advocates that the physician-patient
privilege during trials be abolished. 6
While Dr. Louis J. Regan's work, Doctor and Patient and the
Law, published in 1956, merely indicated a possibility of physicians
being liable for extrajudicial disclosures, 1 7 Shartel and Plant, writing
in 1959, were cautiously optimistic - from the patient's point of
view. After discussing the impact of various types of statutes, they
concluded:
As regards the liability of a physician for damages resulting
from the disclosure of information about a patient, there is not too
much direct authority. But in view of all the ways, above mentioned, in which disclosure is condemned, barred, and penalized,

we think it is almost certain that the 8 courts will recognize the
physician's liability when occasion arises.'

By 1962, Stetler and Moritz were in a position to make an assessment
on the basis of case law:
The belief that the law offers the patient no protection against
unauthorized disclosures has created confusion concerning a physician's civil liability for such disclosures. Although only a few cases
have been found which directly deal with this issue, they indicate
that a wrongful disclosure may give rise to a civil action for damages
directly caused by the violation of confidence. 19

As can be expected, however, there were those who disagreed with
the above views, 20 and it is not intended to convey the idea that there
was, in 1962, or that there is now unanimity on the question of a
physician's liability for extrajudicial truthful disclosure of medical
confidences. Quite to the contrary, one purpose of the preceding discussion has been to show that, around the beginning of this decade,
it was not at all settled law in the United States that a physician was
liable for damages arising out of a betrayal of a professional secret.
The second purpose was to point out the relative preoccupation with
statutes as a basis for liability. This trend started with the first, and
for a long time the only case in point, Simonsen v. Swenson,2 ' decided in 1920. Nebraska happened to have a statute 2 which the
court viewed as permitting the revocation of a physician's license if
he betrayed a professional secret.23 The court thought that breach
of the positive duty imposed by such a statute would give rise to a
16

Id. at 500.

17 L. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 104

18 B.
19
2

C. STETLER &

A. MoRITz, DOCTOR

AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 271

(4th ed. 1962 ).

See Baldwin, Confidentiality Between Physician and Patient, 22 MD. L. REV. 181
(1962).

21

(3d ed. 1956).

SHARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 49 (1959).

104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).

2 NEB. REV. STAT.
23 104 Neb. at 227,

ch. 71, § 148 (1943).
177 N.W. at 832.
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civil action for damages. 24 The scholars, apparently, thought this
to be a reasonable and tenable rationale upon which to predicate a
physician's liability in a civil action.2
II.

THE CASE LAW

A. History and Resume
There are only seven American cases directly in point on the
question of a physician's civil liability to his patient for extrajudicial
truthful disclosure of medical confidences. The cases are set out
below in chronological order.
1. Simonsen v. Swenson, Nebraska,

192026

The physician advised a hotel manager that the patient had a
communicable disease. The court found that under the facts the
physician was privileged to make the disclosure because of an overriding duty to society to prevent the spread of infectious disease.27
Berry v. Moench, Utah, 195828
The physician provided to another physician, a friend of the
plaintiff's bride's family, derogatory information obtained while
treating the plaintiff. The case was remanded to determine whether
the facts existed which would make the disclosure privileged because
29
of an overriding duty to a third party.
2.

3. Clark v. Geraci,New York, 196030
Upon request of the patient, the physician certified that the
patient's absences from work were due to illness. Later, and over
the objections of the patient, the physician admitted to the employer
that the patient's illness was due to alcoholism. The disclosure was
held to have been privileged because of an overriding duty to a third
party, to whom a partial disclosure had previously been made at
the request of the patient."1
4. Hague v. Williams, New Jersey, 196232
The defendant physician disclosed to life insurer that plaintiff's
deceased child had heart disease. The disclosure was held to have
24 Id.
25

See DeWitt, supra note 11, at 21.

26 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).

27 Id. at 228, 177 N.W. at 832.
8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
at 201, 331 P.2d at 820.
30 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
31 Id. at 794, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
32 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962).
2

29Id.
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been privileged, because of a supervening interest of society in disclosure after a patient's physical condition is made an element of a
claim.38
5. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Ohio, 1965"4
The physician disclosed confidential medical information to a
hospital's accident insurer. The court held Ohio's public policy to
impose a duty upon the physician to maintain professional confidences and found no overriding duty to a third party under which
such disclosure would be privileged. Judgment for plaintiff-patient.
6. Quarles v. Sutherland, Tennessee, 1965"5
The physician provided medical reports to a store against which
the patient was about to bring a personal injury action. After an
accident in the store, the plaintiff was taken to the defendant
physician, who did not inform her that he was the store's regular
physician. The court held there was no basis at law for a cause of
action against the physician under the circumstances of this case.
7. Curry v. Corn, New York, 196630
The physician revealed to the plaintiff's husband information
obtained while treating the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the
physician knew that her husband would use the information in a
pending matrimonial action. The disclosure was held to have been
privileged, on the theory that a husband has a right to information
regarding illness of his wife which might affect the marital relationship.
Of the seven cases considered, all but two, Berry v. Moench and
Hammonds v. Aetna, were won by the defendant doctors. In only
one case, Curry v. Corn, did the court not reach the basic issue of a
physician's liability for disclosing medical confidences. 7 In the
other six cases the courts felt compelled to pass on the question of a
physician's civil liability for such breach of a confidence.
In five of the six cases in which the question was reached, the
courts conceded to the patient the basic right to recover damages in
a civil action from a physician who makes an extrajudicial truthful
disclosure of a medical confidence.38 The courts found, however,
33 Id. at 336, 181 A.2d 349.
34243

F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965). See 11 VILL. REV. 662 (1966).
See 79 HARV. L. REV. 1723 (1966);

35215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965).
32 TENN. L. REv. 652 (1965).
36

35 U.S.L.W. 2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 1966).

37

Id.

38

Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793
sen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920);
328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962); Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc.
(Sup. Ct. 1960); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331

(N.D. Ohio 1965); SimonHague v. Williams, 37 N.J.
2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564
P.2d 814 (1958).
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that in three of the above cases the physicians were privileged to make
the particular disclosures because of a duty to third parties or to
society which overrode the duty to the patient to keep silent. "
Of the six courts which reached the question, only one, the court
in Quarles v. Sutherland,4" denied that the patient had any enforceable rights as to extrajudicial truthful disclosure of medical confidences. 4 And even in that case it was conceded by the court that there
might be a possibility of an action on the contract, where there is a
full contractual physician-patient relationship with compensation .42
The court seemed to think that the defendant was not contractually
bound because, as the facts appeared to the court, the plaintiffpatient did not attempt to compensate the physician.4"
In summary, five out of six American courts which have addressed themselves to the issue agree that, in the absence of a privilege based on an overriding duty to third parties or society, a physician is pecuniarily liable to his patient in a civil action for damages
arising out of an extrajudicial truthful disclosure of medical confidences.
B. The Basis for a Physician'sLiability
While the courts are generally agreed on the basic question
whether or not a physician is liable for a breach of professional
confidence, there is considerable divergence of opinion concerning
exactly what constitutes the legal foundation for a physician's civil
liability for extrajudicial truthful disclosure of medical confidences.
This subject will be discussed in three categories: (1) common law,
(2) statutes, and (3) the ethical standards of the medical profession.
1. The Myth of the Duchess of Kingston: Is There a Common
Law Basis for Liability?
Four of the seven cases under consideration either declare or
intimate that there was no liability for extrajudicial truthful disclosures under the common law.44 This notion seems to stem from
a ruling on a point of evidence made in 1776 in the House of .ords,
39 Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 228,

177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920) ; Hague v.
Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962) ; Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc.
2d 791, 794-95, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568-69 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
40 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965).
41 Id. at657, 389 S.W.2d at251.
4

Id. at 657-58, 389 S.W.2d at 252.

43 Id.

"Hammonds

v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1965);
Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 226, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920); Clark v.
Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 792, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Quarles v.
Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 657, 389 S.W.2d 249, 251 (1965).
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during the trial of the Duchess of Kingston for bigamy.45 Doctor
Caesar Hawkins was asked on the witness stand whether he knew of
any marriage between the defendant and the Earl of Bristol. Dr.
Hawkins attempted to invoke the physician-patient privilege. He
said:
I do not know how far anything that has come before me in a
confidential trust in my profession
should be disclosed, consistent
46
with my professional honour.

Lord Mansfield then made the following ruling, in which all
the other lords acquiesced:
[A] surgeon has no privilege, where it is a material question,
in a civil or criminal cause, to know whether parties were married,
or whether a child was born, to say that his introduction to the
parties was in the course of his profession, and in that way he came

to the knowledge of it. I take it for granted, that if Mr. Hawkins
understands that,4 7it is a satisfaction to him, and a clear justification
to all the world.

So far, Lord Mansfield had simply ruled that, during a trial, a
physician must answer questions even though his answers might
reveal information obtained by the physician while treating a patient.
In Quarles v. Sutherland this ruling was correctly cited for the proposition that there was no physician-patient privilege, as to testimony
during trials, under the common law. 48 Lord Mansfield, however,
did not stop there, he continued:
if a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure

he would be guilty of a breach of honour, and of great indiscretion;

but, to give that information in a court of justice, which by the law
of the land he is bound
to do, will never be imputed to him as any
49
indiscretion whatever.
Thereupon, the question was repeated, and Dr. Hawkins
answered it.50
In this second part, Lord Mansfield clearly limited his ruling
to the question of evidence during trials. If Lord Mansfield's ruling
were to be accepted as an indication of a physician's liability for
disclosing professional secrets under the common law, it would have
to be accepted as dictum to the effect that the common law recognized
the duty of the physician not to make voluntary extrajudicial disclosures of confidential information obtained in the practice of his
profession. Nevertheless, in Quarles v. Sutherland, the court deduced,
from Lord Mansfield's ruling, a common law rule to the effect that
4 Trial of the Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. State Trials 355, 573 (1776), reprinted
in Notable British Trial Series (Melville ed. 1927).
46 Id. at 572.
47 Id. at 573.

215 Tenn. at 656, 389 S.W.2d at 251.
20 How. State Trials at 573 (emphasis added).
bo Id. at 574-76.
4

49
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physicians were not liable for extrajudicial disclosures of confidential
information obtained while treating their patients. 5 The court seems
to have simply disregarded the second part of Lord Mansfield's
ruling, although it is quoted in the opinion.5 2 The court also seems
to have overlooked, in its own reasoning, the distinction between a
rule of evidence and substantive law, although it admonished the
plaintiff for attempting to base a cause of action on a rule of
evidence.53
There is no record of any case at English common law which
decided the issue of a physician's liability for disclosing professional
confidences.5 4 There are, however, two Scottish cases where the
55
courts held such actions maintainable.
In summary, while there are no cases at English common law
which either expressly allow or deny the patient a cause of action for
extrajudicial truthful disclosure of medical confidences, there is
Lord Mansfield's dictum which condemns such disclosures; and there
are two Scottish cases where the actions for such disclosures were
held to be maintainable.
2. Statutory Bases for Liability
There are two types of statutes which have had an impact upon
the physician's liability for extrajudicial disclosure of professional
confidences:
(a) Privilege statutes, which generally provide that, unless the
patient consents, a physician may not give evidence during trials
concerning information obtained while treating the patient.
(b) Licensing statutes or regulations, which define professional
standards prerequisite to obtaining and retaining a license to practice
medicine, and which classify betrayal of professional secrets as indicating unworthiness to retain a license to practice medicine.
In six of the seven cases under discussion the courts considered
the question of how a privilege statute affects the civil liability of a
physician for extrajudicial disclosure of professional confidences.
In Quarles v. Sutherland the absence of such a statute was held to
prevent a non-paying patient from maintaining an action.5" In New
Jersey, which did not have a privilege statute, the Hague v. Williams
court thought the existence or absence of a privilege statute to be
51 215 Tenn. at 657, 389 S.W.2d at 251.

2Id. at 655-56,
3

389 S.W.2d at 251.

Id. at 657, 389 S.W.2d at 252.

54 Note, ProfessionalSecrecy, 174 L.T. 187, 188 (1932).

SA.B. v. C.D., 14 Sess. Cas. 177 (Scot. 1851), discussed in DeWitt, supra note 11,
at 20, and in Note, Professional Secrecy, 174 L.T. 187 (1932); A.B. v. C.D., 7
Fraser's Rep. 5th Ser. 72 (Scot. 1904).
56 215 Tenn. at 656, 389 S.W.2d at 251.
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only an indication of the general public policy and thinking in regard
to extrajudicial disclosures of professional confidences. 57 In both
Berry v. Moench58 and Hammonds v. Aetna5" the courts held privilege statutes to be a positive expression of their states' public policy
regarding a physician's duty to maintain professional confidences,
the violation of which would provide a patient with a cause of action.
In Curry v. Corn the court admitted it was inclined to view the
privilege statute as governing merely the reception of evidence, and
not as creating a cause of action against the physician. The court did
not feel obliged, however, to take a position on the question."0
In the first American case on the question, Simonsen v. Swenson,
the court held the Nebraska privilege statute to be only a rule of
evidence and, as such, not relevant to the issue of a physician's pecuniary liability for extrajudicial disclosure of professional confidences."'
While it is clear that privilege statutes only enunciate a rule of
evidence, such statutes are, after all, a public recognition of the
special nature of the doctor-patient relationship. When, as a matter
of public policy, this relationship is so assiduously protected that a
doctor is prohibited from testifying in court concerning information
obtained during the course of treating a patient, it does not seem
inconsistent to argue that the same public policy implies further
restrictions upon the doctor's right to reveal confidences from his
patient. What may not be revealed in court should not be permitted
as the subject of casual conversation in the locker room at the
Country Club.
The impact of a licensing statute was considered by the courts
in three cases. Tennessee has a licensing statute ;62 however, the
Quarles v. Sutherland court did not rely upon this statute in its
decision."3 In Simonsen v. Swenson the court stated that the Nebraska
licensing statute imposed a positive duty upon the physician not to
disclose professional confidences, and that a breach of such duty
would give rise to a civil action for damages."4 The Hammonds v.
Aetna court held the Ohio licensing statute, like the privilege
statute, to be a positive expression of that state's public policy regarding a physician's liability.6 " In Clark v. Geraci the court viewed New
York licensing regulations as an expression of a standard upon which
37 N.J. at 333, 181 A.2d at 348.
8 Utah 2d at 196, 331 P.2d at 817.
59 243 F. Supp. at 797.
60 35 U.S.L.W. at 2011.
81 104 Neb. at 227, 177 N.W. at 832.
52 TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-618,-619 (1965).
63 215 Tenn. at 656, 389 S.W.2d at 251.
8 104 Neb. at 227, 177 N.W. at 832.
65 243 F. Supp. at 800-01.
57

88
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a patient has a right to rely, and as implying a duty of secrecy.6"
Treating licensing statutes as one of the expressions of a standard
of public policy upon which patients have a right to rely appears to
be a sound theory.
3. Medical Standards of Ethics as a Basis for Liability
In determining a physician's liability for extrajudicial disclosure
of professional confidences, three courts took into consideration the
published ethical standards of the medical profession itself. These
standards are embodied in a portion of the Oath of Hippocrates:
"Whatever in connection with my professional practice or not in
connection with it I see or hear in the life of men which ought not
to be spoken abroad I will not divulge as recommending that all such
should be kept secret." 7 The relevant portion of the Principles of
Medical Ethics (1957) of the A.M.A. states: "A physician may not
reveal the Confidences entrusted to him in the course of medical
attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the character of
patients, unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes
necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the
community."6 "
In Hammonds v. Aetna the medical profession's promulgated
standards were held to amount to an implied promise of secrecy on
the part of the doctors, which public policy demanded they obey.69
The Hague v. Williams court stated that the ethical concepts propounded by the medical profession express an "inherent legal obligation which a physician owes to his patient," 7 and viewed these
ethical concepts, by themselves, as a basis for liability. In Clark v.
Geraci the court viewed the Oath of Hippocrates as an indication or
71
expression of a standard upon which a patient has a right to rely.
There seems little to criticize in the view expressed in these three
cases that the medical profession should be bound by the ethical
standards which it so publicly expounds.
Ill.

TYPES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF MEDICAL CONFIDENCE

While comments, articles and medicolegal texts have proposed
several theories,7 2 the courts themselves have not extensively dis6 29 Misc. 2d at 792-93, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
67 Quoted at Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
6 Quoted at Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 332, 181 A.2d 345, 347 (1962).
69 243 F. Supp. at 796.
7037 N.J. at 335, 181 A.2d at 348.
71 29 Misc. 2d at 792, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
7See B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 49 (1959); 79 HARv.
L. REV. 1723 (1966) ; 11 VILL. L. REv. 662 ('1966).
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cussed the precise type of action which a patient should bring if he
has been injured by his physician's disclosure of professional confidences. The courts in Simonsen v. Swenson78 and Hague v. Williams74 simply speak of a breach of the duty to keep confidences
7
secret, and in Curry v. Corn the matter is not discussed at all. 1
Berry v. Moench is an action for libel in which the court held that
where a patient-doctor relationship is involved, truth would not
constitute a defense.7 Actions in tort or contract were suggested by
the court in Hammonds v. Aetna.77 The Quarles v. Sutherland court
conceded the possibility of an action on the contract, but only in the
case of a full contractual physician-patient relationship with compensation paid by the patient.78 In Clark v. Geraci the court thought that
7
the patient should be able to maintain an action for malpractice. 1
An action based upon an unwarranted disclosure of medical
confidences has a number of elements in common with the ordinary
malpractice suit. Such a disclosure involves a deviation from the
standard of the particular school of medicine which the physician
follows," and from the standard of physicians in good standing
within the community.8 ' The basis of the action is also a breach of a
professional duty.8 2 The usual malpractice suit, however, is based
upon a duty to exercise reasonable care as judged by standards of
skill and knowledge commonly possessed by the medical profession.
It should be apparent that questions of knowledge and skill have no
relevance to a physician's duty of secrecy and should not be raised
in an action based upon a disclosure of professional confidences.
IV.

DAMAGES

In each of the seven cases discussed the plaintiff patients were
clearly injured by their physician's disclosure of medical confidences.
There is little discussion in these cases, however, of the measure of
damages by which such injury is to be compensated. In Simonsen v.
Swenson it was held that a physician's breach of the duty of secrecy
"would give rise to a civil action for the damages naturally flowing
104 Neb. at 227, 177 N.W. at 832.
74 37 N.J. at 335-36, 181 A.2d at 348-49.
5 35 U.S.L.W. 2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 1966).
76 8 Utah 2d at 196, 331 P.2d at 816-17.
77 243 F. Supp. at 801-02.
7 215 Tenn. at 657. 389 S.W.2d at 252.
79 29 Misc. 2d at 793, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 568. Contra, Hammer v. Polski, 36 Misc. 2d
482 '(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Special Term, N.Y. County, 1962) (dictum) (disclosure during
judicial proceeding, physician-patient relationship did not exist).
80 See cases cited at 41 Am. JuL. Physicians & Surgeons § 85 n. 9 (1942).
81
See cases cited at 41 AM. Jug. Physicians & Surgeons § 82 (1942).

n 1. § 78.
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from such wrong." 88 The Hammonds v. Aetna court expressed approval of an "action for damages directly caused by the violation of
' In Berry v. Moench it was the court's opinion that "an
confidence." 84
action would lie for any injury suffered,18 5 and it was indicated that
the patient should be protected from disclosures which might be
"embarrassing and harmful to him."8' 6
It remains to be seen if any court will in the future allow an
action for breach of a medical confidence resulting in no actual injury
to the patient. There is no readily apparent reason for doing so. The
patient's rights can be adequately protected by compensating him
for any personal, social, or economic damages resulting from the
disclosure. There is no reason for the courts to assume control of the
ethical standards of the American Medical Association in cases
involving a minor deviation from accepted medical standards and no
actual injury to a patient.
V.

DEFENSES

Of the seven cases under discussion, five were won by the
defendant physicians interposing one or more of three distinct types
of defense:
(1) That there simply is no cause of action, or legal remedy,
for extrajudicial disclosure of professional confidences. This was held
to be a sufficient defense in only one case, Quarlesv. Sutherland, and
was limited to a non-paying patient.8 7 In Curry v. Corn8 the question
was not ruled upon, and the other five cases expressly reject this
defense.
(2) That the patient completely waived his rights regarding
disclosure of professional confidences when he requested the physician to make a partial disclosure of confidential information. This
defense was interposed in only one case, Clark v. Geraci, and was
held to be a good and sufficient defense against a malpractice
action.""
(3) That the physician was privileged to make the particular
disclosure because of a duty to third parties, which was greater than
the duty to the patient to remain silent. This defense was allowed in
Simonsen v. Swenson where the purpose of the communication was
8
84

104 Neb. at 227, 177 N.W. at 832.
243 F. Supp. at 802.

85 8 Utah 2d at 193, 331 P.2d at 817.

86 Id.
87 215 Tenn. at 657, 389 S.W.2d at 250.
8 35 U.S.L.W. 2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 1966).

8 29 Misc. 2d at 794, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
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to prevent the spread of contagious disease.9 0 In Clark v. Geraci the
court found a duty on the part of the physician to make a full disclosure where a partial disclosure made at the request of the patient
would result in a fraud. 9 ' Hague v. Williams recognizes an overriding duty to make a disclosure to a third party where the patient's
physical condition has become the element of a claim.9 2 The duty to
make a disclosure to a third party when the patient's physical condition is made an element of a claim is expressly rejected in Hammonds
v. Aetna."8 In Curry v. Corn the court found the physician to have a
duty to inform a husband of an illness on the part of his wife which
might affect the marital relationship.9 4 In Berry v. Moench the court
describes a physician's conditional privilege to make extrajudicial
disclosures in the following terms: "Where life, safety, well-being
or other important interest is in jeopardy, one having information
which could protect against the hazard, may have a conditional
privilege to reveal information for such purpose[s] ..... 9' Thus,
in six of the seven cases under discussion, the courts expressly recognized an overriding duty to a third party as a good and sufficient defense in an action based upon an extrajudicial disclosure of confidential information by a physician.
The defense of privilege to make a communication because of
an overriding duty to a third party is part of the more fully developed
law of slander and libel.9 6 The courts have not hesitated, however, to
apply this defense in these actions for truthful disclosures of medical
confidences where no libel or slander was involved. With respect to
the defense of privilege, a physician who tells the truth should be
entitled to, at least, the same protection as one who tells a falsehood.
CONCLUSION

It is concluded that patients now have a judicially recognized
right, and physicians have a corresponding judicially recognized
duty, under which the physician must not make extrajudicial disclosures of information obtained while treating the patient, unless
the physician is privileged to make the disclosure because of an overriding duty to society or third parties. The violation of such right,
9

104 Neb. at 226, 177 N.W. at 832.

91 29 Misc. 2d at 793, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
92

37 N.J. at 336. 181 A.2d at 349.

93 243 F. Supp. at 801.
94 35 U.S.L.W. at 2011.

958 Utah 2d at 197, 331 P.2d at 817-18.
9For full discussion in regard to the privilege of statements made by physicians, see
Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 325 (1960) (commenting on Berry v. Moench); Baldwin, supra
note 20; and DeWitt, supra note 11, at 25-27.
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and the breach of such duty, give rise to a civil action for damages.
The patient, however, may waive his rights concerning professional
secrets by requesting the physician to make a partial disclosure, if it
appears later that such partial disclosure would operate as a fraud.
The majority, and better reasoned view bases the patient's cause
of action on a violation of professional standards to which a physician has a duty to adhere, and upon which a patient is entitled to rely.
This duty on the part of the physician may be inferred either from
the public policy statements in privilege and licensing statutes or from
the professional standards of conduct promulgated by the medical
profession itself.
Rolf A. Hanning
Kirk P. Brady
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